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Developing a dynamic model of metacognitive influences on anomalous 
experiences and functional outcome in young people with and without psychosis. 
 
Summary 
Beck and Rector (2005) proposed a model of functional outcome in schizophrenia, 
suggesting the path between neurocognition and functioning is mediated by functional 
capacity and cognitive processes. These cognitive processes include defeatist 
performance beliefs, self-stigma and, most recently, metacognition, considered ‘thinking 
about thinking’. Metacognition has been proposed to work in a hierarchy between the 
object- and meta-level, outlined within Nelson and Narens (1990) model, including 
several metacognitive components: metacognitive ability, experience and efficiency, 
connected by metacognitive processes. Firstly, this thesis investigated how different 
metacognitive components may interact dynamically and predict both what people do in 
their everyday lives (functional outcome) and how people feel about their everyday lives 
(subjective recovery outcome) in First Episode Psychosis (N=62), compared to healthy 
controls (N=73). Following this, this thesis examined the role of metacognition in 
predicting functional outcome across a three-year period, in FEP (N=26). Finally, it was 
suggested that metacognition may be expanded to include the way one thinks about 
oneself through important memories, e.g. self-defining memories (SDMs). The role of 
SDMs as an additional mediator between neurocognition and functioning in psychosis 
(N=71) was investigated. 
 
Next, using only one of the metacognitive components: metacognitive efficiency, this 
thesis explored whether this component could be used to explain the presence of 
anomalous experiences. Anomalous experiences refer to a rich number of various psychic 
phenomena, including anomalous self-experiences and anomalous perceptual 
experiences, leading to anomalous delusional beliefs. Initially, this thesis developed and 
piloted two metacognitive tasks in healthy student sample (N=125). Next, these tasks 
were used to examine the relationship between anomalous experiences and metacognitive 
	 vii	
efficiency within the first two samples (N=135): FEP group (N=62) and healthy control 
(N=73). 
 
Current findings demonstrated a role for metacognitive ability in predicting both 
functional outcome and subjective outcome in FEP, cross-sectionally, and in predicting 
functional outcome across three years. Alongside this, holding specific self-defining 
memories was shown to predict functional outcome, independent of neurocognition and 
metacognition, in FEP. However, no significant association was demonstrated between 
anomalous experiences and metacognitive efficiency, instead anomalous self-experiences 
were associated with auditory perceptual biases. This thesis highlights the importance of 
enhancing metacognitive ability, alongside neurocognitive ability and SDMs, in order to 
improve functioning.  
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1. Chapter One: Introduction 
 
1.1 Psychosis  
 
1.1.1 Definition  
 
Psychosis is a serious mental health disorder and referred to a state of being out of touch 
with reality (Cooke, 2014; The National Institute of Mental Health, n.d.). Psychosis is 
characterised by positive symptoms (experiences that are in addition to normal 
experience, e.g. hearing voices), negative symptoms (dampening of normal experiences, 
e.g. loss of motivation), cognitive deficits and disorganised symptoms and an impairment 
in functioning.  
 
There are a number of psychological symptoms within psychosis, which fit into 4 broad 
categories: 
 
1.1.2 Positive symptoms  
 
Positive symptoms can include hallucinations; aberrant sensory experiences which occur 
in the absence of a stimulus. This can occur in a variety of sensory domains; hearing, 
vision, smell, touch and taste. Hallucinations most commonly occur in the auditory 
domain (Shergill, Murray, & McGuire, 1998; Waters, Allen, et al., 2012). Positive 
symptoms can also include delusional beliefs, referring to strongly held false beliefs, 
outside of the cultural norm, which persist even when presented with contradictory 
evidence. There are a number of different types of delusions: Delusions of control, 
believing that an external being is capable of controlling one’s mind; Grandiosity, 
believing one has special powers or hidden talents which gives one an inflated sense of 
power; and Persecutory delusions, believing one is being conspired against.  
 
1.1.3 Negative symptoms  
 
Negative symptoms can include blunted affect; reduced expression of emotion through 
reduced range of facial expressions and flat tone of voice; reduced feeling of pleasure in 
life; detachment from emotional events or experiences; and reduced speech. Whilst 
negative symptoms are usually grouped into one category, this factor was recently 
considered to be split into two factors: negative community symptoms (Emotional 
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withdrawal, Passive/apathetic social withdrawal, and Active social avoidance) and 
negative emotional expression symptoms (Flat affect, Poor rapport, Lack of spontaneity, 
Mannerisms and posturing, Motor retardation, and Avolition) (Liemburg et al., 2013).  
 
1.1.4 Cognitive deficits 
 
Cognitive deficits refer to difficulties in memory, attention, processing speed, executive 
functioning, and perceptual reasoning. These variables can represent one single 
neurocognitive factor (see Keefe et al. 2004; Keefe et al. 2006; Nuechterlein et al. 2011; 
Schmidt et al. 2011) which is impaired in psychosis. It has been suggested psychosis is 
initially characterised by a general cognitive deficit, which may change over the course 
of the illness (Hill, Schuepbach, Herbener, Keshavan, & Sweeney, 2004) and is 
demonstrated across FEP groups (schizophrenia, bipolar, psychotic depression) (Hill et 
al., 2009). Recently, cognitive factors were considered to be a central part of the 
experience of psychosis (Hasson-Ohayon, Goldzweig, Lavi-Rotenberg, Luther, & 
Lysaker, 2018). Meta-analysis demonstrated that cognitive deficits in psychosis have 
been considered neurodevelopmental (occurring before the onset of psychosis) not 
neurodegenerative (Bora, 2015; Bora & Murray, 2014; Zipursky, Reilly, & Murray, 
2013). 
 
1.1.5 Disorganised symptoms 
 
Disorganised symptoms can include disorganised speech and thoughts (e.g. thought 
disorder). This category has been shown to have significant overlap with cognitive 
deficits and negative symptoms (Basso, Nasrallah, Olson, & Bornstein, 1998; O’Leary et 
al., 2000), and the items referring to negative or disorganised subscales within the Positive 
And Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) (Kay & Fiszbein, 1987) have been disputed 
(Marder, Davis, & Guy, 1997), highlighting evident overlap between the concepts.  
 
1.1.6 Diagnosis 
Psychosis is an umbrella term which is central to the clinical diagnoses in schizophrenia 
spectrum disorders, outlined in the ICD-11. Additionally, affective psychosis is classified 
under affective disorders in ICD-11 under Bipolar Type I or Type II (6A60-61). 
According to DSM-5 “schizophrenia is characterized by delusions, hallucinations, 
		
3	
disorganized speech and behaviour, and other symptoms that cause social or occupational 
dysfunction. For a diagnosis, symptoms must have been present for six months and 
include at least one month of active symptoms” (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013). The DSM 5 recently increased the threshold to require the individual to exhibit at 
least two of the specified symptoms.  
 
However, there is controversy surrounding the use of diagnoses in mental health. 
Psychosis has long been noted as having a very heterogeneous course (Carpenter, 
William, Kirkpatrick, & Brian, 1988) and, therefore, classifying individuals who have 
very different experiences within the same category may not always be appropriate nor 
helpful for the individual. Mental health clinicians focus on both diagnosis and symptom 
expression; with a move towards focusing on symptom severity using a continuum 
approach. At the start of the continuum is subtle expressions of psychotic experiences 
within the general population to extreme psychotic symptoms, as demonstrated within 
acute psychosis (Cuesta, Basterra, Sanchez-Torres, & Peralta, 2009). By using this 
continuum approach, this shifts the focus to current difficulties faced by the individual. 
From this, research has triggered the interest in a “what works for whom” or “personalised 
medicine” approach.  
 
1.1.7 Prevalence  and incidence  
 
In terms of prevalence, psychosis appears in approximately 1% of the population (Frith, 
1992; Johns & van Os, 2001; RM Illness, 2012; Singleton, Lee, & Howard Meltzer, 2000) 
or 3.1 cases per 1000 (Kessler et al., 2007; Morgan et al., 2014). In terms of incidence, 
there is a 0.2-0.7% lifetime incidence rate for non-affective psychosis (Kendler, 
Gallagher, Abelson, & Kessler, 1996). Incidence estimates of psychosis are associated 
with low income; unemployment (Kessler et al., 2005); a marital status of single, 
divorced, or separated; and urban residence (Kendler et al., 1996), suggesting that 
psychosis is a complex disorder with multiple psychological, social and biological factors 
involved.  
 
However, research has recently demonstrated that psychotic experiences/symptoms may 
be more common than once thought. For example, paranoia, excessive fears about others 
which are common in psychosis (Freeman et al. 2002; World Health Organization, 1973), 
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appear to have a prevalence of 18.6% calculated from data taken from the general 
population (Freeman et al., 2011). Equally, anomalous experiences, common in psychosis 
(Mitchell et al., 2017), are demonstrated to be common within the general population 
(Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Kelleher et al., 2012), with 48% of a large sample within 
the general population reporting these experiences (Pechey & Halligan, 2012). This 
demonstrates psychosis is not a discrete illness entity (Johns & van Os, 2001), but instead 
psychotic experiences are on a spectrum, meaning low level symptoms may be common 
in the general population. However, it should be noted that whilst these psychotic 
experiences may be common within the general population (Vaughan Bell, Halligan, & 
Ellis, 2006; Kelleher et al., 2012), the frequency and intensity is increased in those with 
psychosis or those with emerging severe mental health difficulties (Brett, Johns, Peters, 
& McGuire, 2009; Reininghaus et al., 2016; Yung, Phillips, Yuen, & McGorry, 2004).  
 
1.1.8 Age of onset  
 
Typically, psychosis occurs in late adolescence, with First Episode Psychosis (FEP) 
demonstrating a mean age of onset at 23.7 years, compared to youth-onset psychosis at 
13.6 years and late-onset psychosis at 60.7 years (Kessler et al., 2007; Rajji, Ismail, & 
Mulsant, 2009). Late adolescence may be a particularly vulnerable period as the brain is 
undergoing specific changes, including the development of higher cognitive functions 
(Paus, Keshavan, & Giedd, 2008) and increased white matter volume, enabling a smooth 
flow of information throughout the brain (Paus, 2005). Psychosis has been associated 
with impairment in the connection of white matter in the brain (Wu et al., 2015), 
associated with loss of cognitive control capacity (Schaeffer et al., 2015). Later this has 
been associated with positive and negative symptoms in psychosis (Asami et al., 2014). 
Alongside biological changes, there are many environmental changes occurring within 
late adolescence, such as changing schools or moving to University, changes in 
friendships and relationships; associated with poor mental health (Currie et al., 2012; 
Green, McGinnity, Meltzer, & Ford, 2004; Sawyer et al., 2001). As both biological and 
environmental factor play a role in the development of psychosis (Paus et al., 2008), this 
gives rise to the bio-psycho-social model of psychosis; including genes, childhood/adult 
adversity, urban living, migration and other risk factors (Murray, Bhavsar, Tripoli, & 
Howes, 2017).  
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1.1.9 Prognosis or outcomes  
 
Although clinical recovery after an experience of psychosis was previously considered 
poor (May et al., 1981), recent research has demonstrated that around 50% of individuals 
with schizophrenia have favourable outcomes after long follow-up periods (Harrison, 
Hopper, Aig, et al., 2001; Harrow, Grossman, Jobe, & Herbener, 2005; Wunderink, 
Sytema, Nienhuis, & Wiersma, 2009), recently supported within First Episode Psychosis 
(FEP) samples (Henry et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 2004). For example, a 10-year follow-
up study showed 77% of those followed up showed at least one period of recovery, with 
46% as symptom free for at least two years (Morgan et al., 2018). However, for Robinson 
et al. (2004) and Edwards, Maude, McGorry, Harrigan, & Cocks (1998) only 14% and 
6.6% (respectively) met the criteria for full recovery, suggesting whilst some may 
experience recovery, during early stages of illness this recovery may be slow.   
 
Clinical recovery can be deemed as both improvement in symptomatology and 
social/occupational functioning (Andreasen et al., 2005; Harvey & Bellack, 2009). 
Liberman and Kopelowicz (2002) created operationally defined criteria for recovery from 
schizophrenia, including symptom remission, employment, independent living, and 
social support, sustained for two years.  
The service user model of recovery has recently gained interest which aims to focus on 
aspects of recovery and wellbeing that are important to the individual and their subjective 
experience. A well-established piece of research from Anthony (1993) suggested that 
recovery is “a way of living a satisfying, hopeful, and contributing life even with the 
limitations caused by illness. Recovery involves the development of new meaning and 
purpose in one’s life as one grows beyond the catastrophic effects of mental illness” (p. 
15). Recovery is considered to include building a meaningful and satisfying life, as 
defined by the person themselves (Shepherd, Boardman, & Slade, 2008). Recovery may 
be a “process of self-discovery and self-management” (Yeomans et al., 2010, p.92). 
Recovery is not easily separable from “recovering” (Liberman & Kopelwicz, 2005) as 
the process of recovery entails evolution and change and may never be a fixed state, but 
instead a personal journey, a multi-dimensional construct for an individual, rather than an 
objective status (Mancini, Hardiman, & Lawson, 2005). When there is evidence of 
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resolved symptoms and increased function, there is commonly evidence of subjectively 
experienced qualities such as hope, empowerment, and independence (Liberman & 
Kopelwicz, 2005). Therefore, both objective and subjective outcomes are important. 
1.1.10 First Episode Psychosis 
 
First episode psychosis refers to the first psychotic episode which may be disturbing and 
unusual, causing fear or confusion in the individual. As suggested above, FEP occurs 
usually in late adolescence. Early detection is key for early intervention to prevent 
deterioration of symptoms and function and increase likelihood of good recovery 
outcomes (Johannessen et al., 2001). A shorter Duration of Untreated Psychosis (DUP) 
has been modestly associated with better long-term outcomes (Marshall et al., 2005). 
Studies assessing DUP in the United Kingdom demonstrate a mean DUP of 74 days 
(Reichert & Jacobs, 2018), predominately due to the targets enforced on Early 
Intervention Services (EIS). However, there are a number of barriers to prevent early 
help-seeking: fear, stigma, confusion, embarrassment, psychotic symptoms themselves. 
Hence, services have attempted to reduce delays in waiting time or treatment for those 
who do seek help (Addington, Van Mastrigt, Hutchinson, & Addington, 2002; Lincoln, 
Harrigan, & McGorry, 1998). For example, service users with FEP should be allocated 
and engaged with EIS within two weeks of the referral or offered an assessment if 
considered as having “At Risk Mental State” (ARMS). During the assessment for FEP or 
ARMS there are certain standards the EIS team must adhere to provide adequate and 
appropriate care (Early Intervention in Psychosis Network, 2016). Early Intervention 
Services (EIS) for First Episode Psychosis has a key role in preventing further disability, 
often during the “critical-period” (Birchwood, Todd, & Jackson, 1998), and is important 
for the detection of those who are at-risk and provide targeted interventions to prevent 
further difficulties (Bertolote, Mc, Shiers, & Smith, 2002; Max Marshall & Rathbone, 
2011; Mcgorry, Killackey, & Yung, 2008). 
 
1.2 Functional outcome  
 
1.2.1 Definition  
 
Functional outcome is a measurable aspect of an individual’s specific activities of daily 
living, and social and occupational functioning. Functional outcome is particularly 
important in psychosis, as studies have demonstrated that a significant number of young 
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people with psychosis have poor functioning and fail to return to work (Fowler et al., 
2009). Fowler et al. (2010) suggested “If the goal is prevention of long term social 
disability it may be worth investigating if emphasising more clearly early functional 
impairment and comorbid emotional and behavioural dysfunction should take priority in 
selecting cases for intensive intervention in prevention clinics rather than psychotic 
symptoms alone” (p.66). Even a follow-up study at 2, 5, and 11 years, demonstrated that 
there were still significant impairments in social and occupational functioning at each 
point for individuals with psychosis (Carpenter & Strauss, 1991). This highlights the 
importance of tackling and understanding poor functional outcome in young people with, 
or at clinical risk of, psychosis to prevent potential long-term disability.  
 
 
1.2.2 Occupational functioning  
 
Employment is central to the concept of recovery in Severe Mental Illness (SMI) 
(McGurk, Mueser, Derosa, & Wolfe, 2009), as finding meaningful work or roles can be 
an important part of recovery for those with severe mental health difficulties (Provencher, 
Gregg, Mead, & Mueser, 2002; Secker, Grove, Seebohm, 2001; Spaniol, Wewiorski, 
Gagne, & Anthony, 2002). However, employment is generally low in schizophrenia, First 
Episode Psychosis (FEP) and those with At-Risk Mental State (ARMS) (Cella, Edwards, 
& Wykes, 2016; Cotter et al., 2017; Marwaha & Johnson, 2004). For many, employment 
is considered a long-term goal (Secker, Grove & Seebohm, 2001) and studies have 
demonstrated that being in paid work is associated with fewer symptoms and better 
functioning in psychosis (Bell, Paul, & Robert, 1996; Eklund, Hansson, & Ahlqvist, 
2004; Marwaha & Johnson, 2004), improved quality of life in schizophrenia and physical 
functioning (Strassnig et al., 2018; Üçok, Gorwood, & Karadayi, 2012).  
 
Occupational functioning has been measured using a simple categorical variable (within 
full-time or part-time work or unemployment for a period of time) (McGurk & Meltzer, 
2000), although this does not explain much regarding the quality of this work. A study 
assessing occupational functioning in FEP measured work based on number of jobs, 
hourly pay, number of hours per week and number of weeks per job. McGurk et al. (2009) 
later measured occupational functioning in a more detailed manner by tracking paid 
employment on a weekly basis through combination of interviews with consumers and 
staff. Employment quality can be measured using scales such as the Work Behavior 
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Inventory (Bryson, Lysaker & Zito, 1997) which involves observation and rating of the 
individual’s behaviour at work on areas including: social skills, cooperativeness, work 
habits, work quality and personal presentation. This has been reliably used in a 
schizophrenia sample (Lysaker, Dimaggio, et al., 2010).  
 
1.2.3 Social functioning  
 
Social functioning refers to several functional areas such as school/work, leisure activity, 
living skills, forming peer relationships (Bourdeau, Masse, & Lecomte, 2012). Social 
functioning is considered poor in schizophrenia (Häfner, Nowotny, Löffler, an der 
Heiden, & Maurer, 1995), First Episode Psychosis (Grant, Addington, Addington, & 
Konnert, 2001) and ARMS (Chudleigh et al., 2011), suggesting social functioning 
impairments precede the onset of full-threshold psychosis (Grant et al., 2001). The 
quantity and quality of reported social networks is significantly reduced (Macdonald, 
Hayes, & Baglioni, 2000) and social relationships tend to be more negative (Mackrell & 
Lavender, 2004).  
 
Alike to daily functioning, Bourdeau, Mass and Lecomte (2012) measured social 
functioning using the Client’s Assessment of Strengths, Interests, and Goals (CASIG), 
including social: friends and leisure, then vocational: money management, food 
preparation, health management, transportation, personal hygiene and care for personal 
possessions. However, this measure encompasses a range of functional activities rather 
than social activities per se. Instead, social functioning has been measured using more 
detailed measures that better capture social functioning deficits. The Maryland 
assessment of social competence (MASC) measures an individual’s ability to solve 
common problems in an interpersonal context (Bellack, Sayers, Mueser, & Bennett, 
1994). This involves role play scenarios involving social interactions and the individual 
must maintain focus and achieve the goal of the scenario. Bellack et al. (1994) and 
Hawkins, Sofronoff and Sheffield (2009) also used the Social problem solving 
assessment battery (Sayers et al., 1993) which assesses the ability of individuals to 
discriminate between effective and ineffective social problem-solving behaviour.  
 
In order to increase ecological validity, Patterson, Goldman, McKibbin, Hughs and Jeste 
(2001) used the social skills performance assessment, specifically for measuring social 
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skills directly for individuals with diagnosis of schizophrenia. This involves the 
participant initiating and maintaining a conversation for 3 minutes e.g. greeting a 
neighbour or calling a landlord to request a repair for a leak. They are then scored on 
fluency, clarity, focus, negotiation ability, persistence and social appropriateness during 
the interaction. This enables the individual to demonstrate appropriate real-life skills for 
social functioning.  
 
1.2.4 Functional capacity  
 
Functional capacity or direct performance on everyday skills task, is shown to be poor in 
psychosis (Patterson et al., 2001). This can be measured using specific level of 
functioning measures; assessing variety of aspects such as personal care, interpersonal 
skills, community activities and work skills (Bowie et al., 2008; Mausbach, Moore, 
Bowie, Cardenas, & Patterson, 2009). Functional capacity is significantly impaired in 
schizophrenia and FEP (Bowie, Reichenberg, Patterson, Heaton, & Harvey, 2006; 
Vesterager et al., 2012) and has been consistently associated with difficulties in 
community/real-world functioning (Bowie et al., 2006; Green, Kern, Braff, & Mintz, 
2000; Mausbach et al., 2010; Vesterager et al., 2012). 
 
Direct Assessment of Functional Status Scale was developed by Loewenstein et al. (1989) 
for Alzheimer’s disease and related disorders; reliably used within schizophrenia 
(Gladsjo et al., 2004; Patterson et al., 2002). This assesses functioning in several areas, 
including, time orientation, communication, transportation and grooming. This direct 
behavioural assessment is considered less likely to be prone to biases, inherent to 
subjective ratings and therefore provide a superior method for assessment conducted 
longitudinally (Loewenstein et al., 1989). 
 
UCSD Performance-Based Skills Assessment (UPSA) has been used to measure 
functional capacity in adults with severe mental health difficulties (Patterson et al., 2001). 
This measure assesses participants’ performance in 5 domains: household chores, 
communication, finance, transportation, and planning recreational activities. This 
measure correlated with other functional capacity measures and has been used reliably in 
various studies (Leifker, Bowie, & Harvey, 2009; Mausbach et al., 2009), including with 
FEP (Davies, Fowler, & Greenwood, 2017). A brief version has been created which only 
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assesses communication and finance: UPDA-B (Mausbach, Harvey, Goldman, Jeste, & 
Patterson, 2007).   
 
The Test of Adaptive Behaviour in Schizophrenia (TABS) (Velligan et al., 2007) assesses 
functional capacity in assessing the initiation of tasks in the real world and ability to 
identify problems that occur during the course of functional activities. For example, 
clothes closet; selecting appropriate clothes for various circumstances, or shopping skills; 
using a map to get to the store, shop for items with pictures of aisles, and identifying when 
they had not received the correct change. This incorporates motivation which may be 
more related to subjective functioning. Whilst performance-based measures appear to 
have the most evidence for predicting concurrent self-maintenance abilities (Mausbach 
et al., 2009), a criticism for the role-play type assessment is that they are conducted within 
an artificial setting and other issues such as medication side-effects, physical disability, 
and symptoms may play a role.  
 
1.2.5 Community functioning 
 
Community functioning involves identifying the structured activities an individual is 
currently involved within, rather than the observing whether they have the functional 
capacity skills to perform the different activities. This can include occupational 
functioning, social functioning, independent living, and sports/leisure activities, the most 
varied category of outcomes (Green et al., 2000). Community functioning has been 
demonstrated as impaired in schizophrenia (Velligan, Bow-Thomas, Mahurin, Miller, & 
Halgunseth, 2000) and First Episode Psychosis (Malla & Payne, 2005). 
 
Community functioning has been measured using a supermarket shopping task (Hamera 
& Brown, 2000), which involves an individual selecting appropriate and cost-effective 
items within a real-world shopping environment. Greenwood, Landau and Wykes (2005) 
demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia were significantly impaired on the task 
compared to healthy controls. This overcomes the criticism of functional capacity tasks 
which are conducted within artificial settings. Greenwood et al. (2016) recently used a 
virtual reality version of the shopping task, in which significant correlations were found 
between virtual reality and real-life function measures of function (accuracy and 
efficiency). It was suggested that a virtual reality functional shopping measure may 
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enhance predictions of real life performance over and above existing cognitive test 
procedures and may be more time-efficient. This supported virtual reality as a viable 
alternative to direct assessment of real life function.  
 
1.2.6 Global functioning  
 
Other more traditional community functioning measures use interviews or self-report 
type measures to assess functioning, which can be corroborated by caregivers’ or staff 
reports. Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) is the most commonly used measure 
of functioning which is a clinician-rated measure of an individual’s overall functioning 
(Aas, 2010; Jones, Thornicroft, Coffey, & Dunn, 1995). The measure consists of 10 
ranges of functioning which describe a person’s overall psychological, social and 
occupational functioning. The Specific Level of Function Scale (Schneider & Streuening, 
1983) uses caregiver’s report on individual’s functioning on physical functioning e.g. 
vision, hearing, personal care, interpersonal relationships e.g. maintaining contacts, 
socially acceptability e.g. repetitive behaviours, swearing, participation in community 
activities, and work skills. The Role Functioning Scale (Goodman, Sewell, Cooley, & 
Leavitt, 1993; McPheeters, 1984) has been used to assess functioning in different 
domains: working: productivity; independent living: self-care, managing household, 
eating, sleeping, hygiene; extended social network relationships: neighbours, church, 
community.  
 
Community Adjustment Form (CAF) (Test et al., 1991) assesses the individual’s living 
situation, time spent in institutions, employment record, leisure time activities, social 
relationships, quality of environment, and subjective satisfaction with life. This was 
initially used for assessing long-term community care through an assertive continuous 
treatment team. However, this has only been used within individuals considered to have 
long-term severe mental health difficulties, particularly with the inclusion of an item 
assessing time spent in institutions, which may not be as informative within a FEP group. 
 
The Time-Use Survey, adapted from the UK 2000 Time Use Survey (Short, 2003, 2006), 
assesses social and occupational functioning and has been used multiple times within FEP 
(Fowler et al., 2009; Harrison, Hopper, Craig, et al., 2001). This measures the number of 
hours in structured activity per week. Previous research demonstrated that healthy control 
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participants were engaged in 63 hours of structured activity per week, compared to 
individuals with First Episode Psychosis who were only engaged in 25 hours of structured 
activity a week (Hodgekins, French, et al., 2015). Whilst individuals who experienced 
delayed recovery were only engaged in around 20 hours per week. However, 
improvements in hours spent in structured activity has been associated with recovery from 
psychosis (Fowler et al., 2009; Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015), hence this is a 
clinically significant measure. 
1.3 Subjective outcome  
 
1.3.1 Definition 
 
Functional outcome has been considered as more relevant for the “disease” model, 
focusing on symptom remission and objective level of functional recovery. However, the 
literature is not consistent in the method of recording recovery which leads to unnecessary 
variation (Silverstein & Bellack, 2008) and such functional measures can be confounded 
by symptoms (Hodgekins, French, et al., 2015).  
 
More recently, literature also considered a “recovery”-focused model, focused on service 
user perspective and subjective outcome on recovery (Silverstein & Bellack, 2008). 
Literature reviews of personal narratives demonstrate themes within personal 
recovery/subjective outcome in mental health which include social connectedness, 
meaning, hope, identity, responsibility (Andresen, Oades, & Caputi, 2003; Leamy, Bird, 
Le Boutillier, Williams, & Slade, 2011; Roberts & Boardman, 2013; Sheridan, 2017; 
Warner, 2009) and empowerment (Warner, 2010). The use of the subjective model of 
recovery has become mental health policy in a number of countries (Department of 
Health, 2011; Le Boutillier et al., 2015). Subjective recovery models identify recovery as 
both a process and an outcome (Ramon et al., 2007), which mimics the peaks and troughs 
in the recovery trajectory that can be demonstrated within First Episode Psychosis 
(Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015a), along with the historically recorded heterogeneity 
of psychosis recovery (Carpenter, William, Kirkpatrick, & Brian, 1988).  
 
Recovery is defined as a deeply personal, unique process of changing one’s attitudes, 
values, feelings, goals, skills and/or roles. It is a way of living a satisfying, hopeful and 
contributing life even with the limitations caused by illness (Anthony, 1993). “Recovery 
can imply a return to a former identity or the emergence of a new one” (p. 55) (Topor, 
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2001), with new meaning and purpose in one’s life as one grows beyond the catastrophic 
effects of mental illness (Anthony, 1993, p.15). It may be that individuals do not aim to 
return to their former identify, as this could have led to symptoms or functional 
difficulties which may have been intrinsic and habitual aspects of their existence and 
identity (Harvey & Bellack, 2009; Henriksen & Parnas, 2014). Instead, creating a new 
self, which integrates the experiences into their lives, may be more beneficial.  
 
Although research has started to move towards identifying similar definitions and themes 
in recovery across languages and countries (Oades & Slade, 2008), there is currently no 
universal definition of recovery and, at times, it can be a contested concept (Bonney & 
Stickley, 2008). Despite this, Leamy et al. (2011) demonstrated, within a review of the 
literature, that both ethnic minority and ethnic majority groups have a very similar 
concept of recovery, with only stigma and spirituality majorly differing. Recovery is 
defined by the service users as a nuanced, multifaceted concept, with many influences 
from society, mental health system, peers, family, and individual aspects (Leggatt, 2002). 
Recovery is an ongoing process which requires a change in attitudes and values (Booney 
et al., 2008). It can be associated with learning and growth. People’s experiences are fluid 
and are seen as uniquely individual journeys. Roberts and Boardman (2013) suggested 
that it is important that the individual becomes actively involved and engaged with their 
recovery process. The service user-led recovery movement has much to say about 
empowering people through re-balancing the power and authority of professionals 
(Shepherd et al., 2008).  
 
1.3.2 Measures 
 
Subjective outcome (or personal recovery) has been measured predominately using self-
report measures and the following research will highlight appropriate measures to 
determine which measure to use within this thesis. Warwick-Edinburgh Mental 
Wellbeing Scale (WMWS) covers both feelings and functioning aspects of mental 
wellbeing (Clarke et al., 2011). This focuses entirely on positive aspects of mental health, 
considered the foundation for wellbeing and effective functioning for both the individual 
and the community (WHO). Questionnaire of Process of Recovery (QPR) (Neil et al., 
2009) fits a number of the recovery models outlined above very well (Bonney & Stickley, 
2008; Leamy et al., 2011). It focuses on identity, empowerment, acceptance, insight, 
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control, responsibility, and assessing whether there has been an evident change from a 
previous identity (e.g. during the mental health crisis, for example) as suggested by the 
recovery model from (Sheridan et al., 2012). This measure is currently being used within 
the NHS services to assess subjective outcome. 
 
The Choice of outcome in CBT for psychoses (CHOICE) (Greenwood et al., 2010) 
measure is a service user-led outcome measure of psychological wellbeing, following 
CBT-p. This focuses on individual’s outcome based on their experiences and feelings, 
and does not require them to acknowledge their illness. However, due to some questions, 
this is considered most appropriate following CBT-p. The Recovering Quality of Life 
(ReQol) (Keetharuth et al., 2018) was developed to assess quality of life in individuals 
with mental health conditions. This is consistent with the themes of recovery, as reported 
by Roberts and Boardman (2013). However, ReQol is slightly more negatively worded. 
From the research on the various measures, this thesis will use the Questionnaire of 
Process of Recovery (QPR) as it appears the most appropriate measure for recovery in 
psychosis as it covers a range of different aspects of recovery which are outlined in the 
recovery measures, it is acceptable to a group of service users and is currently being used 
within NHS services; so this research may be more directly translatable or applicable to 
current services.  
 
1.3.3 Association with functional outcome  
 
Functional outcome is associated with aspects constituting quality of life (Frattali, 1998) 
and it has also been associated with subjective outcome (self-rated outcome reflecting 
sense of wellbeing and quality of life) in individuals with severe mental health difficulties 
(Malla & Payne, 2005; Provencher et al., 2002). Although these concepts do reflect 
different criteria to judge improvement and are influenced by different factors, e.g. 
diminished insight, demoralization, or altered life expectations, so the relationship 
between these can change over time (Goldberg & Harrow, 2005). There is clear interest 
in the early identification of those at risk of poor outcome (objective and subjective), to 
target interventions to reduce this disability. Assessing both objective and subjective 
function will allow a more in-depth understanding of functional recovery and the 
variables which are associated with it.  
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As literature has highlighted that poor outcome is associated with failure to return to work 
and further disability (Fowler et al., 2009), there is a large social and personal cost 
associated with psychosis (Knapp, Mangalore, & Simon, 2004). Despite significant 
advances in psychological interventions for psychosis, outcomes remain poor. Therefore, 
there is clear interest in the identification of factors which influence recovery after FEP.  
 
1.4 Factors which influence functional outcome 
 
1.4.1 Neurocognition 
 
Research assessing functional outcome within individuals with psychosis has generally 
focused on the influence of neurocognitive difficulties (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000; 
Green, Kern, & Heaton, 2004; Lepage, Bodnar, & Bowie, 2014). Domains of cognitions 
have generally been combined into one neurocognitive factor within psychosis (see Keefe 
et al., 2004; 2006; Nuechterlein et al., 2011; Schmidt et al., 2011). Reviews identifying 
which specific aspects of cognitions influence outcome in psychosis can be found 
elsewhere (see Makarewicz, Karakuła-Juchnowicz, & Łobejko, 2017). For example, 
Vesterager et al., (2012) demonstrated using a 10-month follow-up study that cognitions 
(working memory and visual learning) predicted functional outcome in FEP. Whilst 
Torgalsbøen, Mohn, Czajkowski and Rund (2015) demonstrated attention specifically 
predicting functioning after 2 years of FEP. This suggests the different influences of 
various cognitive functioning.  
 
Given the multitude of factors at play in individuals deemed as experiencing long-term 
schizophrenia, assessing a FEP group may be more valuable in terms of identifying 
changes or developments of deficits. A recent systematic review demonstrated that there 
is evidence of basic cognition impairments in individuals with ARMS (including memory 
impairments, executive functioning, processing speed, learning, attention) and there is a 
progressive cognitive decline from ARMS to the onset of First Episode Psychosis (de 
Paula, Hallak, Maia-de-Oliveira, Bressan, & Machado-de-Sousa, 2015). Studies have 
also demonstrated that ARMS individuals who later develop psychosis show greater 
cognitive deficits (Simon et al., 2012) (see Fusar-Poli et al., 2013 for a review). Although 
it is not yet clear whether it is possible to predict psychosis based on cognitive functioning 
alone (Fusar-Poli, 2014, 2017).  
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The relationship between cognition and functional outcome has been consistently 
demonstrated with cross-sectional studies (Allott, Liu, Proffitt, & Killackey, 2011; 
Carrión et al., 2013). Longitudinal studies have been able to demonstrate cognition 
predicts functional outcome within schizophrenia samples (Delbert G Robinson et al., 
2004), First Episode Psychosis samples (Milev, Ho, Arndt, & Andreasen, 2005; 
Nuechterlein et al., 2011; Stirling et al., 2003), and ultra-high risk of psychosis group (Lin 
et al., 2011). Whilst a global measure of functioning can be useful, a more detailed 
understanding may facilitate research efforts to help better target care for individuals with 
FEP. 
 
1.4.2 Functional capacity 
 
Beck and Rector (2005) and Grant and Beck (2009) proposed a model of functional 
outcome in schizophrenia, suggesting that neurocognitive deficits influence functional 
outcome via cognitions and functional capacity. Cross-sectional studies have 
demonstrated that neurocognitive ability is associated with functional capacity within 
individuals with schizophrenia (Bowie et al., 2010; Bowie et al., 2008; Green et al., 2004) 
and First Episode Psychosis, particularly working memory, social cognition and negative 
symptoms predicts functional capacity (Vesterager et al., 2012). However, studies with 
participants with schizophrenia, compared to FEP, have suggested a more generalised 
relationship between domains of cognition and functional capacity (Bowie et al., 2008; 
Evans et al., 2003). 
 
Importantly here, functional capacity can impact functional outcome in schizophrenia 
(Bowie et al., 2006), considered the most important predictor of functional outcome 
within schizophrenia (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000) and within a sample of older adults 
with schizophrenia (Leifker et al., 2009). As suggested by Beck and Rector (2005) 
functional capacity has been demonstrated to act as a mediator between neurocognition 
and functional outcome in FEP (Davies et al., 2017). This relationship has been confirmed 
longitudinally within a schizophrenia sample (Bowie et al., 2008).  
 
1.4.3 Negative symptoms 
The effects of therapies focused on improving neurocognition to increase functional 
outcome in psychosis, seem to be blocked by additional factors, e.g. negative symptoms 
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(Bowie et al. 2010). Studies have highlighted that symptoms, particularly negative 
symptoms, can predict some of the variance in functional capacity in FEP (Vesterager et 
al., 2012) and Leifker et al. (2009) suggested symptoms, particularly negative symptoms, 
may be a stronger predictor of everyday performance skills than cognitive ability in 
schizophrenia. Negative symptoms have a distinctive and independent effect on 
functional outcome relative to other symptoms (Rabinowitz et al., 2012). Importantly 
here, negative symptoms have been associated with poor function in psychosis (Bourdeau 
et al., 2012; Harvey, Koren, & Bowie, 2006; McGurk & Mueser, 2006; Milev et al., 2005) 
as well as reduced likelihood of living independently or being employed (Hofer et al., 
2005; Rosenheck et al., 2006). Alike to functional capacity, symptoms were also 
suggested to mediate the relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome in 
schizophrenia (Hjorthøj, Bak, & Td, 2016; Ventura, Hellemann, Thames, Koellner, & 
Nuechterlein, 2009). Longitudinal studies support this research by demonstrating that 
negative symptoms, but not positive symptoms, were significantly related to outcome 
measures at two-year follow-up of individuals with first episode psychosis (Ho et al., 
1998).  
 
However, Milev et al. (2005) demonstrated an overlap in the variance in outcome 
explained by cognitions and negative symptoms. Negative symptoms and cognitive 
deficits share many characteristics, e.g. prevalence, course, correlation with function 
(Harvey et al., 2006), although still remain independent and separable. In addition, 
Greenwood, Landau and Wykes (2005) demonstrated that it is the interaction between 
negative symptoms and cognitive deficits which lead to poor function. However, studies 
have still demonstrated that cognition and functional capacity play a large role in 
functional outcome, independent of symptoms in FEP (Peña et al., 2012). This highlights 
the importance of considering negative symptoms, along with cognitive deficits, in 
understanding poor functional outcome. 
 
1.5 Are neurocognition, functional capacity and negative symptoms also 
associated with subjective outcome? 
 
Studies assessing quality of life, as a measure of subjective outcome, demonstrated that 
neurocognitive ability was related to quality of life, arguably a measure of subjective 
recovery outcome, (Savilla, Kettler, & Galletly, 2008); although when symptoms were 
controlled, this relationship was no longer significant (Wegener et al., 2005). In relation 
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to negative symptoms, studies have demonstrated a negative association between quality 
of life and negative symptoms in schizophrenia (Norman et al., 2000; Savilla et al., 2008), 
particularly during stabilisation in schizophrenia (Bow-Thomas, Velligan, Miller, & 
Olsen, 1999). On the other hand, Morrison et al. (2013) recently demonstrated, using the 
Questionnaire of Process of Recovery (QPR), there was no effect of negative symptoms 
or neurocognition on subjective self-rated recovery. Instead, QPR was related to 
psychosocial factors such as self-esteem, locus of control and emotion. This suggests that 
cognitions and negative symptoms may not be related to an overall measure of subjective 
outcome, instead there is a more complex relationship with additional factors to be 
explored.  
 
 
1.5.1 Additional factors  
 
Research has shown that functional outcome is multiply determined by 
neuropsychological performance, functional capacity, and symptoms (Bowie et al., 
2006). However, even when including these factors, there is still a large amount of 
unaccounted variance between neurocognition and functional outcome (Schmidt et al., 
2011), with only 40-60% of the relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome understood (Green et al., 2004). Beck and Rector (2005) and Grant and Beck 
(2009) proposed a model of functional outcome in schizophrenia, suggesting cognitive 
factors mediate the relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome in 
schizophrenia. This has included motivation and defeatist performance beliefs (Grant & 
Beck, 2009b);  negative thoughts about one's ability to successfully perform goal-directed 
behaviour (Campellone, Sanchez, & Kring, 2016), and self-stigma (Berry & Greenwood, 
2018); awareness and agreement of a stereotype. Both of which can lead to the “why try” 
effect (Corrigan, Larson, & Rüsch, 2009) and have been shown to impact on functional 
outcome in young people with and without psychosis (Berry, 2013; Berry & Greenwood, 
2017, 2018). Recently, the focus on cognitive processes, which predict outcome, has 
moved to metacognition (Davies et al., 2017; Koren, Seidman, Goldsmith, & Harvey, 
2006).  
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1.6 Metacognition  
 
1.6.1 Definition 
 
Metacognition is defined as “thinking about thinking” (Flavell, 1979; Semerari et al., 
2003a) and the way one thinks about one’s experience. As humans, we regularly make 
decisions upon our knowledge of the outside world and the reflection of this knowledge 
is termed metacognition (Metcalfe, 1996). Nelson and Narens (1990) outlined a 
metacognitive model suggesting two levels: an object-level, including cognitive 
processes (such as perception and memory), and a meta-level, an appraisal of the object-
level (“metacognition”). These two levels must work in harmony to ensure metacognition 
can be effectively harnessed to enable cognitive processes to appropriately guide thought 
and behaviour.  
 
Metacognition ranges from sub-conscious and momentary reflection to more explicit, 
complex reflection of the self and others. The research literature suggests that 
metacognition may be fractionated and may appear in many different forms (Nelson & 
Narens, 1990; Shea et al., 2014). Three levels of metacognition have been proposed and 
will be discussed here: i) Metacognitive ability/knowledge: capacity to think about one’s 
own cognitions, emotions and behaviour, as well as others’, and to use this reflection to 
respond to challenges (Lysaker, Erickson, et al., 2010; Lysaker et al., 2011), ii) 
Metacognitive experience: appraisal of one’s experience or performance after an activity, 
and iii) Metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency1: “knowing that you know” (Sherman, 
Barrett, & Kanai, 2015), and this level, in particular, may involve unconscious knowledge 
to generate a “feeling of knowing” (Nelson, Gerler, & Narens, 1984). This level is 
assessed using within-task confidence ratings.  These metacognitive levels may influence 
each other, via metacognitive processes. Nelson and Narens (1990) highlighted two 
metacognitive processes: i) Metacognitive control process, (i.e. metacognitive ability is 
used to guide, correct and control ongoing action, e.g. by shifting attentional focus; Wells 
& Purdon, 1999), and ii) Metacognitive monitoring process (i.e. monitoring of ongoing 
																																																						
1 Metacognitive efficiency refers to the same cognitive process as metacognitive sensitivity. However, 
metacognitive efficiency is calculated by additionally taking into consideration objective performance on 
a task (e.g. a visual detection task). Within this thesis, these terms will be used interchangeably as they 
refer to the same cognitive process, despite slight differences in the calculation.  
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metacognitive experience to update higher-level metacognitive ability; Efklides, 2006). 
These are important for ensuring accurate metacognitive functioning.  
 
Whilst neurocognition (e.g. executive functioning) has been related to metacognition, 
metacognition is suggested to represent a more personal and complex understanding 
regarding oneself and others (Trauelsen et al., 2016). Metacognition has also been 
considered dissociable from cognitions (Brüne, Dimaggio, & Lysaker, 2011). This means 
that an individual can have accurate metacognitions, but may still present with poor 
cognitive ability. For example, Song et al. (2011) demonstrated that participants were 
able to accurately acknowledge when their cognitive performance was good and when it 
was poor, demonstrating metacognition is independent of the specific task and a subject 
of study in its own right (Fleming, Dolan, & Frith, 2012). Metacognition is also domain-
specific as a participant can possess appropriate metacognitive sensitivity in the 
perceptual domain but poor metacognitive sensitivity in memory domain (Fleming, Ryu, 
Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014), independent of objective performance on the tasks.  
 
1.7 Metacognitive components  
 
1.7.1 Metacognitive ability 
 
Metacognitive ability, as outlined above, is the capacity to think about one’s own 
cognitions, emotions and behaviour, as well as others’, and to use this reflection to 
respond to challenges (Lysaker et al. 2010; Lysaker, Erickson, et al. 2011).  
 
Lysaker and colleagues proposed metacognitive ability is a “meaning-making process, or 
the ability to form complex and integrated ideas about the self and others that we use to 
guide our lives” (Lysaker & Klion, 2017, p.10), which is deficit in schizophrenia. These 
views are not necessarily new as Bleuler (1911 translated in 1950) previously suggested 
schizophrenia involves a deficit in ‘associations’ or the ability to link ideas and events 
together to make sense of the world and react/interact with the world appropriately. This 
can be measured by assessing the capacity to think about cognition, the self and others, 
and use this knowledge to respond to challenges (Lysaker et al., 2011; Lysaker, 
Dimaggio, et al., 2010; Lysaker & Dimaggio, 2014). This can be captured using 
Metacognition Assessment Scale (Semerari et al., 2003a) or Metacognition Assessment 
Interview (MAI) (Lysaker et al., 2005) which aims to assess how people are able to 
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identify their own and other’s recurrent patterns of thinking, feeling and dealing with 
social problems. It has been suggested those with schizophrenia commonly experience 
deficits in metacognitive ability which play a role in functioning, cognition, distress and 
symptoms of psychosis (Lysaker et al., 2013; Lysaker et al., 2014; Lysaker, Dimaggio, et 
al., 2010; Lysaker et al., 2012) and FEP (Davies et al., 2017; Trauelsen et al., 2016). 
Lysaker and colleagues view metacognitive ability as critical for persons with Severe 
Mental Illness (e.g. psychosis) leading to the development of a new metacognitive 
therapy: Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT). 
 
1.7.2 Metacognitive experience  
 
Metacognitive experience is the appraisal of one’s experience or performance after an 
activity. This provides an assessment of “online‟ awareness, in order to assess current 
performance and identify the opportunity for additional strategies to be used to alter 
performance.   
 
Metacognitive experience can be measured by assessing awareness of abilities. For 
example, the memory awareness rating scale (MARS) (Clare, Wilson, Carter, Roth, & 
Hodges, 2002), which has been in part constituted by the Rivermead Behavioural 
Memory Test (RBMT) (Gilleen et al., 2011; Wilson, Cockburn, Baddeley, & Hiorns, 
1989). This involves asking an individual to provide two scores of their memory ability: 
i) a prediction score (before the task) and ii) post-diction score (after the task). The 
prediction score assessed knowledge of performance. However, this measure is subject 
to biases and external influences which are difficult to appropriately control, e.g. previous 
experience on a task. The post-diction measure assesses “online” awareness of 
performance and experiences; metacognitive experience. The post-diction rating can be 
compared to the actual performance on a task which provides a postdiction discrepancy 
score, and overcomes the limitations of mismatch discrepancy between self- and other-
ratings (Gilleen, Greenwood & David, 2011). Therefore, it is important to ensure the 
subjective metacognitive experience rating is compared to actual performance, as 
performance may have differed within the chosen task which can influence the 
metacognitive experience rating and score.     
 
 
		
22	
1.7.3 Metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency   
 
Metacognitive sensitivity is one’s ability to discriminate between task-related correct and 
incorrect decisions, and can be measured by confidence ratings within a task. 
Metacognitive sensitivity involves unconscious knowledge which generates a “feeling of 
knowing” or “knowing that you know” (Sherman et al., 2015). This type of metacognition 
has been shown to be modality-specific (Fleming et al., 2014).  
 
Metacognitive sensitivity can be assessed using a signal detection task, based on Signal 
Detection Theory: a means of analysing the structure of the observer’s decisions in 
psychophysical tasks and specifies the optimal/ideal detection process in a variety of 
situations (Green & Swets, 1974). A signal detection task could involve a participant 
making two forced-choice binary judgments of whether a visual stimulus (white dot) was 
present or absent (first judgment) within a noisy, moving picture, e.g. “Was the dot 
present or absent?”. Then making a second forced-choice binary judgment of confidence 
in relation to the first judgment, e.g. “Are you confident or guessing?”. This can be used 
to calculate metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’), which describes how well matched 
confidence ratings are to correct vs incorrect trials.  
 
Metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) is one’s ability to discriminate between one’s own 
correct or incorrect perceptual decision, whilst taking into account objective performance 
(Fleming & Lau, 2014). In other words, metacognitive efficiency captures the same 
cognitive process as metacognitive sensitivity, but involves an additional calculation to 
control for objective performance on the particular task (e.g. the visual detection task 
described above). The decisions are made quickly to ensure that these decisions are based 
on lower-level (implicit) feelings of ability or confidence.  
 
With regard to psychosis, metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency has been demonstrated as 
significantly impaired in First Episode Psychosis (FEP) compared to healthy matched 
control participants (Bliksted et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2018). Chapter 6 presents a 
systematic literature on the association between anomalous experiences, anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs and metacognition, including metacognitive sensitivity.  
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1.7.4 Metacognitive processes 
 
As suggested within this Nelson and Narnes (1990) model, the meta-level must accurately 
represent object-level and it does so by using two metacognitive processes: i) 
Metacognitive monitoring process and ii) Metacognitive control processes, both enable 
the individual to use their metacognition to guide thought and behaviour.  
 
Metacognitive monitoring process is involved in the using metacognitive experience to 
update metacognitive ability. This can be assessed using self-reflectivity subscale of 
Cognitive insight scale (Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, & Warman, 2004), appropriate to 
assess metacognitive monitoring in psychosis (David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012; 
Gilleen, David, & Greenwood, 2016). This measure assesses an individual’s capacity and 
willingness to observe their mental productions and to consider alternative explanations 
(Bruno, Sachs, Demily, Franck, & Pacherie, 2012). Inappropriate self-reflectivity may 
mean the individual is unable to synthesise and comprehend ideas about themselves and 
may later attribute experiences or thoughts to external forces (Chan, 2016). 
 
Metacognitive controlling process is involved in using metacognitive knowledge/ability 
to change current thinking. This can be assessed using the Trail-Making Task (Reitan, 
1958), specifically part B:A which assesses flexibility and set-shifting (Gilleen et al., 
2016). This measure assesses set-shifting which is an important skill for controlling as it 
concerns the flexibility to change current thinking from one set of thinking to another set.   
 
 
1.8 Metacognition and functional outcome 
 
In terms of relevance to psychosis, metacognitive ability is poorer in psychosis (Lysaker, 
Pattison, Leonhardt, Phelps, & Vohs, 2018; Lysaker et al., 2005), and is shown to have 
an impact on functional, social and work outcomes in psychosis (Arnon-Ribenfeld, 
Hasson-Ohayon, Lavidor, Atzil-Slonim, & Lysaker, 2017; Brüne, Dimaggio, & Lysaker, 
2011; Davies & Greenwood, 2018; Luedtke et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 2010), 
independent of cognition and symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2011, 2014). Metacognitive 
ability is shown to mediate the relationships between neurocognition, functional capacity 
and functional outcome in FEP (Davies et al. 2017). Negative symptoms have been 
associated with metacognition and may also predict functioning (Hamm et al., 2012; 
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James et al., 2016; McLeod, Gumley, MacBeth, Schwannauer, & Lysaker, 2014). Limited 
research has assessed the role of metacognitive ability on functional outcome in FEP, 
independent of negative symptoms. 
 
Secondly, metacognitive experience (appraisal of experience) has also been associated 
with social functioning (Stratta, Daneluzzo, Riccardi, Bustini, & Rossi, 2009), real-world 
functioning and work outcomes (Gould et al., 2015; Verdoux, Monello, Goumilloux, 
Cougnard, & Prouteau, 2010). However, Gilleen, Greenwood and David (2014) 
demonstrated that metacognitive experience (“online” awareness within the moment) is, 
on average, intact within schizophrenia. This presents a potential dissociation between 
metacognitive ability and metacognitive experience which may be the result of impaired 
metacognitive processes (self-reflection and set-shifting) (Gilleen et al., 2016).  
 
Metacognitive monitoring processes (measured using the self-reflection sub-scale of the 
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale), have been shown to be poorer in psychosis than controls 
(Engh et al., 2007; Warman, Lysaker, & Martin, 2007) and this process has been related 
to global functioning in schizophrenia (Davies et al., 2017; Giusti, Mazza, Pollice, 
Casacchia, & Roncone, 2013). Metacognitive control process (set-shifting using Trail-
Making Task) has been demonstrated as poor in psychosis (Riley et al., 2000), and has 
been linked to real-world outcomes (Strassnig et al., 2018). Gilleen et al. (2016) 
demonstrated that intact metacognitive experience in schizophrenia required both good 
metacognitive monitoring (BCIS self-reflectiveness subscale) and good metacognitive 
control (set-shifting on Trail Making Task) processes. Research within FEP sample could 
identify key early deficits in the model, which may be driving other metacognitive 
deficits, later leading to poorer functioning. Thirdly, metacognitive efficiency is poorer 
in psychosis (Bliksted et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2018) and it has not been associated with 
explicit real-world outcomes.  
 
It is currently unclear which metacognitive processes may be driving these metacognitive 
difficulties. Equally, limited studies have assessed metacognitive processing in 
individuals with FEP, which may provide information regarding the early deficits 
predicting these later difficulties. From this, an aim of the thesis is to assess which 
metacognitive components may impact on what individuals are doing day to day: their 
functional outcome.  
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In terms of metacognition predicting functioning across time in psychosis, there is limited 
evidence. Studies have suggested that those with an at-risk mental state, whose 
functioning declined and later transitioned into psychosis, displayed more maladaptive 
metacognitive beliefs (Barbato et al., 2014). Intervention studies focusing on 
metacognition have demonstrated an improvement in functioning (Briki et al., 2014; 
Dubreucq, Delorme, & Roure, 2016; Moritz et al., 2014; Rocha & Queirós, 2013). 
However, no study has yet assessed the role of metacognitive ability on functioning across 
a long follow-up period, particularly within FEP; where recovery is more likely. 
 
1.9 Self-defining memories 
 
Metacognitive ability has previously been negatively associated with difficulties in 
recalling autobiographical memories and personal narratives (Lysaker et al., 2013; 
Lysaker & Bob, 2013). In particular, self-defining memories are relevant to narrative 
identity (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004) and metacognitive ability has been associated 
with forming complex ideas of one’s life as a narrative across a lifetime (Lysaker et al. 
2010; Lysaker et al. 2013; Lysaker et al. 2013). It may be that SDMs overlap with 
metacognitive ability in terms of being a reflective process on the self. However, it is a 
distinct reflective process as it focuses on one memory, which, when compromised, may 
impact on functioning. Self-defining memories also incorporate an affective information 
component (salient past memory with emotions associated with this). Therefore, it may 
be suggested that self-defining memory is associated with metacognition or represent a 
similar concept, which when compromised may impact functioning in psychosis. Based 
on the Beck and Rector (2005) functional outcome model, it may be suggested that 
cognitive processes could extend beyond metacognition to self-defining memories. 
Hence self-defining memories may play an independent role in functioning, alongside 
metacognition. 
 
Alongside functioning, metacognitive components have also been related to 
hallucinatory experiences and delusional beliefs/ideation in both clinical and non-
clinical groups (Eisenacher et al., 2015; Moritz, Woodward, Whitman, & Cuttler, 2005; 
Warman, 2008). However, the literature is less clear on which particular metacognitive 
components may play a role. Studies have focused on metacognitive ability, monitoring, 
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and sensitivity. A full review of this literature is presented in chapter 6. This association 
may then later have a role in the relationship between metacognition, functional or 
subjective outcome in psychosis. By understanding this association with anomalous 
experiences, this may help us better understand influences on outcome in psychosis.  
 
1.10 Anomalous experiences  
 
An anomalous experience is an unusual event, deviating from expectancy or normality. 
Anomalous experiences can be divided into a number of categories including: i) 
anomalous self-experiences; involving distortions of the unified ‘self’ or being 
(Henriksen & Parnas, 2014), ii) anomalous perceptual experiences; involving distortions 
of sensory experiences, and iii) anomalous (delusional) beliefs; including most commonly 
experiences of paranoia. It has been suggested that anomalous self-experiences precede 
anomalous perceptual experiences (Nelson, Parnas, & Sass, 2014), and then if anomalous 
perceptual experiences are appraised as negative or threatening this can lead to anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs (Corlett et al., 2009; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & 
Bebbington, 2001). Therefore, there is suggested to be a hierarchical relationship between 
these different experiences (Fletcher & Frith, 2009).  
 
Anomalous events (experiences/beliefs) are experienced by a large number of people 
within the general population (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Kelleher et al., 2012). 
However, the frequency and intensity of anomalous experiences is increased for 
individuals with First Episode Psychosis (FEP), and particularly those with an “at risk” 
mental state (Brett, Johns, Peters, & McGuire, 2009;  Reininghaus et al., 2016). Several 
other studies have highlighted early reports of self-experience disturbance predicted 
development of psychosis (Hartmann et al., 1984; Parnas, 2005; Parnas, Handest, 
Jansson, & Sæbye, 2005). It was considered that after anxiety and depression, anomalous 
self-experiences (e.g. depersonalisation) were the most frequent symptoms seen in 
psychiatry (Stewart, 1963); and particularly within psychosis (Sass, Pienkos, Nelson, & 
Medford, 2013).   
 
With this in mind, it has been suggested that anomalous experiences could be linked to 
the progression of positive symptoms in psychosis. Recent studies also suggest 
anomalous self-experiences are associated with positive symptom expression (Brent, 
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Seidman, Thermenos, Holt, & Keshavan, 2014; Nelson & Raballo, 2015; Preti, Cella, 
Raballo, & Vellante, 2012). Such sub-threshold psychotic experiences can predict 
psychotic symptoms at a later stage (Yung et al., 2003; Yung, Phillips, Yuen, & McGorry, 
2004). This body of literature highlights that disturbance of the self may be a key marker 
of development of psychosis and early identification.   
 
1.10.1 Anomalous self-experiences  
 
Anomalous self-experiences concerns an internal distortion of the unified ‘self’ or being 
(Henriksen & Parnas, 2014). In order to understand anomalous self-experiences, it is 
important to understand the concept of the ‘self’ or being. The self is a conscious, 
subjective experience of being. Henriksen & Parnas (2014) described that the experience 
of ‘being’ signifies that we exist as a “self-present, single, temporally persistent, bodily 
and bounded subject of experience” (p. 543). The self can be related to the term ‘ipseity’ 
which refers to the experiential sense of being a self-coinciding subject of experience of 
the world. Theories have suggested that the self is not one large overarching unit but, 
instead, is a multifaceted hierarchical arrangement of self-positions that continually 
realign with dominant self-positions complementing each other, rather than competing 
(Dimaggio et al., 2009; Hamm & Lysaker, 2016; Henriksen & Parnas, 2014; Lysaker & 
Lysaker, 2002). Our internal dialogue makes us aware of these different selves to enable 
us to interpret and understand the world. Being aware of multiple forms of feeling, 
thinking and acting provides information which is necessary to form an integrated point 
of view. This allows one to maintain a sense of wholeness or sameness (Dimaggio et al., 
2009).  
 
Three levels of self have been proposed. Firstly, the prereflective self which refers to 
implicit first-person quality experiences, e.g. my experience or sense of ‘my-ness’. This 
is a foundation level of selfhood and other levels of selfhood are built on this (Parnas, 
Sass, & Zahavi, 2013). Secondly, the reflective self which refers to self as an object of 
reflection e.g. my sense of self as the same across time. In order to have a sense of 
temporal unity of self, the individual must have the knowledge that moment-to-moment 
experience is their own in the first place (Nelson, Sass, & Škodlar, 2009). Thirdly, the 
narrative self which is language-based and includes abstract cognitive representations 
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referring to social identity, personality, habits and history, and may include complex ideas 
of self and others which relies on metacognitive ability (Lysaker et al. 2011).  
 
Research has suggested that within psychosis or schizophrenia there is a disruption to the 
prereflective self, which leads to a new ontological existence (Henriksen & Parnas, 2014; 
Nelson & Raballo, 2015). Once there is a disruption in the prereflective self, on which 
the other selves are built, this can lead to anomalous self-experiences, explained by the 
ipseity-disturbance model (IDM) (Sass & Parnas, 2003). This was recently re-considered 
the bio-pheno-social model (Sass, Borda, Madeira, Pienkos, & Nelson, 2018). This 
suggests that the disturbance of the prereflective self involves three aspects: i) 
hyperreflexivity; heightened awareness of aspects of experience that are normally 
implicit, ii) diminished self-affection; weakened sense of existing as a subject of 
awareness, and iii) disturbed “grip”; loss of salience or stability of objects in perceptual 
or cognitive awareness. This focus on aspects of the self which have been tacitly 
experienced (e.g. breathing or thoughts) is likely to alienate the self and lead to a variety 
of dissociative experiences, e.g. depersonalisation, disturbances in stream of 
consciousness, distorted bodily experiences, and existential reorientation (Nelson et al., 
2009; Sass & Parnas, 2003; Sass et al., 2018). 
 
Anomalous self-experiences can be measured using Examination of Anomalous Self-
Experience (EASE; Parnas et al., 2005; Sass et al., 2013). This is a symptom checklist 
using a semi-structured exploration of experiential anomalies of self-awareness. Cicero 
et al. (2016) recently developed IPASE, a survey version of the EASE. Researchers have 
also developed the Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale (Sierra & Berrios, 2000), a self-
rating scale used to assess anomalous self-experiences (specifically, dissociation, an 
analogous form of self disturbance; Sass et al. 2013). Importantly, anomalous self-
experiences have been associated with positive symptoms in psychosis (Nelson, Sass and 
Skodlar, 2009; Nelson, Parnas & Sass, 2014; Parnas, 2005; Sass, 1998; Sass et al., 2013) 
and, therefore, anomalous perceptual experiences.  
 
 
 
 
		
29	
1.10.2 Anomalous perceptual experiences 
 
Anomalous perceptual experiences involve distortions of sensory experiences, which can 
occur in a variety of modalities, e.g. visual: falsely perceiving flashing lights or figures 
of objects, or auditory: falsely hearing your name being called out in a crowd or thinking 
of a song and hearing it with clarity. Anomalous perceptual experiences have been 
suggested to develop from cognitive disruptions, or bouts of aberrant salience, suggesting 
a crucial role of perceptual/cognitive abnormalities in our understanding of phenomena 
in psychosis (Hemsley, 1993; Hemsley & Hemsley, 2015).  
 
These experiences can be measured using Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale (CAPS: 
Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006), which has been reliably used in both clinical and non-
clinical participants (Bell et al., 2006). This measure assesses whether the participant has 
experienced such phenomena before and, if so, how frequently do they occur, how 
distressing and distracting are these experiences. As suggested above, anomalous 
experiences may be a prerequisite to full-blown psychotic symptoms, e.g. hallucinations. 
Evidence has demonstrated that hallucinations within psychosis commonly occur in the 
auditory domain (Shergill et al., 1998; Waters, Allen, et al., 2012). Recent research has 
suggested, although visual hallucinations occur less frequently than auditory 
hallucinations, there is still an increased presence of this phenomena in individuals with 
schizophrenia (27% of individuals) (Manford & Andermann, 1998; Waters et al., 2014). 
Visual hallucinations tend to represent a more severe psychopathological profile, 
associated with stress or trauma (Read, Agar, Argyle, & Aderhold, 2003; Waters et al., 
2014). From this, it has been suggested that clinicians typically ask about auditory 
hallucinatory experiences, neglecting visual experiences (Bracha, Wolkowitz, Lohr, 
Karson, & Bigelow, 1989; Waters et al., 2014) or patients do not voice these visual 
experiences as they may be less noticeable e.g. brighter lights or outlines of objects, rather 
than fully formed objects. Following this research, there is clear interest in assessing the 
separate modalities of anomalous experiences, to further understand their cognitive 
underpinnings.   
 
Until recently, no scale has divided anomalous perceptual experiences into separate 
sensory modalities. For example, Schizotypy personality questionnaire categorised the 
scale into subscales such as cognitive-perceptual, disorganized and interpersonal factors 
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(SPQ, Raine, 1991). A new scale assessing these unusual anomalous experiences has been 
devised: Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire (MUSEQ; Mitchell et 
al., 2017), which includes 6 subscales dividing the scale in terms of sensory modalities: 
auditory, visual, olfactory, gustatory, bodily sensations, and sensed presence. This scale 
can enable assessment of different anomalous perceptual experiences. Regardless of 
modality of anomalous perceptual experience, these experiences are suggested to be 
cognitively appraised by the individual, resulting in the development of anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs (Garety et al., 2001). 
 
1.10.3 Anomalous (delusional) beliefs  
 
Anomalous (delusional) beliefs are considered fixed false beliefs (Garety, 1999), outside 
of the cultural norm. The most commonly experienced delusional belief is paranoia or 
persecutory delusions (Garety & Hemsley, 1987). Paranoia can be common in the general 
population (Freeman, Pugh, & Garety, 2008). Anomalous perceptual experiences may 
occur and later lead to anomalous (delusional) beliefs. Maher (1974, 1988; 2005) 
previously suggested that anomalous perceptual experiences may occur prior to a 
paranoid ideation, as these experiences demand explanation so a theory is developed to 
explain these experiences. This hierarchical framework between anomalous perceptual 
experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs is supported by many cognitive theories 
(Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, & 
Bebbington, 2002; Garety, Kuipers, Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001; McKay & 
Dennett, 2009). Aligned with this, McKay and Dennett (2009) considered there are two 
types of misbelief, i) misbelief through a breakdown in normal functioning of the belief 
formation system (e.g., delusions) and ii) those arising in the normal course of that 
system’s operations (e.g., based on incomplete/inaccurate information). The former has 
been considered anomalous beliefs which are used as protective mechanisms. To 
understand this framework, it is important to consider the theories associated with the 
development and maintenance of these different anomalies, and the role of metacognition 
here.   
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1.11 Predictors of anomalous experience and anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs 
 
1.11.1 Information processing deficit  
 
Anomalous experiences and beliefs in schizophrenia were previously suggested to be the 
result of a ‘general cognitive deficit’ in associative processes, which connect ideas and 
organisation relevant thoughts (Bleuler,  1911, translated in 1950). Whilst this early work 
was a foundation to future theories, researchers have stated that the pattern of behaviour 
in psychosis is not interpretable in terms of the well-established ‘generalised deficit’ in 
psychosis (Hemsley, 1998). Instead, Hemsley (1993) proposed a theory of information 
processing deficit in psychosis which suggested that cognitive deficits are caused by the 
issue (or a “weakening”) of integrating top-down (prior knowledge in memory) and 
bottom-up (current stimulus input) influences. It has been debated whether this process 
is conscious or unconscious (John & Hemsley, 1992).  
 
Alongside Hemsley (1993), Gray and colleagues (Gray, 1995; Gray, Feldon, Hemsley, & 
Smith, 1991) aimed to understand psychotic experiences using a comparator models. 
Gray (1995) suggested that the contents of one’s consciousness consists of the outputs of 
a moment-by-moment comparator system. In this area, predicted states of the world, from 
memory stores, are compared to actual states of the world to assess whether there is a 
mismatch. Following a mismatch, information is sent to other areas to trigger exploratory 
behaviour to understand the mismatch and update the internal model. In psychosis, it is 
suggested that bottom-up processes are dominant, such that stimuli in the environment 
appear unusually salient. This reduction in top-down influences on current perception, 
results in ambiguous, unstructured sensory processing. This represents the anomalous 
experience which appears in psychosis, particularly FEP (Reininghaus et al., 2016).  
 
An example of this information processing deficit is latent inhibition. Latent inhibition 
(LI) is a learning phenomenon involving the idea that learning performance is poorer if 
the task involves pre-exposed non-reinforced stimulus (Weiner, 2003) as prior experience 
has an interfering effect. Therefore, latent inhibition is a measure of ability to filter out 
irrelevant stimuli. However, latent inhibition has been shown to be poorer in psychosis 
(Lubow, 2005) and psychosis prone individuals (Lubow, 1992). Hemsley (1993) 
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suggested that LI is not simply habituation, but individuals must assess contextual cues 
which may be relevant to the associations. Therefore, individuals with psychosis can learn 
new associations with previously associated concepts better than controls as they do not 
overuse their prior information. This disrupted LI in psychosis can be used to explain the 
presence of hallucinations or perceptual disturbances as there is difficulty in filtering out 
irrelevant stimuli in the environment (Baruch, Hemsley, & Gray, 1988; Hemsley, 1993) 
and then attempts to understand the disturbance which may manifest as a delusion-like 
idea (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009;  Maher, 1984, 1988).  
 
However, there appears to be inconsistencies within the literature. Weiner (2003) 
demonstrated that administrating NMDA blockade drugs (using ketamine to mimic 
positive and negative symptoms of psychosis, Stone et al., 2008), resulted in persistent 
latent inhibition, so individuals were overusing prior information. To understand this, a 
review from Weiner (2003) suggested a two-headed latent inhibition model of psychosis. 
This suggested that latent inhibition disruption is more likely associated with early stage 
psychosis. For example, recent research demonstrated that a group of ARMS participants 
demonstrated disrupted in LI, suggesting these individuals are impaired in their allocation 
of attentional resources based on past predictive value of repeated stimuli (Kraus et al., 
2016; Kraus, Keefe, & Krishnan, 2009). Then later there is suggested to be a 
reinstatement of LI in chronic psychosis, due to medication (Hemsley, 1993; Williams et 
al., 1998); highlighting the role of dopamine in information processing deficit. This model 
can explain the two extremes of cognitive switching: excessive switching of associations 
which is caused by disrupted LI and inflexible switching in persistent LI. Failure to ignore 
irrelevant stimuli for the former and attentional perseveration for the latter.  
 
Therefore, this research suggests that difficulties in using prior knowledge or experience 
is evident in psychosis. Difficulty with using prior knowledge to filter out irrelevant 
stimuli in the environment can mean the environment becomes overly salient and 
confusing leading to anomalous perceptual experiences, which may later manifest as a 
delusion-like idea.  
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1.11.1 Self-monitoring theory  
 
Frith (1987) suggested individuals with psychosis may have an inability to appropriately 
self-monitor due to a fault in the internal monitoring, comparator system, and corollary 
discharge. For example, when we perform an action (arm raise) we make a motor 
command, e.g. “I want to move my arm upwards”. A signal is sent to the motor, and then 
sensory system, and another signal (corollary discharge) generates the predicted sensory 
feedback. Both the signals are compared (Blakemore & Sirigu, 2003; Frith, Blakemore, 
& Wolpert, 2000; Frith, Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2015) and, if matched, the 
individual experiences the movement as predicted and can assign agency to the 
movement, e.g. “I moved my arm upwards”. However, for individuals with psychosis, 
there is a fault in the corollary discharge (prediction of movement) which may induce a 
feeling of strangeness, or lack of agency, that the movement was externally caused, rather 
than self-produced.  
 
As an example, Blakemore and colleagues suggested that, typically, individuals cannot 
tickle themselves as they are unable to use their self-monitoring system to predict both 
their own movements and the sensation produced from these movements (Blakemore et 
al. 2000). However, for individuals with psychosis who may have difficulty with 
monitoring or predicting their own movements, Blakemore and colleagues suggested that 
individuals with psychosis may experience self-produced tickling as a more intense 
experience. Blakemore, Smith, Steel, Johnstone and Frith (2000) demonstrated that 
individuals with psychosis, who had auditory hallucinations or passivity experiences, 
experienced tactile sensation produced by themselves or the experimenter as equally 
intense/tickly. An increase in intensity of a tickle was also demonstrated within healthy 
controls when a time delay was introduced between when they expected to experience 
the tickle compared to when they actually experienced the tickle (Blakemore, Frith, & 
Wolpert, 1999). In particular, it was suggested that less weight was being given to internal 
predictions and individuals with psychosis tend to focus on external cues (Frith, 2012; 
Synofzik et al. 2010; Synofzik et al. 2013), as a result of saliency. Therefore, difficulty 
with internal models of prediction may cause an environment to appear surprising and 
salient to the individual, which warrants explanation.  
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1.11.2 Prediction errors and Bayesian models  
 
Following from the self-monitoring deficit in psychosis (Frith, 1987), theories of the self, 
including understanding agency, free will and intentions, propose that the self is 
constructed via simulated Bayesian computational models (Apps & Tsakiris, 2014; Clark, 
2013). Frith and Friston (2013) outlines the basic Bayesian model, which suggests that 
when we perform an action we predict the outcome based on prior knowledge/experience 
(Corlett, Honey & Fletcher, 2016). If the outcome is not as we predicted, then we 
experience a prediction error/’Bayesian surprise’ (Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Dolan, & 
Friston, 2013). From this, we modify our knowledge on which our expectation was based 
to prevent the prediction error in the future (Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, 
& Friston, 2015).  
 
Bayesian computational models have suggested that, within psychosis, there is a 
disruption in this predictive coding in such that there is a weakening of use of prior beliefs 
and overreliance on sensory occurrences. This loss of top-down predictions leads extra 
weight to be given to external influences which means everything becomes salient and 
surprising to the individual (Adams et al., 2013). This hypothesis was recently used to 
explain anomalous experiences, particularly within psychosis or those with a propensity 
to anomalous experiences (Adams et al., 2013; Corlett et al., 2007; Davies, Teufel, & 
Fletcher, 2017; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Frith & Friston, 2013; Rudolph et al., 2015; 
Sterzer et al., 2018; Teufel et al., 2010a). 
 
However, recent studies have demonstrated that those with FEP or those with psychosis 
proneness had a shift in bias towards prior knowledge and beliefs, over sensory evidence 
(Davies, Teufel, & Fletcher, 2017; Teufel et al., 2015). Davies et al. (2017) recently 
suggested that the predictive coding can be used to explain both anomalous perceptual 
experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs. The authors suggest that prior beliefs 
work at different levels of the anomalous experiences/delusional beliefs hierarchy. For 
example, hallucination-proneness relied on both prior knowledge about details of the 
environment and knowledge of ‘gist’ of the environment, but delusion-proneness was less 
associated with prior knowledge about details and instead was influenced by prior beliefs 
about the overall ‘gist’. Anomalous (delusional) beliefs are suggested to be the result of 
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higher-level, metacognitive strategies used to account for salient, anomalous experience 
(Corlett et al., 2007; Hemsley & Garety, 1986).  
 
1.11.3 Neurotransmitters 
 
Dopamine theory has been a prominent and well-established theory in psychosis 
(Carlsson, Hansson, Waters, & Carlsson, 1997; Kapur, 2003; Laruelle & Abi-Dargham, 
1999), demonstrating an increased presynaptic dopaminergic function in psychosis 
(Howes et al., 2012). In particular, pre-synaptic dopamine synthesis and synaptic 
dopamine availability is increased in psychosis (Howes, Dm, & Mccutcheon, 2017) and 
those with ARMS, who later transitioned to psychosis (Howes, Montgomery, Asselin, 
Murray, & Paul, 2013). In this psychotic transition group, there was a direct relationship 
between magnitude of dopaminergic dysfunction and severity of prodromal symptoms.  
 
Pharmacological models have been developed which highlight the role of dopamine, 
glutamate and serotonin in psychosis (Aghajanian & Marek, 2000; Carlsson et al., 1997; 
Coyle, 2006; Kapur & Remington, 1996) and, more recently, ‘GABAergic involvement’ 
in schizophrenia (Harrison, 2015). From this research, it appears there are various 
mechanisms involved; NMDA receptor hypofunction, GABAergic deficits and serotonin-
2A overactivity, may lead to dysregulation of subcortical dopamine (Cohen & Halassa, 
2015; Kegeles et al., 2000), leading to these psychotic experiences. With this evidence in 
mind, dopamine has been described as the wind of the psychotic fire (Laruelle & Abi-
Dargham, 1999), that dopaminergic abnormality in psychosis is like a state abnormality 
associated with dimensions of psychosis instead of the fundamental abnormality in 
psychosis (Kapur, 2003).  
 
1.11.4 Aberrant salience  
 
Psychosis itself has been defined as a “state of aberrant salience” (Kapur, 2003), linked 
to a disruption in dopamine and glutamate activation (Corlett et al., 2007). Within 
psychosis, Kapur (2003) suggested that the dysregulated dopamine transmission leads to 
stimulus-independent release of dopamine, leading to aberrant salience of external objects 
and internal representation, e.g. in psychosis dopamine creates salience, instead of 
mediating between contextually relevant saliences. Hallucinations are suggested to be a 
direct result of the aberrant salience which develops as a cognitive effort to make sense 
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of these experiences, later leading to delusional beliefs (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Freeman 
et al., 2002; Garety et al., 2001). Therefore, Kapur (2003) suggested that it is 
antipsychotics which “dampen the salience” and prevent these anomalous experiences or 
delusional beliefs.  
 
Reininghaus et al. (2016) demonstrated, using experience sample methodology, for 
individuals with FEP, ARMS and healthy controls, that aberrant salience and elevated 
stress sensitivity was associated with increased psychotic experiences. Within the FEP 
group, increased sensitivity to minor stressful events or threat anticipation led to more 
intense psychotic experiences, and in the ARMS group, aberrant salient experiences and 
sensitivity to outsider status were associated with more psychotic experiences. This 
highlighted that aberrant salience, stress sensitivity and threat anticipation are important 
for psychotic experiences in daily life. More recently, momentary aberrant salience has 
been associated with psychotic experiences (Reininghaus et al., 2018). However, 
cognitive biases; a lower threshold for accepting a stimulus as present (Moritz, 
Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz et al., 2017; Veckenstedt et al., 2011), was 
importantly involved in this relationship (Reininghaus et al., 2018). 
 
1.11.5 Signal detection theory  
 
Signal detection theory (SDT) suggests that information recognition involves discerning 
signal within an uncertain environment (Waters, Woodward, Allen, Aleman, & Sommer, 
2012). SDT methods allow us to capture two aspects of perception: i) perceptual 
sensitivity (d’): the ability to discriminate between two perceptual decisions and ii) 
perceptual bias (B): the tendency to report one decision over the other.  
 
Signal detection theory (SDT) studies have demonstrated that anomalous experiences are 
associated with perceptual signal detection biases towards noticing stimulus (e.g. a voice) 
when it was in fact absent (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Kok, Kouider, Lange, & Supe, 2015; 
Barkus et al., 2010; Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990); or those with psychosis have a lower 
threshold for accepting a stimulus as present (Moritz et al., 2009; Moritz, Woodward, 
Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz et al., 2017; Veckenstedt et al., 2011). For example, in 
the classically reported Bentall and Slade (1985) study individuals with a predisposition 
to hallucinations, or those with psychosis and hallucinations, falsely perceived a noise 
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when it was absent, but could accurately report it when it was present. The role of 
perceptual biases was later supported by studies within psychosis/psychosis-proneness 
samples (Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990; Teufel et al., 2015; Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, 
Wolpert, & Fletcher, 2010; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011). Given the hierarchical 
model of anomalous experiences – from anomalous self-experiences to anomalous 
perceptual experiences to anomalous (delusional) beliefs – it is important for studies to 
assess whether perceptual biases could also be related to anomalous self-experiences. 
Limited research has assessed this hypotheses. Varese et al. (2012) demonstrated, within 
a small group of patients with schizophrenia, no significant association between 
anomalous self-experience (dissociation) and auditory perceptual bias. The lack of 
association may be due to statistical power, which the authors note as a limitation.  
 
Research has demonstrated that perceptual biases may be present in both visual and 
auditory domain (Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990); despite many research studies in this area 
focusing on auditory perceptual biases (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Varese et al., 2011). 
Likewise, anomalous experiences can appear in several different domains: auditory, 
visual, olfactory (Mitchell et al., 2017); although most commonly in the auditory domain 
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017; Shergill et al., 1998; Waters, Allen, et al., 2012). From our 
knowledge, no study has yet assessed the modality-specific association between 
perceptual biases and anomalous experiences. Therefore, it is currently unclear whether 
there is also a modality-specific association between visual perceptual biases and visual 
anomalous-perceptual experiences or whether auditory perceptual biases may also predict 
visual anomalous experiences.  
 
A literature review was conducted to assess the cognitive models of hallucinatory 
experiences, including source-monitoring, self-monitoring and signal detection theory 
(Brookwell, Bentall, & Varese, 2013). This literature review demonstrated significant 
effects for source-monitoring and signal detection studies, e.g. perceptual biases, for 
explaining hallucinatory experiences in both clinical and non-clinical participants. 
Furthermore, Kok, Kouider, Lange and Supe (2015) demonstrated that healthy controls, 
with proneness to hallucinations, demonstrate a bias in prestimulus activity in the visual 
cortex towards an expected stimuli. These studies support the notion that both visual and 
auditory hallucinations may be due to an imprecise/biased information processing system, 
which biases prior knowledge.  
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This perceptual bias, towards noticing salient aspects within the environment, may later 
lead to false perceptions. As Dodgson and Gordon (2009) suggested that the false 
positives may be a by-product of a perceptual system that has evolved to reduce false 
negatives in conditions of threat leading to hallucination. Studies from Reininghaus and 
colleagues have demonstrated, using Experience Sampling Method (ESM) aberrant 
salience is linked to liberal acceptance bias; associated with perceptual biases, and threat 
anticipation, have both been separately linked to with increased psychotic experiences in 
FEP (Reininghaus et al. 2016; 2018). Therefore, it appears there is an appraisal of salient 
aspects in the environment (as a result of the bias information processing) which can lead 
to anomalous perceptual experiences.  
 
1.11.6 Cognitive appraisals 
  
Garety et al. (2001) model suggests anomalous perceptual experiences may occur via two 
routes: i) cognitive (perceptual bias) and affective disturbance, and ii) affective 
disturbance alone. The cognitive disturbance is then (metacognitively) appraised by the 
individual, in order to understand this experience (Maher, 1984, 1988). However, they 
may be appraised as negative or distressing, which can lead to anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs. Therefore, both the perceptual bias and the metacognitive appraisal of the 
anomalous experiences may be key to understanding both anomalous experiences and 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs.   
 
Whilst many theories have been proposed to understand anomalous experiences, it is clear 
that there is substantial support for anomalous experiences arising from deficit in the 
Bayesian predictive processing (Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Schwartenbeck et al., 2013; Seth, 
2013; Seth, Suzuki, & Critchley, 2012). The Bayesian predictive processing theory 
suggested that deficit in this processing can cause environmental stimuli to appear more 
salient leading to these anomalous perceptual experiences. These anomalous perceptual 
experiences are then cognitive appraised, resulting in the development of 
delusional/anomalous beliefs (Garety et al., 2001). This supports the hierarchical 
framework proposed by Fletcher and Frith (2009).  
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Therefore, it may be suggested that the way in which individuals think about and interpret 
their own experiences may play a role in the presence and maintenance of anomalous 
experiences/beliefs. To support this, metacognitive sensitivity, measured using 
confidence ratings within a certain task, has been demonstrated as poor in those with First 
Episode Psychosis (Bliksted et al., 2017; Davies et al., 2018), those with a propensity to 
psychotic symptoms (Bhatt et al. 2010), those with a history of hallucinations (Gaweda, 
Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 2013) and those at high risk (Gawęda et al., 2018). This 
supports that metacognition may contribute to the maintenance of anomalous perceptual 
experiences and, later, the development of anomalous (delusional) beliefs. However, it is 
currently unclear which aspects of metacognition may, or may not, be related to 
anomalous events. From this, chapter 6 includes a literature review with an aim to further 
understand various anomalous events: anomalous experiences and anomalous delusional 
beliefs, which may have a relationship with metacognition.  
 
1.12 Summary of thesis chapters  
 
Research within this introduction highlights the complex relationships between 
neurocognition, metacognition, functional capacity, functional outcome and subjective 
outcome in psychosis. This thesis will specifically focus on the role of metacognition on 
outcomes in young people with and without psychosis. However, as suggested above, 
metacognition is measured in a variety of different ways. This thesis will explore how 
metacognitive components are related and which metacognitive components are relevant 
in poor outcomes, in both FEP and those without psychosis. There is clear interest in the 
early identification of those at risk of poor outcome (objective and subjective), to target 
interventions to reduce this disability. However, no study has yet assessed the role of 
metacognitive ability on functioning across a long follow-up period, particularly within 
FEP; where recovery is more likely. This thesis aims to explore the role of metacognitive 
ability across time on functional outcome within FEP; where recovery is more likely. 
 
Metacognition has also been shown to be involved in appraising experiences, particularly 
anomalous experiences or delusional beliefs which may be related via a hierarchical 
framework. Research in this area has suggested the role of perceptual biases or cognitive 
deficits may predict anomalous experiences, but metacognition may maintain these 
anomalous experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs in young people with and 
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without psychosis. Anomalous self-experience, perceptual experiences and delusional 
beliefs are suggested to be associated within a hierarchical framework. However, limited 
evidence has assessed the role of perceptual biases on anomalous self-experiences and 
the role of metacognition on each of these levels. However, research in this area is within 
its infancy and requires more detailed and rigorous assessment of these relationships. 
Finally, this thesis will investigate the relationship between anomalous self-, perceptual 
experiences and (delusional) beliefs with perceptual biases and metacognition in young 
people with and without psychosis (see figure 1 for full proposed model).  
 
1.13 Aims of thesis  
The first aim of the thesis is to assess the connection between metacognitive variables 
and which metacognitive components are important for anomalous experiences and 
difficulties in functioning in psychosis (Chapter 2 & 3).  
The second aim of the thesis is to assess variables associated with both objective and 
subjective function, to enable an in-depth understanding of functional recovery. However, 
limited research has assessed whether other metacognitive components are relevant in 
poor functional outcome in FEP (Chapter 3, 4 and 5).  
Given the limited longitudinal research, the third aim of the thesis is to assess whether 
metacognitive ability can predict functional outcome across a longer follow-up period, 
particularly within FEP; where recovery is more likely (Chapter 4).  
The fourth aim of the thesis is to assess the role of cognitive and metacognitive 
processes on anomalous experiences and delusional beliefs (Chapter 6, 7 and 8).  
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Figure 1: Proposed model for metacognitive influences on anomalous experiences and 
functional outcome in young people with and without psychosis.  Note: Solid line 
signifies associations already present within the literature. Solid red lines are present in 
schizophrenia. 
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2. Developing a dynamic model of anomalous experiences and functional 
outcome in young people with or without psychosis: a cross-sectional and 
longitudinal study protocol. 
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2.1 Abstract 
2.1.1 Introduction 
Anomalous experiences are common within the general population, but the frequency and 
intensity is increased in young people with psychosis. Studies have demonstrated that 
perceptual biases towards noticing these phenomena plays a role, but the way one thinks 
about one’s experience (metacognition) may also be relevant. Whilst poor metacognitive 
function has been theoretically associated with anomalous experiences, this relationship 
is currently unclear. However, metacognition may work along a continuum with various 
metacognitive levels, many of which have been demonstrated as impaired in psychosis. 
These metacognitive components may interact via processes that maintain poor 
metacognition across levels, and that potentially impact both what people do in their 
everyday lives (functional outcome) and how people feel about their everyday lives 
(subjective recovery outcome) in people with psychosis compared to healthy participants. 
 
2.1.2 Methods and analysis 
This study will investigate the association and contribution of metacognition to 
anomalous experiences and outcome measures cross-sectionally, and longitudinally in a 
36-month follow-up. Firstly, young people with psychosis will be compared with healthy 
control participants on selected measures of anomalous experience, metacognition, and 
function, using ANCOVA to identify group differences. Next, the relationship between 
metacognitive components and processes will be explored, including processes 
connecting the different components, using regression analyses. Finally, mediation 
analyses will be used to assess the predictive value of metacognitive measures on 
outcome measures, both cross-sectionally and longitudinally at 36-months, whilst 
controlling for symptoms and cognition.  
 
2.1.3 Ethics and dissemination 
Ethical and Health Research Authority approval has been obtained through Camberwell 
St. Giles Research Ethics Committee (reference number: 17/LO/0055). This research 
project will be reported within a PhD thesis and submitted for journal publication. Once 
key predictive components of poor outcome in psychosis are identified, this study will 
develop a series of dynamic models to understand influences on outcome for young 
people with psychosis. 
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2.2 Introduction 
 
 
Anomalous experiences refer to a rich number of various psychic phenomena. These 
experiences can be divided into three main categories: anomalous self-experiences, the 
sense that you are not “real” (distortions in experience of self and being); anomalous 
perceptual experiences, hearing sounds which cannot be accounted for by the 
environment (distortions of sensory events in various domains; auditory, visual; touch; 
taste); and anomalous delusional beliefs, experiencing unusual thoughts or beliefs. These 
experiences may be common within the general population1,2 but the frequency and 
intensity of these anomalous experiences is increased in those with psychosis or those 
with emerging severe mental health difficulties3,4 and may predict psychotic symptoms at 
a later stage5,6. Research has suggested that anomalous self-experiences are suggested to 
precede and generate “surface-level” anomalous perceptual experiences (hallucinations)7 
and anomalous delusional beliefs may be developed from anomalous experiences8,9,10, 
suggesting a hierarchical framework between the anomalous delusional beliefs, 
experiences and self-experiences.  
 
Many theories have been proposed to understand anomalous experiences, including 
source-monitoring deficits11 and aberrant salience hypothesis12. Signal detection theory 
(SDT) has been the foundation to this research and studies using SDT have demonstrated 
that anomalous perceptual experiences are associated with perceptual signal detection 
biases13, 14; bias towards stating that a stimulus was present when it was in-fact absent. Such 
signal detection biases have been consistently shown within psychosis/psychosis-
proneness literature15, 16, 17 and suggest that top-down processes on (false) perception can 
lead to hallucinations or delusions8, 18, 19.  
 
Recent evidence suggests these signal detection biases are associated with metacognition 
in healthy students20, and metacognition may therefore play a role in anomalous 
experiences. Metacognition is defined as “thinking about thinking”21, 22, an abstract view of 
the object-level23. Literature has demonstrated that hallucinatory experiences and 
delusional beliefs/ideation have been associated with metacognition (overconfidence, 
specifically) in both clinical and non-clinical groups24, 25, 26. In particular, those with 
psychosis demonstrate more incorrect self-monitoring responses with higher confidence27, 
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28, also present in those with a history of hallucinations29, and those within at-risk mental 
state groups30.   
 
This research has not been consistent (see Gawęda et al., 201328) as some studies did not 
control for objective performance, crucial for metacognitive efficiency scores31, 32. A recent 
controlled study demonstrated that individuals with FEP and those at-risk were more 
likely to misattribute an imagined action for a performed action, compared to healthy 
controls30, but found no difference in misattribution of verbal or non-verbal actions. This 
suggests the deficit in metacognition may be across several modalities. However, 
metacognitive efficiency/sensitivity (measured using meta-d’) is known to be modality-
specific33, 34 and anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g. hallucinations) can vary in 
modalities35. It has also been acknowledged that auditory anomalous experiences are most 
common in psychosis36, 37, all of which may suggest a modality-specific association with 
auditory or visual anomalous experiences and perception/metacognition. This present 
study will assess the modality-specific association between perceptual bias (signal 
detection bias) and metacognitions with anomalous perceptual experiences in visual and 
auditory modalities, whilst controlling for objective performance (see figure 2).  
 
Limited research has assessed the association between anomalous self-experiences and 
metacognition, but it may be suggested metacognitive efficiency may also be associated 
with anomalous self-experiences, previously alluded to by Dokic and Martin38. This study 
will empirically test the association between anomalous self-experiences and perceptual 
biases and metacognition. Anomalous self-experiences and anomalous delusional beliefs 
have not been considered to be modality-specific, therefore these measures are 
hypothesised to be related to both visual and auditory perceptual signal detection biases 
and metacognitive ability. 
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Figure 2: Proposed model including associations between perceptual signal detection bias and metacognitive efficiency with various 
anomalous events: anomalous experiences and beliefs, and the associations between metacognitive aspects. 
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Metacognition has been considered fractionated and can appear in many different forms, 
associated within a dynamic model23, 39. Three levels of metacognition have been proposed: 
i) Metacognitive efficiency: “knowing that you know”40, and this level in particular may 
involve unconscious knowledge to generate a “feeling of knowing”41 and has been shown 
to be modality-specific33, which can be assessed by within-task confidence ratings, ii) 
Metacognitive experience: online appraisal of one’s experience or performance after an 
activity, and iii) Metacognitive ability is the capacity to think about one’s own cognitions, 
emotions and behaviour, as well as others’, and to use this reflection to respond to 
challenges and link to other relevant narrative events. These metacognitive levels may 
influence each other via metacognitive processes. Nelson and Narens23 highlighted two 
processes: i) Metacognitive controlling processes, (i.e. such that knowledge is used to 
control, guide and correct ongoing action)42, and ii) Metacognitive monitoring processes 
(i.e. monitoring of ongoing experience in order to recognise anomalies and update higher 
level beliefs)43, which are important for accurate metacognitive functioning. 
 
As metacognition works in a hierarchical fashion, it may be expected the poor 
metacognitive efficiency in psychosis, demonstrated above, can impact the next 
component on the continuum: metacognitive experience, appraisal of one’s experience or 
performance after an activity, via metacognitive processes. However, Gilleen, 
Greenwood and David44 demonstrated that metacognitive experience (awareness of level 
of cognitive ability) is on average intact within a group of individuals with schizophrenia, 
whilst metacognitive ability is deficit. The dissociation between the different levels of 
metacognition may be the result of impaired metacognitive processes (self-reflectiveness 
and set-shifting)45, akin to various other studies46, 47, 48. Due to limited studies, it is currently 
unclear which metacognitive processes may be driving these metacognitive difficulties. 
This study aims to further understand the difficulties in metacognitive processes in young 
people with psychosis and matched healthy controls within two models (see figure 3 and 
4). 
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Figure 3: Part of figure 2 model. Proposed associations between metacognitive 
efficiency and metacognitive experience with monitoring and controlling processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Part of figure 2 model. Proposed associations between metacognitive 
experience and metacognitive ability with monitoring and controlling processes. 
 
 
 
 
From this, we will assess which metacognitive components may impact on functional 
outcome: a measurable aspect of an individual’s specific activities of daily living. 
Research suggests functional outcome is predicted by neurocognition49, 50, functional 
capacity (measured using real-life performance skills task)51-53, negative symptoms54, which 
has been demonstrated to show a synergistic interaction with cognition to impact 
functioning55, and, importantly here, metacognition. Metacognitive ability, measured 
using the Metacognition Assessment Interview (MAI) or MAS22, 56, appears to play a 
crucial role on functional outcome, independent of cognition and symptoms57-59. In a recent 
study, Davies, Fowler & Greenwood60 demonstrated that metacognition partially mediates 
the relationship between cognition and functional capacity, and fully mediates the 
relationship between functional capacity and functional outcome. Limited research has 
assessed whether metacognitive processes are also relevant in maintaining poor 
functional outcome over time, independent of cognition. With this in mind, the role of 
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metacognition will be examined to explore the impact on functional outcome and capacity 
(see figure 5) and a longitudinal model will also explore the relationships over time.  
 
Figure 5: Proposed model for cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses including 
indirect effects from symptoms and neurocognition to metacognition and functional 
capacity to functional and subjective outcome. 
 
 Functional outcome has also been associated with subjective recovery outcome (self-
rated outcome reflecting sense of wellbeing and quality of life)61, 62. Metacognitive 
capabilities were related to components of recovery beyond the effects of psychiatric 
symptoms, including aspects of quality of life63-65. There is a complex relationship between 
metacognitive ability, functional outcome and subjective outcome in psychosis. This 
study will assess these relationships to enable in-depth understanding of functional 
recovery.  
 
This study aims to develop and test a series of dynamic models to understand (i) the nature 
of metacognitive deficits compared to healthy controls (chapter 3) (ii) the relationship 
between metacognitive components (chapter 3) (iii) and the influences of metacognition 
on objective/subjective functional outcome for young people with psychosis (chapter 3 
and 4) and anomalous experiences (chapter 8). If these proposed models can be 
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demonstrated empirically, this can help to understand and remediate poor outcome within 
psychosis. 
 
2.3 Hypotheses1 
 
Hypothesis 1: A two-way relationship will be present in such that metacognitive control 
processes will significantly predict metacognitive ability and metacognitive monitoring 
processes will significantly predict metacognitive experience. In addition, metacognitive 
control processes will significantly predict metacognitive experience and metacognitive 
monitoring processes will significantly predict metacognitive efficiency. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Metacognitive variables (metacognitive ability, metacognitive processes 
and metacognitive experience) will significantly predict outcome measures (functional 
capacity, functional outcome and subjective recovery outcome) in young people with and 
without psychosis, even after controlling for symptoms, anomalous experiences and IQ. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Metacognitive variables (metacognitive ability, metacognitive processes 
and metacognitive experience) will significantly predict outcome measures (functional 
capacity and functional outcome) at 36-month longitudinal follow-up of participants in 
young people with psychosis, even after controlling for symptoms and IQ. 
 
Hypothesis 4: Anomalous experiences will be associated with increased signal detection 
biases and poor metacognitive efficiency, and this relationship will be domain-specific.  
 
2.4 Methods 
 
2.4.1 Design  
 
This is a cross-sectional and longitudinal study. This cross-sectional aspect will explore 
(i) deficits in metacognition between young people with psychosis and healthy controls; 
(ii) interrelations between different metacognitive components and processes across the 
whole sample; and (iii) the contribution of specific novel metacognitive variables to 
anomalous experiences and outcomes. The longitudinal aspect will identify whether 
																																																						
1 The order of these hypotheses have been changed to be consistent with the overall structure of this 
thesis.  
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metacognition predicts experiences and outcomes at 36-month follow-up period 
(psychosis sample only). 
 
2.4.2 Participants 
 
Seventy-three young people with psychosis will be recruited. This sample will be made 
up of a convenience sample from first episode services and the remaining individuals will 
be those re-recruited from a previous first episode psychosis (FEP) sample (previous 
N=80), to take part in the main cross-sectional study and longitudinal follow-up aspect. 
Participants from the previous FEP study have baseline data on metacognition, functional 
capacity, functional outcome, symptoms and cognition60. These data will form the baseline 
data for the longitudinal analysis. All participants with psychosis will be 18 – 40 years of 
age, able to read and communicate in English and receiving treatment for psychosis with 
a UK Early Intervention in Psychosis service at first assessment. Participants with organic 
causes for psychosis or those with a diagnosis of substance use disorder will be excluded.  
 
Seventy-three healthy control participants will be recruited as a comparison group. These 
participants will be 18-40 years of age, able to read and communicate in English and 
matched on age, gender and education with the psychosis sample. Participants will be 
recruited through advertisement within the local community, e.g. in libraries, cafes and 
on social media. Participants with current mental health problems or history of psychosis 
will be excluded following screening questions: i) Are you currently experiencing any 
mental health difficulties? ii) Are you on any psychotropic medication/substances? iii) 
Have you been in contact with psychological or psychiatric services for psychological 
problems? iv) Has anyone in your immediate family experienced an episode of psychosis? 
E.g. parents, siblings. If healthy control answered yes to any of the questions, these 
participants were deemed ineligible to take part in the study.  
 
Participants with hearing or sight problems (which cannot be corrected) will be excluded. 
Data collection will be undertaken within an NHS building or community setting between 
10th March 2017 and 4th May 2018. The end date of the study is 18th September 2018.  
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2.4.3 Patient and public involvement 
 
Patient and Public Involvement is primarily via the Psychosis Interest Group run by the 
Service User and Carer Involvement Coordinator at the Sussex Partnership NHS 
Foundation Trust Research and Development department, and service users within the 
Psychosis Theme Group (PTG). The first author met with the PTG to consult on the 
development of this project, including the design, methods, and procedure of the project. 
The lived experience group have viewed all the measures, including the two main 
computer tasks (visual and auditory tasks), and provided extensive feedback which has 
been incorporated into this project. Study participants who consent to receiving the study 
results will receive these by post/email. The first author and the Psychosis Theme Group 
will continue to meet to consult on recruitment procedures, and on the plans for 
dissemination to service user groups following data analysis.  
 
2.4.4 Cross-sectional measures 
 
Anomalous experience measures 
Anomalous perceptual experiences: Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences 
Questionnaire35. This measures anomalous perceptual/sensory experiences with 6 
subscales. Both the full scale and subscales have been demonstrated as possessing good 
reliability (auditory r=0.72, visual r=0.72), good validity between clinical and non-
clinical group (Cohen’s d = 0.96) and significance with all other anomalous experience 
scale, and internal consistency (auditory α=0.82, visual α=0.88). The auditory and visual 
subscales will be used for this study which each provide a combined score for presence 
and frequency of anomalous experiences. 
Anomalous self-experiences: Cambridge depersonalisation scale (trait and state 
versions)66. The trait version includes 29 items measuring frequency (Never to All the 
time) and duration (Few seconds to More than a week) of anomalous self-experiences 
over the last 6 months. It demonstrates high internal consistency (>0.6), good validity 
with other scales (r=0.8) and good reliability (α= 0.89)66, and is useful for assessing 
depersonalisation in a schizophrenia group67. The state version includes 22 items 
measuring anomalous self-experiences within-the-moment on a scale of intensity from 0-
100. Subscales of the CDS are ‘alienation from surroundings’, ‘anomalous subjective 
recall’, ‘emotional numbing’ and ‘anomalous body experience’.  
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Anomalous delusional beliefs: Schizotypal Symptom Inventory68. This measure assesses 
residual psychotic symptoms, providing a total score with separate subscales for paranoia, 
anomalous experience and social anxiety69. This present study will use the paranoia 
subscale as a measure of anomalous delusional beliefs and the anomalous experience 
subscale as a measure of anomalous perceptual experiences, to confirm MUSEQ data 
assessing anomalous perceptual experiences. This scale demonstrates high internal 
consistency (non-clinical sample α=0.87 and clinical sample α=0.92), good validity with 
other scales (PANSS with total r = 0.59 and paranoia r=0.6) and good test-retest reliability 
(0.85 for total and 0.6-0.84 for subscales).  
 
Metacognition 
Metacognitive efficiency 
This encompasses separate computer –based visual and auditory detection task. The 
critical task in both paradigms is to make two forced-choice binary judgments of whether 
a visual or auditory stimulus (dot or tone) was present or absent (first judgment) within a 
noisy picture or presentation of white noise, and whether this was associated with high 
confidence or low confidence in the first judgment (second judgment).  
 
The first judgment can be used to calculate a score for signal detection perceptual 
sensitivity and perceptual signal detection bias. Perceptual sensitivity (d’): the ability to 
correct report whether the stimulus (dot/tone) was either present or absent. Signal 
detection theory (SDT) posits that detection making involves depicting whether certain 
waveforms called signals may or may not be embedded within background ‘noise’, using 
internal responses70. Perceptual bias (B) is the tendency to report one decision over the 
other, e.g. stating the stimuli was present when it was in-fact absent. The internal 
responses from perceptual sensitivity score is then compared to a decision criterion (c) so 
all evidence above criteria elicits a response of ‘present’ compared to below the criteria 
elicits the response of ‘absent’71. The perceptual sensitivity score and the decision criterion 
can be fitted to an empirical Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve, enabling us 
to assess perceptual biases in responses, e.g. whether someone was more or less likely to 
report stimuli as being present based on a lower/higher decision criterion.  
 
The second judgment can be used to calculate a score for metacognitive sensitivity and 
metacognitive efficiency. Metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) is the ability to discriminate 
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between correct and incorrect judgments. Alike to the SDT above, metacognitive 
sensitivity is based on assessment of sensitivity (how well confidence ratings discriminate 
correct from incorrect trials) and response bias (overall propensity for reporting high 
confidence). However, this score from the second judgment must take into account first 
judgment performance72. Meta-d’ indicates the d’ that would have been predicted to result 
in the confidence rating assuming the signal detection theory. Optimal metacognitive 
sensitivity is when perceptual sensitivity score is matched. Meta-d’ greater or less than d’ 
indicates metacognition is better or worse than d’ 34. Metacognitive efficiency is one’s 
ability to discriminate between one’s own correct or incorrect perceptual decision, whilst 
taking into account objective performance32. This is calculated as meta-d’/d’. 
Metacognitive efficiency (meta-d’/d’) was chosen as a more robust form of perceptual 
metacognition, over metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) which was previously used by 
researchers73. 
 
Performance on the first judgment will be held constant throughout the task and across 
participants (using a 1-up-2-down staircase procedure) to ensure that metacognitive 
ability is measured independent of task performance and produces valid scores. 
 
Studies including signal detection tasks typically involve a large number of trials (~400), 
to avoid statistical bias and large variance in scores74. However, following a pilot study, 
we reduced the trials to 200, whilst maintaining reliable data. To ensure the feasibility of 
conducting this study within a clinical population, who may present difficulty with 
attention and concentration75, the two computer tasks have been developed from a pilot 
study within a healthy student population76. 
 
Alongside this, participants will be asked to prospectively and retrospectively rate their 
performance on the detection tasks. These ratings will be used to assess metacognitive 
ability and metacognitive experience.   
 
Metacognitive experience: The retrospective rating (“How well do you think you 
performed overall on the task? For instance, if you think you were right every time, select 
100 (all correct). If you think you were correct none of the time, select 0 (none correct). 
You can select any value in between zero and 100 to indicate what percentage you think 
you correctly identified”) will assess task-related metacognitive experience.  
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Metacognitive ability: This will be assessed using the Metacognitive Assessment 
Interview56. This measure assesses the ability to understand “the self” and “the other”; 
termed as one multidimensional construct as ‘metacognition’. This measure has 
demonstrated good inter-rater reliability and internal consistency (α=0.90 for total 
metacognition), factorial validity, and reliability (r=0.62 to 0.90)56.   
 
Metacognitive processes (monitoring and control): Monitoring processes will be assessed 
using self-reflectivity subscale of Cognitive insight scale77.  This measure possesses good 
internal consistency (α=0.68), convergent validity (with SUMD-A delusions, r= -0.67)77 
and test-retest reliability (r=0.90)78. Studies have demonstrated this measure is appropriate 
to assess metacognitive monitoring45, 79. Control processes will be assessed via set-shifting 
using trail-making task80 part B-A.  This measure possesses good internal consistency 
(TMT-A α=0.39, TMT-B α=0.71), convergent validity (with Task Switching Paradigm 
r=0.32)81, and good reliability of other forms of TMT (r=0.78)82. This measure is 
appropriate to assess metacognitive control processes45. 
 
Functional outcome 
Functional outcome: Time Use Survey (adapted from Short83) provides a retrospectively 
rated objective measure for hours spent engaging in structured activity per week84. This 
measure has been used within a First Episode Psychosis sample to assess functioning85, 86. 
This measure has good reliability (inter-rater reliability at 0.99)85, coder reliability (89% 
accuracy)87, good validity as differences in Time-Use have been demonstrated between 
different stages of psychosis, representing social recovery in psychosis85, validity as TUS 
is comparable to studies using functioning measures69. 
 
Functional capacity: The UCSD Performance-Based Skills Assessment53 provides a total 
score for real-life performance skills based on simulated tasks. It was adapted to be 
applicable for UK participants. This measure demonstrates high internal consistency 
(α=0.88), good validity with other scales (DAFS r=0.86) and good test-retest reliability 
(r=0.91)88. 
 
Subjective recovery outcome: The Questionnaire of Process of Recovery89 provides a score 
for an individual’s subjective functioning (psychosis participants only). This scale has 
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two subscales: intrapersonal items related to hope, empowerment, confidence, and 
interpersonal related to connectedness with others, others help/care, reliance. This 
possesses good internal consistency (intrapersonal subscale, α=.94, interpersonal 
subscale, α=.77), construct validity (GHQ total score: intra, r=-.83 inter, r=.52) and 
reliability (intra, r=.87, inter, r.77)89.  
 
Covariates 
Symptom severity: This assesses symptoms of psychosis using Positive and Negative 
Syndrome Scale90 (clinical participants only), which is the mostly widely used 
standardised instrument for assessing symptom severity in schizophrenia91. This measure 
has demonstrated good reliability and validity, and appropriate inverse correlations 
between positive and negative subscales92. This measure has good internal consistency 
(agreement for PANSS items r=0.69 – 0.94), construct validity (between PANSS and 
Andreasen rating system, r=0.77) and reliability (interrater correlations for PANSS scales 
ranged from 0.83 to 0.87)92. 
Cognitive ability: This includes verbal IQ: Vocabulary task93 is a measure of an 
individual’s verbal knowledge and fund of information. This measure as good internal 
consistency (correlation with other cognitive measures range r=0.54 to 0.79), construct 
validity (with WASI-III, r=0.88) and reliability (0.90 to 0.89) and test-retest (0.88)93; and 
performance IQ: Matrix reasoning task93 is a measure of individual’s ability to mentally 
manipulate abstract symbols and perceive the relationship among them. This measure as 
good internal consistency (correlation with other cognitive measures range r=0.59 to 
0.63), construct validity (with WASI-III, r=0.66) and reliability (0.88 to 0.96) and test-
retest (0.76)93. 
 
2.4.5 Longitudinal measures  
 
For participants who have baseline data, this comprises of the following measures 
outlined above: metacognitive ability and metacognitive monitoring processes; functional 
outcome and functional capacity; and all covariates.  
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2.5 Analysis 
 
2.5.1 Sample size 
 
Two sample size estimates have been combined to ensure the analyses have sufficient 
power to detect effects.  
 
Firstly, sample size to detect differences between individuals with psychosis and healthy 
control participants on metacognitive efficiency. Using G power with .8 power, .57 effect 
size based on a previous metacognitive efficiency task in psychosis94 and 0.05 alpha, the 
proposed total sample size is 28 (14 per group). Secondly, a regression analysis to assess 
the predictive value of metacognitive ability, processes and experience on outcome 
measures (controlling for symptoms and IQ) will be conducted. G power estimation was 
used for a power calculation based on a power of .80, effect size of .31360 and alpha of 
.05. This suggested for 6 predictors a total of 55 participants are required.  
 
In terms of the mediation analysis, power estimation was calculated using the monte carlo 
method to estimate power for complex mediation models (see Thoemmes, MacKinnon & 
Resier95). Using fixed parameters from Davies, Fowler and Greenwood60 and power at .8, 
this suggested a total sample size of 146 participants to detect mediation effects, outlined 
in the above model.   
 
In terms of the longitudinal analysis, as many of the original sample (n=80) as possible 
will be followed up to maximise statistical power.  
 
2.5.2 Planned data analysis  
 
Data will be double entered and checked for accuracy, and checked for outliers.  
 
Missing data will be considered as ‘Missing at random’ (MAR), which means the missing 
variables are related to additional observed variables within the data, but values of 
missing data itself. Missing data will be treated according to best practice96. Principled 
missing data methods will be used which combine available information from the 
observed data to estimate the population parameters and/or the missing data mechanism97. 
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Full information maximum likelihood (FIML) involves using all the observed data and 
creating values for missing data using maximum likelihood estimations. This works well 
provided that the model for the complete data is realistic98. FIML will be used within this 
study which is considered most appropriate for MAR data and for mediation analyses99. 
Quantitative data (including demographic information) will be reported using descriptive 
statistics, e.g. means and standard deviations.  
 
Data will be analysed using SPSS and Mplus software. Group differences of all 
metacognitive measures and perceptual signal detection biases between young people 
with psychosis and healthy controls will be assessed, controlling for age and IQ. Linear 
regression analyses will be used to assess how metacognition (and perceptual signal 
detection biases) predicts anomalous experiences. Cross-sectional and longitudinal 
predictive analyses will be conducted, including regression analyses which will assess 
whether metacognitive components; ability, experience, efficiency are predicted by 
metacognitive processes. A mediation analysis will be used to assess whether functional 
capacity, functional outcome and subjective recovery outcome are predicted by 
metacognition and metacognitive processes, whilst controlling for anomalous 
experiences, symptoms and cognition. These analyses will include bootstrapped bias-
corrected confidence intervals.  
 
Results of the planned analyses are presented in chapters 3, 4 and 8.  
 
2.6 Discussion 
 
Our assumption is that metacognitive variables predict, and maintain, anomalous events, 
poor objective and subjective recovery outcome in young people with and without 
psychosis. Particularly in young people with psychosis, metacognitive deficits may 
predict long-term functional outcome.  
 
The study results will be an important addition to the literature and for clinicians for four 
main reasons: i) this study tests a proposed model from previous literature which may 
help understand poor functional outcome in psychosis, ii) from this, novel intervention 
studies can be developed to tackle the potential metacognitive deficits in psychosis which 
predict this poor functional outcome, iii) this is one of the first studies to assess 
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metacognition as a longitudinal predictor of functional outcome in young people with 
psychosis sample, and finally iv) our studies use up-to-date paradigms within the field of 
metacognition to avoid biases.  
 
2.6.1 Limitations  
 
A foreseeable limitation is that the First Episode Psychosis sample will be comprised of 
both a previous FEP sample and new participants who are currently engaged in EIS in 
Sussex. Therefore, individuals will be at various stages of their recovery and support from 
the Early Intervention Services which adds variation in terms of symptoms and recovery. 
With this in mind, symptoms will be controlled in the main analysis. However, this will 
enable exploration of factors which predict this variation. Due to length of follow-up 
period, another limitation may be the difficulty in re-recruiting these participants into the 
study. If re-contacting is difficult, the model may not have full power. If so, the individual 
paths of the model in the longitudinal analyses will be explored.  
 
2.7 Ethics and dissemination 
This study has been reviewed and approved by Camberwell St. Giles Research Ethics 
Committee (reference number: 17/LO/0055). The data will be stored securely in 
accordance with usual NHS procedures and data will be governed by the sponsor: 
University of Sussex. This research project will be reported within a PhD thesis, and will 
be written up for publication in scientific journals. 
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3.1 Abstract 
 
3.1.1 Introduction 
 
Beck and Rector (2005) proposed a model of functional outcome in schizophrenia, 
suggesting that the path between neurocognition and functioning is mediated by 
functional capacity and cognitive processes. These cognitive processes can include 
metacognition, considered ‘thinking about thinking’. Metacognition has been proposed 
to include several components: metacognitive ability, experience and efficiency, 
connected by metacognitive monitoring and control processes. It is unclear how these 
metacognitive components interact and which are important for outcomes in First Episode 
Psychosis (FEP).  
 
3.1.2 Methods  
This was a cross-sectional study involving 62 individuals with FEP and 73 matched 
healthy controls who completed measures of metacognition, functional capacity, 
functional outcome, and subjective recovery; with covariates: IQ, anomalous experiences 
and symptoms. 
 
3.1.3 Results 
A series of factor analyses demonstrated that metacognitive ability, experience, efficiency 
and monitoring were separate aspects of metacognition. Metacognitive ability predicted 
functional capacity, and objective functional outcome, independent of IQ, and subjective 
recovery independent of mood and anxiety. Metacognitive experience also predicted 
functional capacity. 
 
3.1.4 Discussion 
This is the first study to assess key metacognitive components within a large model and 
their independent role on outcomes, and to consider the distinct contributions to both 
objective and subjective recovery. This highlighted the important role of metacognitive 
ability as an early marker for later poor functioning and as a target for interventions in 
FEP. 
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3.2 Introduction 
 
Recent studies exploring recovery in psychosis have demonstrated favourable outcomes 
after long follow-up periods within schizophrenia and First Episode Psychosis (FEP) 
(Harrison, Hopper, Aig, et al., 2001; Harrow et al., 2005; Henry et al., 2010; Robinson, 
Woerner, McMeniman, Mendelowitz, & Bilder, 2004; Wunderink et al., 2009). Recovery 
can be considered an improvement in symptomatology and functioning (Andreasen et al., 
2005; Harvey & Bellack, 2009), and the latter may be objectively assessed in terms of the 
number of hours in structured activity, e.g. Time-Use Survey (Fowler et al., 2009; Short, 
2006). Alongside this, research in psychosis has now begun to consider the subjective 
perspective of recovery, including quality of life, finding hope, stability, re-establishment 
of  identity, and empowerment (Andresen, Oades, & Caputi, 2003; Leamy, Bird, Le 
Boutillier, Williams, & Slade, 2011; Sheridan et al., 2012). These subjective recovery 
models identify recovery as both a process and an outcome (Ramon, Shera, Healy, 
Lachman, & Renouf, 2009) which mimics the peaks and troughs in the recovery trajectory 
shown in FEP (Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015). 
 
These two streams of recovery (e.g. subjective and objective outcomes) have been 
associated (Provencher et al., 2002) and may have considerable overlap (Malla & Payne, 
2005). Research has now started to consider both objective and subjective outcomes in 
order to understand the ‘breadth of success’ across recovery (Harvey & Bellack, 2009). 
There is clear interest in the identification of those with FEP who are at-risk of poor 
recovery, to target interventions to reduce these poor outcomes.  
 
Functional outcome in schizophrenia has been shown to be predicted by neurocognition 
(Green et al. 2000), including IQ (Leeson, Barnes, Hutton, Ron, & Joyce, 2009), 
functional capacity (measured using real-life performance skills task) (Bowie, 
Reichenberg, Patterson, Heaton, & Harvey, 2006; Bowie et al., 2008), and negative 
symptoms (Milev et al., 2005; Greenwood et al., 2005). Beck and Rector (2005) proposed 
that this path between neurocognition and functional outcome is mediated by other 
cognitive processes: including defeatist performance beliefs, self-stigma (Berry & 
Greenwood, 2018) and, importantly here, metacognition (Davies, Fowler, & Greenwood, 
2017).  
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Metacognition is considered “thinking about thinking” (Flavell, 1979) or the way one 
thinks about one’s experience. Metacognition has been considered fractionated and can 
appear in many different forms and representations of the self (Lysaker et al., 2014; Shea 
et al., 2014). Three levels of metacognition have been proposed. The highest level is 
metacognitive ability: capacity to think about one’s own cognitions, as well as others’, 
and to use this to respond to challenges (Lysaker & Dimaggio, 2014). Metacognitive 
ability may impact the second level, metacognitive experience: “online” appraisal of 
one’s experience. Metacognitive experience may then impact the lowest level, 
metacognitive efficiency: unconscious knowledge used to generate a feeling of “knowing 
that you know” (Sherman et al., 2015). Theoretically, these components have been 
suggested to be associated within a dynamic model (Nelson & Narens, 1990) via: i) 
metacognitive controlling processes, (i.e. used to guide and correct ongoing action, Wells 
& Purdon, 1999), and ii) metacognitive monitoring processes (i.e. monitoring of 
experience in order to update beliefs, Efklides, 2006). These processes must work in 
harmony to ensure metacognition is effectively harnessed to enable cognitions to guide 
thought and behaviour. No study has yet empirically assessed these metacognitive 
components within a model nor assessed their role on outcomes. 
 
Firstly, metacognitive ability is poorer in psychosis (Lysaker, Pattison, Leonhardt, 
Phelps, & Vohs, 2018; Lysaker et al., 2005), and is shown to have an impact on 
functional, social and work outcomes in psychosis (Arnon-Ribenfeld, Hasson-Ohayon, 
Lavidor, Atzil-Slonim, & Lysaker, 2017; Brüne, Dimaggio, & Lysaker, 2011; Davies & 
Greenwood, 2018; Luedtke et al., 2012; Lysaker et al., 2010), independent of cognition 
and symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2011, 2014). Metacognitive ability is shown to mediate the 
relationships between neurocognition, functional capacity and functional outcome in FEP 
(Davies et al. 2017; Wright, Davies, Fowler & Greenwood, 2018). Negative symptoms 
have been associated with metacognition and also functioning (Hamm et al., 2012; James 
et al., 2016; McLeod et al., 2014). Limited research has assessed the role of metacognitive 
ability on functional outcome in FEP, independent of negative symptoms.  
 
Metacognitive ability has also been associated with components of subjective recovery 
outcome in schizophrenia (Kukla, Lysaker, & Salyers, 2013; Phalen, Viswanadhan, 
Lysaker, & Warman, 2015) and social quality of life (arguably a measure of subjective 
recovery outcome) (Lysaker et al., 2013; Hasson-Ohayon et al., 2015). Morrison et al. 
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(2013) recently demonstrated that there was no impact of neurocognition or negative 
symptoms on subjective recovery, instead negative emotion (including anxiety and 
depression) and internal locus of control have been shown to have a direct influence on 
subjective recovery. Individuals within these studies had long-term schizophrenia and no 
study has yet assessed the association between metacognition and subjective recovery in 
FEP, independent of negative emotion. 
 
Secondly, metacognitive experience (online appraisal) has also been associated with 
social, real-world and work functioning (Gould et al., 2015; Stratta et al., 2009; Verdoux 
et al., 2010). However, Gilleen, Greenwood and David (2014) demonstrated that 
metacognitive experience (“online” awareness within the moment) is, on average, intact 
within schizophrenia. This presents a potential dissociation between metacognitive ability 
and metacognitive experience, which may be the result of impaired metacognitive 
processes. 
 
Metacognitive monitoring processes (measured using self-reflectiveness scale of the 
Beck Cognitive Insight Scale) have been shown to be poorer in psychosis than controls 
(Engh et al., 2007; Warman, Lysaker, & Martin, 2007) and related to global functioning 
in schizophrenia (Giusti et al. 2013; Davies et al. 2017). Metacognitive control processes 
(set-shifting using Trail-Making Task) has been demonstrated as poor in psychosis (Riley 
et al., 2000) and linked to real-world outcomes (Strassnig et al., 2018). Intact 
metacognitive experience in schizophrenia requires both appropriate metacognitive 
monitoring and control processes (Gilleen et al., 2016). Research within FEP could 
identify key early deficits, which may be driving other metacognitive difficulties and 
could later predict difficulties in functioning. 
 
Thirdly, metacognitive efficiency is poorer in psychosis (Bliksted et al., 2017; Davies et 
al., 2018). Due to the lack of research linking metacognitive efficiency with real-world 
outcomes, it is not expected that this metacognitive component will be associated with 
functioning.  
 
Following Nelson and Naren’s proposed model of metacognition, it is hypothesized that 
there is a hierarchical relationship between the distinct metacognitive components. It is 
hypothesized that metacognitive ability, experience, monitoring and control processes 
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will predict functional capacity and functional outcome in young people with and without 
psychosis, independent of neurocognition (IQ) (and negative symptoms for the psychosis 
group). In the clinical group only, metacognitive ability will also be related to subjective 
recovery outcome in FEP, independent of negative emotion. 
 
3.3 Methods 
 
3.3.2 Participants 
 
Individuals with psychosis were recruited through a convenience sample from Early 
Intervention in Psychosis services in Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, and a 
minority were re-recruited from a previous first episode psychosis (FEP) sample (Davies, 
Fowler & Greenwood, 2017). All had been given a formal diagnosis of First Episode 
Psychosis (F29) by a psychiatrist, and were aged 18-40 at entry into the study. Participants 
with primary diagnosis of substance misuse disorder or organic neurological impairment 
were excluded. 
 
Healthy control participants were recruited as a comparison group, matched with the 
clinical group on age, gender and educational status. Participants with current mental 
health problems or family history of psychosis were excluded following screening 
questions.  
 
3.3.3 Design 
 
This is a cross-sectional study exploring the different components of metacognition and 
the contribution of these metacognitive measures to functional and subjective outcome 
measures, independent of IQ and symptoms, with individuals with First Episode 
Psychosis and matched healthy control participants. Full details of the study design and 
ethical approval is in the protocol in Chapter 2 (Wright, Fowler & Greenwood, 2018). 
Data collection was undertaken between March 2017 to May 2018. 
 
3.3.4 Measures 
 
Metacognition 
Metacognitive ability: The Metacognitive Assessment Interview (Semerari et al., 2012) 
required the participant to reflect on a recent difficult interpersonal experience and answer 
a series of questions to assess i) monitoring, ii) differentiation, iii) integration, and iv) 
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decentralization. These four subscales are each scored between 0-5, depending on 
spontaneity, use of aids/prompts and the sophistication of the answer. The scores for the 
sub-domains are averaged to provide one multidimensional construct as ‘metacognitive 
ability’. Psychometric properties and further details of this measure (and others below) 
can found in the protocol paper (Wright, Fowler, & Greenwood, 2018).  
 
Metacognitive experience (appraisal): Participants were asked to prospectively and 
retrospectively rate their performance on the detection tasks above. The retrospective 
rating was used: “How well do you think you performed overall on the task? For instance, 
if you think you were right every time, select 100 (all correct). If you think you were 
correct none of the time, select 0 (none correct)”. This scale was adapted from previous 
metacognitive research (see Rouault, Seow, Gillan, & Fleming, 2018). The participant’s 
accuracy score on the task (S) is subtracted from their subjective retrospective rating (R) 
to provide a metacognitive experience accuracy score for the individual’s ratings (ME) 
[R – S = ME]. This score ranged from -100 to 100. A score of 0 is perfect accuracy. An 
appraisal scored below 0 is considered under-confidence and above 0 is over-confidence. 
This measure provides two separate visual and auditory metacognitive experience scores, 
one for each task.  
 
Metacognitive efficiency: This encompasses separate computer–based visual and 
auditory detection tasks. The critical task in each paradigm is to make two forced-choice 
binary judgments of (i) whether a visual or auditory stimulus (dot or tone) was present or 
absent (first judgment) within a noisy picture or presentation of white noise, and (ii) 
whether confidence in this decision was high or low (second judgment). The second 
judgment captures metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’): the ability to discriminate between 
correct and incorrect judgments. Meta-d’ greater or less than d’ indicates metacognition 
is better or worse than d’ (Morales, Lau, & Fleming, 2017). Metacognitive efficiency 
involves taking into account objective performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco 
& Lau, 2012), and is calculated as meta-d’/d’ (metacognitive sensitivity divided by 
perceptual sensitivity) (Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010). The 
two tasks provide separate visual and auditory metacognitive efficiency scores. 
 
Metacognitive processes (monitoring and control): Monitoring processes will be assessed 
using the self-reflectivity subscale of the Cognitive insight scale (Beck et al., 2004). 
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Studies have demonstrated this measure is appropriate to assess metacognitive 
monitoring (David, Bedford, Wiffen, & Gilleen, 2012; Gilleen et al., 2016). Control 
processes will be assessed via set-shifting using the  trail-making task (Reitan, 1958)  time 
taken in seconds to complete part B-part A. This measure is appropriate to assess 
metacognitive control processes (Gilleen et al., 2011; Gilleen et al., 2016) and executive 
control processes (Tombaugh, 2004).  
 
Function 
Functional outcome: Time Use Survey (adapted from Short, 2006) provides a 
retrospectively rated objective measure for hours spent engaged in structured activity per 
week (Fowler et al., 2009), including work, education, voluntary work, childcare, sports, 
leisure and housework activities.  
 
Functional capacity: The UCSD Performance-Based Skills Assessment (Patterson, 
Goldman, McKibbin, Hughs, & Jeste, 2001) is a role play test which assesses the capacity 
to perform behaviors on simulated tasks. This measure is divided into five sections: i) 
finance, ii) communication, iii) comprehension/planning, iv) transport, and v) household. 
During each role-play the individual is given 0 or 1 point(s) by the researcher from the 
manual guidelines. These raw scores are totalled for each domain and converted into 0-
10 scale to be comparable across domains. This score is then multiplied by 2 and summed 
to provide a total out of 100.  
Subjective recovery outcome: The Questionnaire of Process of Recovery (Neil et al., 
2009) is a 22-item self-report questionnaire which provides a score for an individual’s 
subjective recovery outcomes; hope, empowerment, confidence, connectedness with 
others, and reliance (psychosis participants only). The participant rates declarative 
statements from 0 (strongly disagree) to 4 (strongly agree), with a higher score indicating 
recovery. Studies have reported scores in the range of 50-60 for schizophrenia samples 
(Morrison et al., 2013; Neil et al., 2009) 
Covariates 
IQ: Verbal IQ was measured through the Vocabulary task (Wechsler, 1999), a measure 
of an individual’s verbal knowledge. Performance IQ was measured with the Matrix 
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reasoning task (Wechsler, 1999), a measure of an individual’s ability to mentally 
manipulate abstract symbols and perceive the relationship among them.  
 
Symptoms: Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay & Fiszbein, 1987) is the most 
widely used standardized instrument for assessing symptom severity in schizophrenia 
(Hermes, Sokoloff, Stroup, & Rosenheck, 2012). This measures provide three separate 
scores for positive, negative and general psychopathology symptoms. This study also 
used individual item scores for depression and anxiety. Anomalous experiences were also 
included as a covariate, using anomalous experience subscale of Schizotypal Symptom 
Inventory (Hodgekins et al., 2012).  
 
3.4 Planned analysis 
 
Firstly, ANOVAs were conducted to assess the differences in metacognitive scores 
between the clinical and non-clinical group. Next, an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA) 
was conducted using items from metacognitive components to confirm the loading onto 
separate metacognitive factors. Next, associations between the metacognitive variables 
in the full group were explored using a correlational matrix. Next, to assess hierarchical 
framework for metacognitive components, a mediation analysis was conducted to assess 
the direct and indirect relationships between metacognitive ability, experience, and 
efficiency, via control and monitoring processes. Following this, metacognitive ability, 
experience, monitoring and control processes were used as predictors within a multiple 
regression analysis to assess the role on functional capacity and functional outcome, 
independent of IQ (and negative symptoms for FEP group). Next, the role of 
metacognitive ability on subjective recovery outcome in FEP was assessed, independent 
of anxiety and depression. 
 
3.4.2 Data and assumption checking 
Missing data was kept to a minimum and was shown to be Missing Completely At 
Random (MCAR) as it was unrelated to key variables within the data. Descriptive 
statistics for the data were checked for skewness, kurtosis and outliers, and normality of 
the data was assessed visually and using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality. Trail-
Making Task (B-A), PANSS positive and PANSS negative were all negatively skewed, 
and variables were transformed using Log10 transformation. 
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3.5 Results  
 
3.5.2 Sample characteristics 
 
A total of hundred and thirty-five participants took part. This includes sixty-two 
participants with First Episode Psychosis and seventy-three healthy control participants 
(see table 1). Table demonstrates sample characteristics and ANOVAs for comparing 
metacognitive components between FEP and control group.   
 
Table 1: Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics with difference tests between 
the two groups. 
 FEP sample 
(N=62) 
Healthy control 
sample (N=73) 
Differences 
test 
Age, yrs. (SD) 26.24 (5.66) 
range 18-431 
26.3 (S.D 6.6) 
range 18-40 
t(132.99) = -
.004, p=.99 
Gender  
Male 
Female 
 
46 (74%) 
16  
 
51 (73%) 
22  
Ӽ² (1, 135) = 
.31, p =.58 
Educational level2 
No qualifications or 
GCSE 
A-levels 
Degree or Higher 
Degree 
 
20 (32%)  
22 (36%)  
18 (30%)  
 
 
6 (8%)  
49 (67%)  
18 (25%)  
 
Ӽ² (3, 134) 
= 17.88, 
p<.001*** 
																																																						
1 As this study involved re-contacting individuals from an early cohort study, one participant was above 
the 18-40 range.  
2 Due to the way educational level, martial status, ethnicity, work status and accommodation status were 
measured and the assumptions of chi-square tests, we had to collapse the groups. Participants who 
preferred not to state their answer were removed from these chi-squared analyses.		
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Work status 
Full-time or part-time  
Not in employment 
Other: Student, 
Looking after home, 
or Long-term sickness 
 
 
30 (49%)  
14 (23%)  
17 (27%)  
 
 
36 (50%)  
5 (7%)  
31 (42%)  
Ӽ² (2, 135) 
= .7.89, 
p=.02* 
Accommodation status 
Parent’s house 
Other: Family carer 
home, support living, 
or NHS 
accommodation 
Lives independently 
 
 
25 (40%)  
7 (9%)  
 
 
29 (47%)  
 
 
17 (23%)  
11 (15%)  
 
 
45 (62%)  
 
Ӽ² (2, 134) = 
5.19, p=.08 
 Mean (SD) Mean (SD) Difference 
tests 
Matrix reasoning (t-score) 52.39 (8.53)  
(range 26-66) 
52.04 (7.6)  
(range 30-68) 
t(131) -.25, 
p=.8 
Vocabulary (t-score) 51.25 (13.1)  
(range 20-70) 
54.76 (8.65)  
(range 33-70) 
t(98.79) -
1.78, p=.08 
2-part IQ 104.54 (14.99)  
(range 61-131) 
106.13 (10.78)  
(range 75-131) 
t(102.8) -
.68, p=.5 
MAI total (0-5) 3.15 (.87)  
(range 1.19-4.56)  
3.64 (.65)  
(range 2.38-
4.69) 
t(111.36) 
3.68, 
p<.001*** 
Visual metacognitive 
experience (-100-100) 
-20.2 (19.96)  
(range -53.7-17.3) 
-29.08 (18.27)  
(range -66.7-
14.7) 
t(121) -2.57, 
p=.01** 
Auditory metacognitive 
experience (-100-100) 
-20.47 (19.72)  
(range -69.7-26.7) 
-26.5 (21.06)  
(range -65.0-
16.3) 
t(124) -1.64, 
p=.1 
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Visual metacognitive 
efficiency (meta-d’-d’) 
-.45 (.43)  
(range -1.87-.96) 
-.49 (.55)  
(range -2.29-.72) 
t(122) -.34, 
p=.74 
Auditory metacognitive  
efficiency (meta-d’-d’) 
-.41 (.53)  
(range -2.1-.98) 
-.43 (.43)  
(range -1.65-.23) 
t(125) -.25, 
p=.8 
BCIS self-reflectiveness 
subscale (0-27) 
15.3 (4.44)  
(range 6-25) 
12.68 (3.48)  
(range 5-21) 
t(132) -2.35, 
p=.02* 
BCIS self-reflectiveness 
subscale (4 items)1 (0-12) 
7.1 (2.7) (range 2-
12) 
4.85 (2.19) 
(range 0-9) 
t(114.98) 
5.26, 
p<.001*** 
TMT-BA (seconds) 39.63 (39.7)  
(range -7.7-261.2) 
27.0 (16.9)  
(range 5.2-
89.86) 
t(131) -2.12, 
p=.04* 
Time-Use Survey (hours in 
activity per week) 
38.45 (24.14)  
(range 5-109.69) 
55.46 (19.99)  
(range 8.27-
110.9) 
t(132) -4.46, 
p<.001*** 
UPSA total (0-100) 80.9 (9.58)  
(range 54.87-
96.9) 
84.38 (9.29)  
(range 56.6-
98.18) 
t(130) -2.12, 
p=.04* 
QPR total (0-88) 61.29 (13.4)  
(range 31-88) 
  
PANSS Positive (7-49) 12.44 (4.66)  
(range 7-26) 
  
PANSS Negative (7-49) 11.53 (4.04)  
(range 7-26) 
  
PANSS General (16-112) 26.86 (5.84)  
(range 17-39) 
  
Note: MAI = Metacognitive Assessment Interview; Visual/Auditory metacognitive experience = 
Postdiction accuracy of visual/auditory performance; BCIS = Beck Cognitive Insight Scale; TMT-BA = 
Trail Making Task (B-A); UPSA = UCSD Performance-Based Skills Assessment; QPR = Questionnaire 
of Process of Recovery; PANSS = Positive And Negative Syndrome Scale.  
 
	
																																																						
1 BCIS self-reflectiveness 4 items was derived from the factor analyses below.   
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3.5.3 Hypothesis testing 
 
Prior to the main Exploratory Factor Analyses (EFA). Two CFAs were conducted to 
assess i) the factor loadings for the four variables onto one latent variable: metacognitive 
ability (Metacognitive Assessment Interview), and ii) the factor loadings for 9 variables 
onto one latent variable: metacognitive monitoring (self-reflectiveness subscale of Beck 
Cognitive Insight Scale). The metacognitive variables were converted into Z scores, using 
mean and S.D within this current data. Next, the main EFA was conducted using items 
for the metacognitive measures to confirm the loading onto four separate metacognitive 
factors: metacognitive ability, experience, monitoring and efficiency. Metacognitive 
control processes were not included as this measure includes only one variable (TMT-
BA) and is conceptually indefensible.  
 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA): Metacognitive ability (MAI) 
A CFA was conducted which included all individual metacognitive ability variables to 
assess loading onto one latent variable. Scree plot and model fit suggested one factor 
(supplementary material) which had excellent fit indices, [χ2(2) = .04, p=.98, CFI = 1.00, 
TLI = 1.02, RMSEA = .00].  
 
CFA: Metacognitive monitoring [BCIS-Self-reflectiveness (SR)] 
A CFA was conducted which included all individual metacognitive monitoring to assess 
loading onto one latent variable. BCIS-SR as one factor had poor fit indices, [χ2(27) = 
76.19, p<.001, CFI = .69, TLI = .59, RMSEA = .12] (supplementary material). BCIS-SR 
6-8 were excluded (“Even though I feel strongly that I am right, I could be wrong”; “If 
somebody points out that my beliefs are wrong, I am willing to consider it”; “There is 
often more than one possible explanation for why people act the way they do”). The CFA 
was conducted again with 6 items which had improved but still poor fit indices, [χ2(9) = 
36.44, p<.001, CFI = .8, TLI = .67, RMSEA = .15] (supplementary material). All 
variables significantly loaded onto one factor.   
 
Full Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA)  
An EFA was conducted which included all individual metacognitive factors to identify 
loadings onto four separate factors. Metacognitive efficiency and metacognitive 
experience had two factor loadings and, following the theoretical model, two factor 
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loadings were deemed appropriate for these two factors. The scree plot and model fit 
suggested five factors. A five factor solution had excellent fit indices, [χ2(31) = 15.1, 
p=.99, CFI = 1.00, TLI = 1.02, RMSEA = .00]. Two BCIS-SR were not loading 
appropriately and were removed from this analysis (“Other people can understand the 
cause of my unusual experiences better than I can”; “I have jumped to conclusions too 
fast”). The new scree plot (supplementary material) suggests five factors. However, the 
model fit supported a four factor solution with good fit indices, [χ2(24) = 13.79, p=.95, 
CFI = .97, TLI = .96, RMSEA = .00]. Table 2 presents the factor loadings.  
Table 2: Exploratory factor loadings for metacognition. 
Item MAI Metacognitive 
efficiency  
Metacognitive 
experience 
BCIS-
SR 
MAI: Monitoring  .76    
MAI: Differentiation .79    
MAI: Integration .81    
MAI: Decentralization .76    
BCIS 1: At times, I have 
misunderstood other people’s 
attitudes towards me 
   -.42 
BCIS 4: Some of my experiences 
that have seemed very real may 
have been due to my imagination 
   -.75 
BCIS 5: Some of the ideas I was 
certain were true turned out to be 
false 
   -.8 
BCIS 9: My unusual experiences 
may be due to my being extremely 
upset or stressed 
   -.39 
Visual metacognitive experience    -.5  
Auditory metacognitive experience   -1.04  
Visual metacognitive efficiency   .41   
Auditory metacognitive efficiency  .85   
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With the acknowledgement of separate and independent factors of metacognition, a 
correlational matrix was conducted with the metacognitive variables (factor scores)1, 
outcome variables and covariates (table 3).  
																																																						
1 Note: Following the outcome of factor analysis in which BCIS-SR factor had 4 factor 
loadings, this factor score was used in the following analysis.  
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Table 3: Correlational matrix with metacognitive variables, outcome variables and covariates. 
N=135 TMT 
(BA) 
BCIS 
(SR-4) 
Metacog 
experience 
Metacog 
efficiency  
UPSA Time-
Use 
QPR IQ PANSS 
Negative 
PANSS 
Anxiety 
PANSS 
Depression 
SSI AE 
MAI r= -.2* 
p=.02 
r= .01 
p=.99 
r= -.22** 
p=.01 
r= .05 
p=.61 
r= .48*** 
p<.001 
 
r= 
.32*** 
p<.001 
 
r= .23 
p=.08 
r= 
.55*** 
p<.001 
r=-.56*** 
p<.001 
r= .11 
p=.42 
r= .18 
p=.16 
r=-.11 
p=.23 
TMT (BA) 1 r= .08 
p=.34 
r= .15 
p=.09 
r= .01 
p=.95 
r= -.33*** 
p<.001 
r= -.15 
p=.08 
r= .2 
p=.13 
r=-
.32*** 
p<.001 
r= .12 
p=.37 
r= -.07 
p=.58 
r= -.12 
p=.37 
r= .08 
p=.38 
BCIS (SR-4)  1 r= .13 
p=.17 
r= .15 
p=.09 
r= -.01 
p=.96 
r= -.04 
p=.68 
r= .08 
p=.56 
r= .17 
p=.05 
r= .09 
p=.49 
r= .16 
p=.23 
r= .01 
p=.98 
r= .22** 
p=.01 
Metacog 
experience 
  1 r= -.12 
p=.21 
r= -.32*** 
p<.001 
r= -.18* 
p=.04 
r= .02 
p=.91 
r= -.13 
p=.15 
r= .05 
p=.69 
r= .04 
p=.74 
r= -.02 
p=.86 
r= .15 
p=.08 
Metacog 
efficiency  
   1 r= .08 
p=.41 
r= .01 
p=.99 
r= .11 
p=.48 
r= -.02 
p=.87 
r= -.04 
p=.79 
r= .14 
p=.33 
r= -.02 
p=.9 
r= -.06 
p=.49 
UPSA     1 r= -
.24** 
p=.01 
r= .11 
p=.41 
r= 
.52*** 
p<.001 
r= -.5*** 
p<.001 
r= -.01 
p=.92 
r= .08 
p=.55 
r= -.15 
p=.09 
Time-Use      1 r= .44** 
p<.001 
r= .11 
p=.21 
r= -.38** 
p=.01 
r= -.26* 
p=.04 
r= -.16 
p=.23 
r= -.21* 
p=.02 
QPR1       1 r= .11 
p=.43 
r= -.35** 
p=.01 
r= -.5*** 
p<.001 
r= -.49*** 
p<.001 
r= -.44** 
p=.01 
																																																						
1 N=58 (Data collected on FEP group only) 
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IQ        1 r= -.23 
p=.09 
r= -.06 
p=.67 
r= -.06 
p=.65 
r= -.13 
p=.13 
PANSS 
Negative1 
        1 r= .09 
p=.5 
r= .16 
p=.22 
r= .33* 
p=.01 
PANSS 
Anxiety  
         1 r= .66* 
p<.001 
r= .42** 
p=.01 
PANSS 
Depression 
          1 r= .31 
p=.02 
MAI = Metacognitive Assessment Interview; TMT = Trail Making Task (B-A); BCIS = Beck Cognitive Insight Scale; SR-6 = Self-reflectiveness scale 6 items; Metacog 
exp = Metacognitive experience; UPSA = UCSD Performance Based Skill Assessment; QPR = Questionnaire of Process of Recovery; PANSS = Positive And Negative 
Syndrone Scale; SSI AE = Schizotpyal Symptom Inventory Anomalous Experiences.  
 
																																																						
1 N=59 (Data collected on FEP group only)	
		
86	
Due to the lack of correlation between metacognitive variables (efficiency, experience, 
ability, control and monitoring), the mediation analysis could not be conducted.  
 
Functional capacity  
Stepwise multiple regression analyses were used to assess the role of metacognitive 
components on functional capacity, independent of IQ and, in the FEP group only, also 
negative symptoms. Metacognitive ability (MAI) was a significant predictor of functional 
capacity, R²=.23, F(1, 131) = 38.98, p<.001, and remained so after controlling for IQ, 
R²=.33, F(2, 128) = 30.72, p<.001. Metacognitive ability predicted 5.6% of this variance 
(ΔR²= .06, F(1, 126) = 10.43, p=.01).  
 
Metacognitive monitoring (BCIS-SR-4) was not a significant predictor of functional 
capacity (p>.05).  
 
Metacognitive control (TMT-BA) was a significant predictor of functional capacity, 
R²=.11, F(1, 130) = 16.16, p<.001, and remained so after controlling for IQ, R²=.29, F(2, 
127) = 25.29, p<.001. Metacognitive control predicted 2.4% of this variance (ΔR²= .02, 
F(1, 125) = 4.25, p=.04).  
 
Metacognitive experience was a significant predictor of functional capacity, R²=.101, 
F(1, 131) = 14.6, p<.001, and remained so after controlling for IQ, R²=.34, F(2, 128) = 
31.8, p<.001. Metacognitive experience predicted 6.3% of this variance (ΔR²= .06, F(1, 
126) = 12.01, p=.01).  
 
All significant predictors: metacognitive ability, metacognitive experience and 
metacognitive control were included within a multiple regression (see table 4). Even when 
controlling for IQ, metacognitive experience, control process and ability predicted an 
additional 10.4% of the variance and improved the model (ΔR²= .104, F(1, 111) = 18.42, 
p<.001). Including anomalous experience as a covariate did not change this result. 
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Table 4: A stepwise regression model for predictive value of metacognitive components 
on functional capacity in full sample.  
  B SE B β p value CI  
Model 2       
 Constant 48.8     
 IQ .26 .07 .37 <.001*** .13, .39 
 Metacognitive 
ability (MAI) 
2.55 1.09 .211 .02** .39, 4.72 
 Metacognitive 
control process 
-3.37 2.25 -.12 .14 -7.82, 1.08 
 Metacognitive 
experience 
-.07 .03 -.21 .01** -.13, -.02 
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
 
In the FEP group only, MAI was not a significant predictor of functional capacity when 
controlling for IQ and negative symptoms (p=.71) but this result may have been impacted 
by the smaller sample size. Metacognitive control and experience were not significant 
predictors of functional capacity when controlling for IQ and negative symptoms (p=.14, 
p=.09).  
 
Functional outcome   
Stepwise multiple regression analyses were used to assess the role of metacognitive 
components on functional outcome, independent of IQ and, in the FEP group only, also 
negative symptoms. 
 
Metacognitive ability (MAI) was a significant predictor of functional outcome, R²=.104, 
F(1, 133) = 15.39, p<.001, and remained so after controlling for IQ, R²=.12, F(2, 129) = 
8.77, p<.001. Metacognitive ability predicted 10.9% of this variance (ΔR²= .11, F(1, 127) 
= 15.74, p<.001). Including anomalous experience as a covariate did not change this 
result.  
 
		
88	
Metacognitive experience was a significant predictor of functional outcome, R²=.03, F(1, 
132) = 4.15, p=.04. Whilst controlling for IQ, metacognitive experience was not a 
significant predictor of functional outcome (p=.097). Metacognitive monitoring and 
metacognitive control (TMT-BA) were not significant predictors of functional outcome, 
even when controlling for IQ and/or negative symptoms (p>.05).  
 
Whilst controlling for negative symptoms, neither MAI nor metacognitive experience 
were significant predictors of functional outcome (p=.2), but may have been impacted by 
the smaller sample size. 
 
Subjective recovery outcome 
Functional outcome significantly predicted subjective recovery outcome in FEP, 
independent of depression and anxiety, R²=.41, F(3, 57) = 12.32, p=.01.  
 
Next, this study hypothesized that only metacognitive ability would be associated with 
subjective recovery outcome in the FEP group. Whilst controlling for depression and 
anxiety, metacognitive ability was a significant predictor of subjective recovery outcome, 
R²=.39, F(3, 57) = 11.55, p<.001. Metacognitive ability predicted 9.7% of this variance 
and improved the model (ΔR²= .1, F(1, 54) = 8.57, p=.01). No other metacognitive 
variable was associated with subjective recovery outcome (p>.05). 
 
3.6 Discussion 
 
This was the first study to assess the independence of different metacognitive components 
within a large sample of individuals with FEP and non-clinical controls. Metacognitive 
components were demonstrated to be separate and independent, contrary to our proposed 
model. This suggests that each metacognitive component is focused on a specific type of 
reflection or self-assessment, which is important and useful to identify components to 
target for those with functional difficulties. 
 
Those with FEP demonstrated poorer metacognitive ability and metacognitive control 
processes than the healthy control group. However, contrary to our hypothesis, the FEP 
group demonstrated more accurate metacognitive experience (appraisal of experience 
after a task) and were higher on metacognitive monitoring process than controls. Higher 
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metacognitive monitoring (self-reflectiveness) and higher metacognitive experience 
(awareness of cognitive ability) was previously demonstrated in other psychosis samples 
(Gilleen et al., 2014; Kimhy et al., 2014; Mass, Wolf, & Lincoln, 2012). This current 
sample had fewer symptoms and better functioning than other FEP studies (Hodgekins, 
French, et al., 2015; Leucht et al., 2005), which may suggest that this group may have 
been further along in their recovery and can now more accurately reflect on their 
experiences, compared to a period of time when they were unwell. To support this, studies 
have demonstrated self-reflectiveness improves overtime in FEP (Bora et al., 2007; 
O’Connor et al., 2017), but poor metacognitive ability may continue to persist. 
Importantly, metacognitive ability was not associated with metacognitive monitoring, 
which is inconsistent with previous research in FEP (Davies et al. 2017), but may be due 
to the removal of some items which did not load onto the metacognitive monitoring factor, 
causing the factors to become differentiated.  
 
Metacognitive experience and metacognitive ability predicted functional capacity, 
independent of IQ. However, less accurate metacognitive experience predicted higher 
functional capacity score, even when controlling for negative symptoms. This is in the 
opposite direction than hypothesized and this may suggest that those with awareness of 
their difficulties on specific tasks may be less likely to want to engage in functional tasks, 
to protect themselves from feeling low about potentially performing poorly and this lack 
of practice may actually corrode their skills (see Greenwood et al. 2005). Conversely, 
individuals who practice their functional skills daily may be less aware of their specific 
abilities and more focused on their overall experience.  
 
Metacognitive ability was the only predictor of functional outcome in the full group, 
whilst controlling for IQ. This supports research in schizophrenia (Arnon-Ribenfeld et 
al., 2017) and FEP (Davies, Fowler & Greenwood, 2017). When negative symptoms were 
included, metacognitive ability was not a significant predictor. But this was only within 
those with psychosis and may have been impacted by power. Alternatively, metacognitive 
ability may be impacted by negative symptoms, e.g. poverty of speech or motivation. 
However, Wright, Davies, Fowler & Greenwood (submitted) (chapter 4) demonstrated 
that metacognitive ability at baseline predicted functional outcome at a three-year follow-
up period in FEP, independent of negative symptoms. This suggests that metacognitive 
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ability has a distinct role on functioning from negative symptoms. Future studies should 
aim to assess the overlap in these concepts within a larger sample.  
 
Functional outcome was associated with subjective recovery outcome in this FEP sample, 
and FEP sample scored slightly higher than previous studies within schizophrenia 
samples (Morrison et al., 2013; Neil et al., 2009). This was the first study to demonstrate 
the predictive role of metacognitive ability on subjective recovery outcomes in FEP, 
where recovery may be more variable. This finding suggests that subjective recovery is 
predicted by an individual’s ability to think about their own mind and different states of 
mind throughout the process of recovery.  
 
There is clear importance of tackling metacognitive ability within the early stages of 
psychosis to improve both functional and subjective outcomes. Metacognitive Insight and 
Reflection Therapy (MERIT) enables an individual to integrate their current experiences, 
increase their sense of agency and improve their ability to manage their experiences 
(Lysaker et al., 2015, p. 305). MERIT has been shown to improve metacognitive ability, 
which, in turn, has been shown to improve job satisfaction and social functioning (de Jong 
et al., 2016; Dubreucq et al., 2016). It is important to note the role of both cognitive and 
metacognitive factors and the use of cognitive/metacognitive remediation, which has 
demonstrated evidence of improvement in functioning in schizophrenia and FEP 
(Breitborde et al., 2015; Reeder et al., 2017). This research may also be important for 
providing insight for groups of individuals Not in Education, Employment or Training 
(NEET). As prolonged economic inactivity is shown to affect mental health (Benjet et al., 
2012), these current outcomes may be helpful for improving functioning within the 
general community.   
 
3.6.2 Limitations 
There are limitations to the study. Firstly, in terms of the metacognitive model, the sample 
size was typically small for a factor analysis. Following MacCallum et al. (2001), which 
suggested that studies with high communalities should use a ratio of 5 participants: 1 
variable, this sample size may have been appropriate as this study had communalities at 
a reasonable level. Future studies should replicate this model within a larger sample. From 
a theoretical standpoint, it was important to load visual and auditory metacognitive 
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experience onto one factor and visual and auditory metacognitive efficiency onto another 
factor. Future studies should aim to assess whether these factors can be combined, as 
Rouault et al. (2018) demonstrated these two measures displayed similar patterns. 
Secondly, individuals who typically engage in research studies tend to be higher-
functioning, e.g. this sample were on average scoring higher on functioning and lower on 
symptoms than the average psychosis sample (Hodgekins, French, et al., 2015; Leucht et 
al., 2005). Caution should be taken when applying these results to a lower functioning 
group.  
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This study demonstrated that metacognitive components described within the psychosis 
literature are independent and distinct, focusing on particular aspects of reflection. 
Metacognitive ability and control processes were poor in FEP, compared to metacognitive 
monitoring and experience which were higher in FEP, compared to a healthy control 
group. This study demonstrated the role of metacognitive ability and experience in 
predicting functional capacity, and the role of metacognitive ability and control processes 
in predicting functional outcome in people with and without psychosis. This study was 
the first study to provide evidence for the role of metacognitive ability on subjective 
recovery outcome in FEP, independent of negative emotion, as well as demonstrating the 
association between the two modes of recovery. In terms of clinical importance, 
metacognitive ability in particular is a clear and viable targets for improving functional 
and subjective recovery in FEP.  
	
 
NOTE: References at the end of the thesis. 
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4.1 Abstract 
 
4.1.1 Introduction 
 
Research has demonstrated that functional outcome in psychosis is predicted by factors 
such as neurocognition, functional capacity, symptoms and, more recently, 
metacognition. Metacognitive ability has been demonstrated to mediate between 
neurocognition and functional outcome in First Episode Psychosis (FEP). Whether 
metacognition also predicts longer-term recovery in first episode is unknown. This study 
assessed whether neurocognition, functional capacity and metacognitive ability in FEP 
predicted functional outcome three years later.  
 
4.1.2 Methods  
Eighty individuals with First Episode Psychosis were re-contacted after an average three 
years (range: 26-45 month follow-up) from baseline. Twenty-six participants (33%) 
completed neurocognitive measures, metacognition, functional capacity, functional 
outcome (hours spent in structured activity per week) and psychopathology at baseline 
and at follow-up. 
 
4.1.3 Results 
Individual regression analyses demonstrated neurocognition, functional capacity and 
metacognitive ability at baseline significantly predicted functional outcome at three years. 
However, when baseline functional outcome was controlled, only metacognition was a 
significant predictor of change in functional outcome from baseline to follow-up, p<.001. 
This model explained 72% (adjusted r² = .69) of the variance in functional outcome at 
follow-up. Negative symptoms did not change the model. 
 
4.1.4 Discussion 
This study demonstrated that better metacognitive ability significantly predicted 
improvement in functioning in FEP across a 3-year period. This highlights the potential 
value of clinical interventions that focus on improving metacognitive ability at first point 
of illness to maximize recovery. 
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4.2 Introduction 
 
Although clinical recovery after an experience of psychosis was previously considered 
poor (May et al., 1981), recent research has demonstrated that around 50% of individuals 
with psychosis had favourable outcomes after long follow-up periods (Harrison, Hopper, 
Aig, et al., 2001; Harrow et al., 2005; Wunderink et al., 2009) and this has also been 
demonstrated with First Episode Psychosis (FEP) (Henry et al. 2010; Robinson et al. 
2004) . A 10-year follow-up study showed 77% of participants showed at least one period 
of recovery, with 46% symptom free for at least two years (Morgan et al., 2018). 
However, for Edwards et al. (1998) and Robinson et al. (2004) only 6.6% and 14% 
(respectively) met the criteria for full recovery after 1 and 5 year(s) (respectively), 
suggesting recovery during early stages of illness may be slow. There is clear interest in 
understanding factors that influence recovery in psychosis, particularly FEP where 
recovery may be more likely (Harrison, Hopper, Aig, et al., 2001; Morgan et al., 2014). 
Birchwood et al. (1998) named this the critical-period, highlighting the importance of 
early and targeted interventions to prevent further decline (Bertolote et al. 2002; McGorry 
et al. 2008; Marshall & Rathbone 2011). 
 
Clinical recovery can be considered improvement in symptomatology and 
social/occupational functioning (Andreasen et al., 2005; Harvey & Bellack, 2009). 
Hodgekins et al. (2015b) suggested assessing functioning, or recovery, using time spent 
in structured activity per week (Fowler et al., 2009; Harrison, Hopper, Aig, et al., 2001), 
including employment, education, sports, and leisure. Research has demonstrated that 
time spent in structured activity is on average 63.5 hours in the healthy population, 25.2 
hours in FEP sample (Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015), and 19.7 hours in a psychosis 
sample with delayed recovery (Hodgekins, French, et al., 2015). However, engaging in 
more hours of activity, e.g. paid work, has been associated with reduced symptoms and 
improved functioning in interventions studies (Bell et al., 1996; Eklund et al., 2004). 
There is value in the identification of those with psychosis who are at risk of poor 
functioning across time, to target interventions to reduce this disability. There are four 
selected lines of evidence which will be discussed here to suggest factors which predict 
poor functioning: i) neurocognition, ii) functional capacity, iii) symptoms and iv) 
metacognition.  
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Research assessing functional outcome within individuals with psychosis has focused on 
the influence of neurocognitive difficulties (Green, 1996; Green, Kern, Braff, & Mintz, 
2000; Green, Kern, & Heaton, 2004; Lepage, Bodnar, & Bowie, 2014). The relationship 
between neurocognition and functional outcome has been demonstrated cross-sectionally 
(Allott et al., 2011; Carrión et al., 2013) and longitudinally in schizophrenia, FEP and 
Ultra-High Risk groups (Robinson et al., 2004; Leeson et al. 2011; Milev et al. 2005; 
Nuechterlein et al. 2011; Stirling et al. 2003; Torgalsbøen et al. 2015; Lin et al., 2011). 
However, studies have demonstrated that predicting those who would have poor outcome 
with neurocognitive variables is substantially more straight-forward than predicting those 
who would recover (Faber et al., 2011; Gonzalez-Blanch et al., 2010). This suggests a 
more complex relationship with additional factors to be explored. 
 
Functional capacity has also been shown to predict real-world functional outcome within 
schizophrenia (Green, 1996; Green et al., 2000; Leifker, Bowie, & Harvey, 2009b) and 
FEP (Davies, Fowler, & Greenwood, 2017). Functional capacity has been shown to 
mediate between neurocognition and functional outcome in schizophrenia (Bowie, 
Reichenberg, Patterson, Heaton 2006) and FEP (Davies et al., 2017). A longitudinal study 
demonstrated functional capacity predicted real-world functioning in psychosis for those 
with positive, but not for those with negative symptoms (Best, Gupta, Bowie, & Harvey, 
2014). The authors suggested that negative symptoms are distinct and impact functioning, 
above functional capacity. This demonstrates clear evidence for the relationship between 
neurocognition, functional capacity and functional outcome in psychosis, although the 
role of negative symptoms needs consideration.  
Following this, models have highlighted that negative symptoms predict functional 
outcome in psychosis (Rector, Beck, & Stolar, 2005; Ventura, Hellemann, Thames, 
Koellner, & Nuechterlein, 2009). Negative symptoms have been shown to interact with 
neurocognition to predict functioning in schizophrenia (Greenwood et al., 2005). 
Longitudinal studies support this research, demonstrating that low negative symptoms at 
baseline predict improved psychosocial recovery at 10-year follow-up (Austin et al., 
2013). However, Alvarez-Jimenez et al. (2012) demonstrated that whilst symptom 
remission predicted functional recovery, negative symptoms had little predictive value 
for long-term functioning. Studies have noted an overlap in the variance in outcome 
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explained by cognition and negative symptoms (Milev et al., 2005; Villalta-Gil et al., 
2006) and, when taking into consideration the role of cognition, symptoms are shown not 
to predict functioning cross-sectionally (Velligan et al., 2000) and later longitudinally 
(Peña et al., 2012). These studies highlight that functional outcome is the product of a 
complex array of abilities and symptoms.  
Following this consistent research, models in psychosis suggest that neurocognition, 
functional capacity and negative symptoms influence functional outcome (Bowie et al., 
2008; Grant & Beck, 2009; Rector, Stolar, & Grant, 2011). The path between 
neurocognition and functioning has been shown to be mediated by functional capacity 
and cognitive processes (Bowie et al., 2006; Couture, Blanchard, & Bennett, 2011; Grant 
& Beck, 2009; Rector et al., 2011), including defeatist performance beliefs and self-
stigma (Berry & Greenwood, 2018) and, most recently, metacognition (Davies et al., 
2017).  
 
Metacognition is considered ‘thinking about thinking’(Semerari et al., 2003b) or the way 
one thinks about one’s experience (Dimaggio, Vanheule, Lysaker, Carcione, & Nicolò, 
2009b). Metacognitive ability, measured using Metacognitive Assessment Scale (Lysaker 
et al., 2005) or Metacognitive Assessment Interview (Semerari et al., 2012), is shown to 
predict real-life functioning in schizophrenia (Arnon-Ribenfeld, Hasson-Ohayon, 
Lavidor, Atzil-Slonim, & Lysaker, 2017; Davies & Greenwood, 2018; Lysaker et al., 
2013). In particular, metacognitive ability is a mediator between neurocognition and 
functioning schizophrenia (Lysaker et al. 2010) and FEP (Davies et al., 2017; Wright, 
Davies, Fowler & Greenwood, 2018). Metacognitive ability is shown to have a key role 
in functioning in psychosis, although this relationship is also influenced by 
neurocognition and functional skills.  
 
Whether the relationship between metacognition and functional outcome persists across 
time is unknown. Intervention studies focusing on metacognition have demonstrated an 
improvement in real-world functioning (Briki et al., 2014; Dubreucq et al., 2016; Moritz 
et al., 2014; Rocha & Queirós, 2013). However, no study has yet assessed the role of 
metacognitive ability on functioning over a longer follow-up period; particularly within 
FEP, where recovery is more likely. In addition, metacognitive ability may enable the use 
of appropriate skills and abilities to perform a task or challenge. Successful outcome, 
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following the utilization of metacognitive ability, may predict engagement in more 
activities. Lysaker et al. (2010a) demonstrated that those with schizophrenia and high 
metacognitive ability display better work performance across 6-months, as those with 
high metacognitive ability were able to see their conclusions as fallible and were able to 
learn and adapt to the changing demands of work. Therefore, metacognitive ability may 
predict a change in functional outcome across time.   
 
From this, it is hypothesized that functional outcome in FEP at 3-year follow-up will be 
predicted by metacognitive ability at baseline, independent of neurocognition, negative 
symptoms and functional capacity. It is also hypothesized that a change in functional 
outcome will be predicted by metacognitive ability at baseline, independent of 
neurocognition, negative symptoms and functional capacity.  
 
4.3 Methods 
 
4.3.1 Procedure 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from London-Camden and Islington NHS Research and 
Ethics Committee (Ref: 11/LO/1877). All participants provided informed consent at first 
entry to the study and participants who gave consent to be re-contacted were contacted 
after the three-year period. 
4.3.2 Participants 
Participants with First Episode Psychosis were recruited, via a convenience sample, from 
outpatient Early Intervention in Psychosis services in Sussex Partnership NHS 
Foundation Trust. All had been given a formal diagnosis of First Episode Psychosis by a 
psychiatrist. Participants with a primary diagnosis of substance misuse disorder or organic 
neurological impairment were excluded. 
4.3.3 Design 
This is a longitudinal follow-up study exploring the contribution of metacognitive ability 
to functional outcome at three-year follow-up with individuals with First Episode 
Psychosis. Full details of the study design and ethical approval is provided in the protocol 
(Wright et al., 2018). Details of the baseline study are provided in an earlier publication 
(Davies et al., 2017).  
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4.3.4 Measures 
 
Measures below were collected at baseline and follow-up time-points.  
 
Metacognitive ability: This was assessed using the Metacognitive Assessment Interview 
(Semerari et al., 2012), which requires the participant to reflect on a recent difficult 
interpersonal experience and to answer a series of questions. The measure assesses the 
individual’s ability for i) monitoring, identification of feelings and thoughts, ii) 
differentiation, distinguishing between dreams, beliefs or assumptions, iii) integration, 
reflection on different mental states and rules governing them, and iv) decentralization, 
describing the mental state of the other which is independent of their own view. These 
four subscales are scored between 0-5, depending on spontaneity, use of aids/prompts and 
the sophistication of the answer. The scores for the sub-domains are averaged to provide 
one multidimensional score. This measure has demonstrated good inter-rater reliability 
and internal consistency (α=0.91 for total metacognition), and construct reliability 
showing correlations amongst the MAI scales (r=0.62-0.9) (Semerari et al., 2012). 
 
Function 
Functional outcome: Time Use Survey (adapted from Short, 2006) captures, via self-
report, number of hours spent engaging in structured activity per week for the preceding 
month (Fowler et al., 2009); including work, education, voluntary work, childcare, sports, 
leisure and housework activities. This measure has been validated within a FEP sample 
(Cella et al., 2016; Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015a), has good reliability (inter-rater 
reliability at 0.99 Hodgekins et al. 2015b), and is able to reliably capture differences in 
functioning across different clinical and non-clinical groups (Hodgekins, 2012; 
Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015a). 
 
Functional capacity: The UCSD Performance-Based Skills Assessment (Patterson et al., 
2001) provides a total score for real-life performance skills based on role-play tasks. This 
measure is divided into five sections: i) finance, e.g. counting money, ii) communication, 
e.g. re-arranging a medical appointment, iii) comprehension/planning, e.g. planning a 
visit to a theme park, iv) transport, e.g. reading a bus timetable, and v) household, e.g. 
creating a shopping list from a recipe. During each role-play the individual is given points 
by the researcher from the manual guidelines. These raw scores are totaled for each 
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domain, converted into 0-20 scale then multiplied by 2 and summed to provide a total out 
of 100. This measure demonstrates high internal consistency (α=0.88), good validity with 
other scales (Direct Assessment of Functional Status scale, r=0.86) and good test-retest 
reliability (r=0.91) (Harvey, Velligan, & Bellack, 2007; Mausbach et al., 2011; 
Mausbach, Moore, Bowie, & Cardenas, 2009).   
 
Neurocognitive ability: Participants completed a battery of neurocognitive measures, 
including Verbal and working memory (Logical Memory and Letter-Number Sequencing 
subscales from the Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III)), executive function (Trail-
Making Task and Verbal Fluency), Verbal and Performance IQ (Vocabulary and Matrix 
reasoning tasks). All scores were converted into Z scores using age-scaled population 
means and standard deviations (Tombaugh, 2004; Tombaugh, Kozak, & Rees, 1999; 
Wechsler, 1987, 1999). IQ was assessed at follow-up using Vocabulary task and Matrix 
reasoning task (Wechsler, 1999). 
 
Symptoms: Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay & Fiszbein 1987) is the most 
widely used standardized instrument for assessing symptom severity in schizophrenia 
(Hermes et al., 2012). This measures provide three separate scores for positive, negative 
and general psychopathology symptoms.  
 
4.4 Planned analysis 
 
Hypothesis testing  
Descriptive statistics for neurocognitive ability, metacognitive ability, functional 
capacity, functional outcome and symptoms were compared between baseline and follow-
up. In light of the small sample size, and in order to reduce the number of predictors in 
the model, a series of single regression analyses were used to assess the predictive value 
of each variable at baseline on functional outcome at three-year follow-up. After this, a 
stepwise regression was conducted using only the significant predictors as covariates and 
metacognitive ability was added to the model in block 2, to assess the independent 
contribution of metacognitive ability. Next, the predictive value of variables on change 
in functional outcome from baseline to follow-up was assessed, using baseline functional 
outcome as a covariate. Then, significant predictors were used as covariates and 
metacognitive ability added to the model in block 3. Due to the sample size and to 
		
100	
minimise the number of predictors within a single model, the independent role of negative 
symptoms was used as a covariate within a parallel analyses.  
 
4.5 Results  
 
Data and assumption checking 
Missing data was considered as ‘Missing Completely At Random’ (MAR), as missing 
data was not associated with data within the study. All predictor and outcome data were 
checked for skewness, kurtosis and outliers. MAI total at baseline displayed a multimodal 
distribution. There were no significant differences in cognition, functional capacity, 
functional outcome, symptoms and metacognitive ability for those who participated in 
follow-up and those who did not.  
 
Sample characteristics  
This first recruitment phase took place during 2013-2015. The follow-up recruitment 
phase took place within 2017 after three years (average 36-month; range 26 – 45-month 
follow-up). The baseline sample included 80 participants with FEP (49 men, 31 female) 
with a mean age of 26.08 years (5.53). Seventy-seven people provided consent to re-
contact. Twenty-six participants from the baseline study took part in the follow-up 
assessment (see figure 6 for flowchart of participation). The mean age at follow-up was 
28.93 (SD=5.55, range 22-43) with 23 males and 8 females (see table 5). See appendix B 
for distribution of months between baseline and three years for the sample followed-up.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
101	
Figure 6: Flowchart for re-recruiting individuals from baseline study into longitudinal 
study.9 
 
																																																						
9 11 people were untraceable: 1 participant was not on the records system and 10 people provided contact 
details which were now out-of-date and were no longer connected to services.   
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Descriptive statistics  
Table 5: Sample characteristics and descriptive and change statistics for neurocognitive 
measures, functional capacity, functional outcome, metacognitive ability and symptoms. 
 Baseline 
(N=80) 
Baseline 
(N=26) 
Three-year 
follow-up 
(N=26) 
Differences 
test (baseline 
to follow-up) 
Age, yrs. (SD) 26.08 (5.53, 
range 19-39) 
25.9 (5.94, 
range 19-39) 
29.32 (6.18, 
range 22-43) 
 
Gender (M/F) 49/31 19/7 19/7   
Education (years) 12.81 (1.7) 
Range 11 – 
17 years 
13.67 (2.09) 
Range 11 – 16 
years 
13.64 (range 
11-16)10 
 
Medication (Y/N) 48/32 22/4 18/8  
Matrix reasoning 
(t-score) 
51.67 (8.48) 
(range 25-
70) 
51.6 (8.71) 
(range 24-68) 
54.17 (5.52) 
(range 41-
66) 
t(23)-1.96, 
p=.06 
Vocabulary (t-
score) 
46.47 
(11.68) 
(range 20-
68) 
49.62 (12.79) 
(range 35-70) 
54.23 
(12.57) 
(range 21-
70) 
t(24)-2.2, 
p=.04* 
UPSA total (0-
100) 
72.02 
(14.64) 
(range 36.6-
95.2) 
74.66 (13.45) 
(range 42.94-
93.18) 
83.09 (9.18) 
(range 
57.96-96.6)  
t(24)-4.35, 
p<.001*** 
Time Use CEA 
(hours in activity 
per week) 
24.97 (23.1) 
(range 0-
77.1) 
22.07 (19.95) 
(range 0-70.62) 
31.66 
(22.87) 
(range .81-
88.96) 
t(25)-2.66, 
p=.01* 
Time Use SU 
(hours in activity 
per week) 
32.95 (26.0) 
(range 2.3-
96.7) 
29.82 (22.3) (3-
74.80) 
39.31 
(24.81) 
t(25)-2.47, 
p=.02* 
																																																						
10 Data for follow-up was captured as categories (e.g. GCSE, A-level, Degree, higher degree) which was 
subsequently converted into years of education to match the baseline group. 
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(range 6.06-
96.46) 
MAI total (0-5) 2.77 (3.5) 
(range .4- 
4.9) 
2.77 (1.32) 
(range .88-4.56) 
3.27 (.87) 
(range 1.63-
4.44) 
t(25)-2.28, 
p=.03* 
Symptoms 
(positive) (7-49) 
12.0 (3.5) 
(range 7-19) 
11.44 (3.63) 
(range 7-19) 
11.87 (4.7) 
(range 7-23) 
t(23)-1.23, 
p=.23 
Symptoms 
(negative) (7-49) 
13.6 (4.9) 
(range 7-36) 
13.40 (4.06) 
(range 7-22) 
10.87 (3.89) 
(range 7-26) 
t(23)2.92, 
p=.01** 
Symptoms 
(general) (16-112) 
28.35 (6.7 
(range 16-
43) 
28.68 (6.9) 
(range 17-43) 
26.0 (5.68) 
(range 18-
38) 
t(23) 1.5, 
p=.15 
Symptoms (total) 
(30-210) 
53.96 (12.1) 
(range 30-
81) 
53.52 (12.36) 
(range 32-79) 
48.73 
(12.84) 
(range 34-
85) 
t(23) 1.2, 
p=.24  
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001  
 
Associations between predictor variables 
See table 5 for descriptive statistics and see appendix B for correlation matrix for 
neurocognition, metacognitive ability, symptoms, functional capacity and functional 
outcome at baseline and follow-up. Age at baseline was significantly associated with 
functional outcome at follow-up (r=.4, p=.027) and included as a covariate in subsequent 
analyses. For neurocognition, a Confirmatory Factor Analysis was conducted on the z 
scores of the cognitive variables and converted into a neurocognitive factor score for each 
participant. 
  
Hypothesis 1  
In order to test predictors (neurocognition, functional capacity, negative symptoms and 
metacognition) of functional outcome at 3-year follow-up, individual regression analyses 
were conducted. These demonstrated that neurocognitive ability at baseline did not 
significantly predict functioning at three years, p=.24. Functional capacity, F(2, 25) 6.66, 
p=.005, negative symptoms, F(2, 23) 5.69, p=.01, and metacognitive ability, F(2, 24) 
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27.97, p<.001, were significant predictors of functioning at three years. Including 
negative symptoms as a covariate in the above analyses did not substantially change the 
significance levels for neurocognition and metacognitive ability (p=.44 and p<.001, 
respectively).  However, when controlling for negative symptoms functional capacity at 
baseline was no longer a significant predictor of functional outcome at follow-up, 
(ΔR²=.07, p=.13).  
 
Next, in order to test whether metacognition predicted functional outcome at follow-up 
independent of other known factors, all significant predictors (functional capacity and 
negative symptoms) were included in the first block of the stepwise regression then the 
independent contribution of metacognitive ability (MAI) to recovery was assessed. This 
model explained 77.1% (adjusted r² = .72) of the variance in functional outcome at 
follow-up (R²=.77, F(4, 23) 16.01, p<.001). MAI significantly improved the model 
(ΔR²=.35, p<.001), explaining 34.6% of the 77% (adjusted r² = .72) total variance 
explained.  
 
Hypothesis 2  
In order to assess predictors (neurocognition, functional capacity, negative symptoms and 
metacognition) of a change in functional outcome from baseline to 3-year follow-up, 
individual regression analyses were conducted, controlling for baseline functional 
outcome. Neither neurocognition (p=.22), functional capacity (p=.57) or negative 
symptoms (p=.35) predicted change in functional outcome. Metacognitive ability (MAI) 
was a significant predictor of change in functional outcome at follow-up, when including 
baseline functional outcome as a covariate. This model explained 72% (adjusted r² = .69) 
of the variance in functional outcome at follow-up (R²=.72, F(3, 25) 19.22, p<.001). MAI 
significantly improved the model (ΔR²= .12, p<.005), explaining 12% of the 72% total 
variance explained (see table 6). VIF values were inspected to check multicollinearity and 
the score was acceptable (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1995; Ringle, Wende, & 
Becker, 2015).  
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Table 6: Full regression model for predictive value of metacognitive ability on 
functional outcome at three years, whilst controlling for baseline functional outcome, 
and age.  
  B SE B β p value CI  
Model 2       
 Constant -25.69 14.12    
 Age .93 .53 .21 .09 -.18, 2.04 
 Time use 
baseline 
.21 .24 .18 .38 -.28, .70 
 Metacognitive 
ability (MAI) 
12.21 4.00 .61 .01** 3.88, 20.53  
*<.05, **<.01, ***<.001 
Note: When include age as a covariate, functional outcome at baseline was no longer 
significant.  
 
For those participants who were followed-up, metacognitive ability (MAI) at baseline 
demonstrated a bivariate distribution (Appendix B). We therefore, compared those with 
FEP and either high or low metacognitive ability graphically, with other previous 
samples. Specifically, we divided participants into two groups: high MAI at baseline 
(N=14) or low MAI at baseline (N=12), using mean split, to assess the changes in time-
use scores between the groups. Individuals in the high MAI group demonstrated a 
significant difference in hours spent in structured activity between baseline (M=50.32, 
SD=23.98) and follow-up (M=58.13, SD=19.29), but for the low MAI group there was no 
significant difference (p=.17) in structured activity between baseline (M=13.17, SD=7.7) 
and follow-up (M=15.53, SD=7.63) (see figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Bar graph to demonstrate differences in mean follow-up time-use scores 
(including CI for current data) for those with high or low metacognitive ability at baseline 
compared to previous data from Hodgekins et al. (2015). 
 
 
 
4.6 Discussion 
 
This was the first study assessing the role of metacognitive ability on functional outcome 
longitudinally in First Episode Psychosis. This study was able to demonstrate that 
functional outcome improved over time and, whilst negative symptoms and functional 
capacity predicted functioning at three years, the improvement in functioning was largely 
predicted by metacognitive ability and baseline functioning.  
 
The finding that functional outcome at three-years was predicted by metacognitive ability 
supports previous cross-sectional studies (Davies et al. 2017; Lysaker et al. 2010; Saeedi 
et al. 2007). Metacognitive ability was also the only significant predictor of improvement 
in functioning accounting for a significant change in functioning over time. This 
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highlights that those with higher metacognitive ability may be better able to make use of 
strategies and resources (e.g. from the early intervention services) to improve their 
functioning over time, compared to those with lower metacognitive ability who may need 
more guidance in order to utilize the services available to them. 
 
In further exploring metacognitive ability at baseline, it was evident that individuals who 
displayed low metacognitive ability at baseline demonstrated limited change in 
functioning at three-year follow-up, compared to individuals who displayed adequate 
metacognitive ability. This may suggest that those with better metacognition were better 
able to reflect on their thoughts, strengths, as well as perspectives of others, and use 
appropriate strategies to implement in the real world. Importantly, metacognitive ability 
was a longitudinal predictor of functional outcome, independent of IQ. Whilst the sample 
size in the group is small, this supports the main hypothesis that early metacognitive 
factors influence change in functioning.  
 
A large amount of the variance in time-use at follow-up was predicted by baseline time-
use and age. Therefore, individuals with better initial functioning are more likely to show 
an improvement later on, compared to those who had lower functioning who showed no 
change in already poor functioning. This may suggest that those with low functioning are 
less likely to use metacognitive abilities or strategies to improve their poor functioning or 
are less motivated, due to poor cognitive and metacognitive ability (Luther et al., 2016; 
Tas, Brown, Esen-Danaci, Lysaker, & Brüne, 2012). This highlights the importance of 
the Early Interventions services to focus on improving functioning and encouraging early 
help-seeking to prevent low levels of functioning initially.  
 
Within this study, individuals with FEP significantly improved in cognition, real-life 
functional capacity skills, metacognitive ability and negative symptoms over three years. 
At baseline, individuals within this sample were demonstrating typical mean activity 
levels for an FEP sample (29.82 hours per week) (see Hodgekins et al. 2015b), but there 
was an improvement of 9 hours in structured activity at the three-year follow-up, resulting 
in a time-use score similar to an ARMS group. There was an increase in functional 
capacity, in that individuals at follow-up were similar to those typically residing 
independently and employed (Mausbach et al., 2011). There was a significant 
improvement in verbal cognitive ability (vocabulary). Studies in the general population 
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suggest vocabulary is stable over time (Scheider, Niklas, & Schmeideler, 2010), including 
studies within schizophrenia (Ginett & Moran, 1964; Heaton et al., 2001). The increase 
in verbal cognition may be the consequence of an initial drop in cognitive ability, 
particularly verbal IQ (Vorstman et al. 2015; Leeson et al. 2011), which then recovered 
throughout the follow-up period.  
 
Findings demonstrated that neurocognitive ability at baseline was significantly associated 
with real-life functional skills at follow-up, supporting previous research (Evans et al., 
2003a; Vesterager et al., 2012). Functional capacity, but not neurocognition, at baseline 
predicted functional outcome at three years after FEP, supporting and furthering research 
(Bowie et al., 2008). Surprisingly, neurocognition did not directly predict functional 
outcome at three-years. However, studies have suggested that neurocognitive factors only 
predict a small amount of variance in real-world functioning (Bowie et al., 2006) and 
other factors have a more substantial role. Alternatively, neurocognition may have an 
indirect role, via functional capacity, as the present study demonstrated an association 
between neurocognition and functional capacity. 
 
These findings can be taken forward in two ways: i) poor metacognitive ability may be a 
marker for poor outcome in psychosis later on, and ii) metacognitive ability may be a key 
ability for interventions to target in early psychosis to improve subsequent functioning. If 
metacognitive ability does play a role, metacognitive interventions which have previously 
demonstrated to be associated with decrease in symptoms (Lysaker, Buck, & Ringer, 
2007), may also be useful for improving functional outcome in psychosis (Dubreucq et 
al., 2016). Metacognition Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT) is specifically aimed 
at improving metacognitive ability (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2011). However, De Jong et al. 
(2018) recently demonstrated, in a trial of MERIT for individuals with schizophrenia, 
evidence of improved metacognitive ability but not functioning. The lack of improvement 
in functioning may be due to shorter follow-up period or may be accounted for by other 
factors, e.g. functional capacity or neurocognition (see Davies et al. 2017; Koren et al. 
2006). Therefore, new interventions, such as cognitive remediation, should continue to 
aim to improve both cognitions and real-life skills to consider both cognitive and 
metacognitive ability (e.g. Cella et al. 2015).  
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4.6.1 Limitations 
 
Firstly, there was a low follow-up rate. This may be due to the long period between the 
two assessment points and during this time participant had moved out of area, lost contact 
with study team, or could not remember the first study due to length of time or being 
unwell during the first assessment. Future studies should carefully consider the role of 
presentation of the study and continuity of contact across time. A consequence of this low 
follow-up rate was the small sample size, which limited the number of predictors included 
in the regression analyses. It was not possible to fully explore the role of negative 
symptoms, alongside metacognitive ability. Future studies using a large sample can 
confirm the results whilst i) controlling for all symptoms and i) exploring the interaction 
between symptoms and metacognitive ability. 
 
This sample was on average lower on symptoms of psychosis at baseline and follow-up 
(Leucht et al., 2005) compared to other FEP samples (Fitzgerald  Lucas, Redoblado, 
Winter, Brennan, Anderson, & Harris, 2004; McLeod et al. 2014), which may explain the 
lack of change in positive symptoms.  Finally, age was used as a covariate within the main 
analyses assessing predictors of outcome, as it was associated with functional outcome at 
follow-up. Age was recently demonstrated as a positive predictor of structured activity in 
At Risk Mental State (ARMS) group (Bright et al., 2018) and it may be suggested that 
age is a proxy for illness severity as those who have an earlier psychosis onset may have 
more difficulties in functioning later on (Immonen, Jääskeläinen, Korpela, & Miettunen, 
2017). However, age of onset is difficult to measure and research suggests that premorbid 
IQ accounts for this difference (Zammit et al., 2004). Analyses without age as a covariate 
demonstrated no difference in the results. 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
The present three-year follow-up study was able to demonstrate that metacognitive 
ability at baseline significantly predicted improvement in functioning after three years, 
in FEP. This was independent of cognitions, functional capacity and negative 
symptoms. This study highlighted the importance of intervening early to enhance 
metacognitive ability, over neurocognitive ability or functional capacity, in order to 
improve functioning later on, and to target interventions to improve functioning in those 
with poor metacognitive ability in the early stages of psychosis. In addition, this study 
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highlights the importance of additionally tackling cognitive ability, a predictor of 
metacognitive ability, within metacognitive interventions. Future studies should aim to 
replicate this within a larger sample.  
 
NOTE: References at the end of the thesis. 
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5.1 Abstract 
5.1.1 Background  
Self-defining memories (SDM) are vivid personal memories, related to narrative identity. 
Individuals with schizophrenia report less specific, more negative, and extract less 
meaning from these memories compared to control groups. Self-defining memories have 
been shown to be predicted by neurocognition, associated with metacognition, and linked 
to goal outcomes in healthy controls. As neurocognition and metacognition are known 
predictors of poor functioning in psychosis, self-defining memories may also be a 
predictor. No study has assessed the relationship to functioning or pattern of SDMs in 
First Episode Psychosis. 
5.1.2 Methods  
This was a cross-sectional study involving 71 individuals with First Episode Psychosis 
(FEP) and 57 healthy controls who completed a self-defining memories questionnaire. 
FEP participants completed measures of neurocognition, metacognition (Metacognitive 
Assessment Interview), functional capacity (The UCSD Performance-Based Skills 
Assessment) and functional outcome (Time-Use Survey). 
5.1.3 Results  
Self-defining memories reported by individuals with FEP were less integrated compared 
to healthy controls. Within the FEP sample, holding less specific memories was 
associated with engagement in significantly fewer hours of structured activity per week 
and specificity of SDMs mediated the relationship between neurocognition and functional 
outcome, independent of metacognition. 
5.1.4 Conclusion  
This is the first study to assess SDMs in FEP and to explore the important role of SDMs 
on clinical outcomes, compared to healthy controls. This study suggests that elaborating 
on specific self-defining memories is a valid therapeutic target and may be considered a 
tool to improve daily functioning in FEP. 
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5.2 Introduction 
 
Self-defining memories (SDMs) are vivid, intense and well-rehearsed personal 
memories1, related to narrative identity and ‘ingredients’ for the life story2. Prior research 
has considered four dimensions of interest for SDM3: i) specificity- the ability to provide 
a detailed, clear memory, ii) integration- capacity to learn from, and incorporate, the 
memory into self-knowledge, iii) type of event- linked to a general theme (e.g. 
achievements) or unresolved conflict (e.g. mental health crises)1, and iv) content valence- 
the strength of affective response when recalling the SDM. 
 
Self-defining, or autobiographical, memories reported by individuals with schizophrenia 
have been found to be less specific4-6, more negative7, and individuals extract less meaning 
from these types of memories compared to control groups7, despite cues8.  
 
In terms of the separate dimensions of SDMs, research on autobiographical memories 
(ATM) highlights that specific ATM can be impacted by neurocognitive deficits in 
psychosis9,10. They may also be linked to negative symptoms in schizophrenia11, which are 
related to avoidance of trauma memories, hence a lower likelihood of reporting specific 
memories. Specific memories are suggested to be associated with impairment in 
executive control and functional avoidance12, and influence goal outcomes in control 
participants1,3 as individuals who report specific memories are better able to use 
appropriate cognitive-affective information to achieve their goals1. Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce’s Self-Memory System13 (SMS) suggested that ATM contain knowledge at three 
hierarchical levels of specificity: lifetime period, general events and event-specific 
knowledge, which make up the hierarchy of ATM structures. These knowledge structures 
are joined with the working self, which enables an individual to draw on their memory to 
achieve goals. Within psychosis, Mehl et al.14 demonstrated that ATM specificity 
predicted social performance, involving role-play tasks, over neurocognition and 
symptoms. This current study aimed to understand the role of specific SDMs in predicting 
functional outcome, associated with mental health recovery.  
 
Secondly, in terms of integration, individuals with psychosis extract less meaning or learn 
fewer lessons from the self-defining events they report, compared to healthy controls4,8,15,16. 
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Greater integration is associated with greater optimism and attainment of goals within 
healthy controls1,3, and may be associated with neurocognition13.  
 
Finally, SDM for individuals with psychosis tend to be more negative in content17, and 
focused on illness7,15,18. This may be linked to lower self-esteem and negative outlook3,7. 
However, unlike specificity and integration, content valence has not previously been 
associated with neurocognition nor outcomes. Whilst Raffard7 demonstrated that 
memories reported by individuals with psychosis tend to be focused on 
hospitalization/illness, this study was conducted in an in-patient unit which may influence 
the type of memory recalled, due to contextual cues19-20. This hospital-related contextual 
cue, coupled with known memory difficulties in schizophrenia21-23, may have biased the 
individual to report a memory focused on hospitalization/illness. Another study 
demonstrated illness-related SDMs in a group of outpatients, however, this group 
included long-term schizophrenia patients8, who may have integrated their illness within 
their self, compared to a FEP sample. This current study aimed to investigate the pattern 
of SDMs in FEP and healthy controls.  
 
Whilst studies have demonstrated differences in SDMs between individuals with 
psychosis and healthy controls, and studies in healthy controls show these memories may 
predict goal outcomes, no study has assessed the impact of SDMs on outcome in 
psychosis. Functional outcome is a measurable aspect of an individual’s activities of daily 
living. This has been measured using the Time-Use Survey24,25, which captures the number 
of hours in structured activity per week. Time spent in structured activity is on average 
63.5 hours in a healthy population, 25.2 hours in a FEP sample, and 19.7 hours in a 
delayed recovery group26. There is clear interest in the identification of those at-risk of 
poor functioning, to target interventions to reduce this disability. 
 
This study will combine three theoretical frameworks of: i) cognitive and neurocognitive 
underpinnings of functional outcome in psychosis, ii) metacognition as a mediator of 
functional outcome, and iii) sense of self in psychosis. These theories will be explored in 
turn, to develop the rationale for the hypothesis that self-defining memories and 
metacognition may impact on functional outcome. 
 
		
115	
Firstly, models of functional outcome in psychosis suggest neurocognition, functional 
capacity and negative symptoms influence functional outcome27-29. However, the picture is 
complex as cognitions and negative symptoms are shown to have a synergistic interaction 
which impacts functioning30 and the path between neurocognition and functioning has 
been shown to be mediated by functional capacity and cognitive processes29,30,32. Secondly, 
these cognitive processes include defeatist performance beliefs and self-stigma33, and, 
recently also metacognition34, termed ‘thinking about thinking’35, or the way one thinks 
about one’s experience36. Metacognition partly mediates the link between neurocognition 
and functional capacity, and fully mediates between functional capacity and functional 
outcome32 independently from symptoms37-39.  
 
Finally, SDMs are most relevant to narrative identity2 and metacognitive ability has been 
associated with forming complex ideas of one’s life as a narrative across a lifetime 10, 40, 41. It 
may be that SDMs overlap with metacognitive ability, but involve a distinct reflective 
process, focusing on one memory, which, when compromised, may impact on 
functioning. To support this, SDMs, like metacognition, are proposed to use cognitive 
information to help goal outcomes1. Negative content and poor integration might impact 
on optimism towards reaching a goal and poor specificity might limit the detail available 
regarding actions or pathways to reach goals. Reflection on the self is shown to impact 
goal performance42, which in turn impact on motivation43, hope44 and functional outcome. 
Based on the Beck and Rector functional outcome model27 and literature within SDMs, 
cognitive processes could extend to SDMs and have an independent role on functioning, 
alongside metacognition.  
 
Self-defining memories may contain different levels of specificity13, which are integrated 
into the sense of self. These SDMs may be used by the individual, drawing on cognitive 
and affective information about the self, to engage in functional activities. Following the 
research above, it is hypothesized that SDM will be less specific, less integrated and more 
negative in FEP compared to healthy controls.  SDM (specificity and integration) may be 
associated with neurocognition and metacognition. Finally, SDMs might contribute to 
difficulties in functioning in FEP. This is the first study to assess the role of SDMs in the 
relationship between neurocognition and functional outcome, independent of 
metacognition, in First Episode Psychosis. 
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5.3 Methods 
 
5.3.1 Procedure 
 
Ethical approval was obtained from London-Camden and Islington NHS Research and 
Ethics Committee (Ref: 11/LO/1877). All participants provided informed consent.  
 
5.3.2 Design 
 
This present study involved a cross-sectional design, with measures assessing 
neurocognition, metacognition, SDM, and functional outcome in FEP. Additional 
measures can be reviewed in Davies, Fowler and Greenwood manuscript32. Data from the 
SDM measure was compared between participants with FEP and healthy control 
participants. 
 
5.3.3 Participants 
Seventy-one young people with FEP were recruited, via a convenience sample, from 
outpatient Early Intervention in Psychosis services in UK. All had been given a formal 
diagnosis of First Episode Psychosis by a psychiatrist. Participants with a primary 
diagnosis of substance misuse disorder or organic neurological impairment were 
excluded. 
Fifty-seven healthy control participants were matched on age, gender and education to the 
earlier psychosis sample (see table 7 with difference statistics). Participants were 
recruited through advertisement within the local community. Participants with current 
mental health problems or history of psychosis were excluded following screening 
questions. 
 
5.3.4 Measures 
 
Self-defining memories  
Self-defining memories questionnaire45 asked the participant to provide three descriptions 
of SDM. The participant was asked to provide a memory that was at least one-year-old, 
remembered very clearly, important to the individual, one that helped the individual to 
understand themselves as a person, leading to strong feelings and familiar like a picture 
or a song46. The participant had to provide a title, age at the time of the event, and a 
description of the event. 
		
117	
 
All scripts were coded by the first author through consultation with the classification 
system and scoring manual of self-defining autobiographical memories46 (Appendix C). 
This manual was previously shown to have inter-rater reliability (Cohen’s K 0.54 - .98) 
for students44 and clinical groups7,15.  
 
Only the first memory was coded into: specificity (non-specific or specific), integration 
(integrated or non-integrated), type of event, content valence (positive or negative). 
Details in supplementary materials. A second independent rater, blind to the scope of the 
study, coded responses for 12% of the total scripts (15 scripts). Reliability between the 
two raters was good (specificity, integration and content valence, Cohen's kappa (κ) 
coefficient was .84, p<.001, and for type of event, Cohen's kappa (κ) was .83, p<.001). 
 
Neurocognition 
Participants completed a battery of neurocognitive measures, including Executive 
function (Verbal Fluency47 and Trail-Making Task48), memory (Logical Memory and 
Letter-Number Sequencing subscales (WMS-III)49), and IQ (Vocabulary and Matrix 
reasoning tasks50). All raw scores were converted into Z scores using age-scaled 
population means and standard deviations.  
 
Metacognition  
The Metacognitive Assessment Interview51 requires the participant to reflect on a recent 
difficult interpersonal experience and asked a series of questions to assess i) monitoring, 
identification of feelings and thoughts, ii) differentiation, distinguishing between dreams, 
beliefs or assumptions, iii) integration, reflection on different mental states and rules 
governing them, and iv) decentralization, describing the mental state of the other which 
is independent of their own view. These four subscales are each scored between 0-5, 
depending on spontaneity, use of aids/prompts and the sophistication of the answer. The 
scores are averaged to provide one multidimensional construct. This measure has 
demonstrated good inter-rater reliability and internal consistency (α=0.90 for total 
metacognition), factorial validity, and reliability (r=0.62 to 0.90)51. 
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Measures of functioning  
Functional outcome: Time Use Survey (adapted from Short52) provides a retrospective 
objective measure for hours spent engaging in structured activity per week24. This measure 
has been used within schizophrenia53 and FEP sample26, has good inter-rater reliability54 
(ICC=0.99)26, and good validity at different stages of psychosis26, 55. 
 
Functional capacity: The UCSD Performance-Based Skills Assessment56 provides a total 
score for real-life performance skills based on simulated tasks. This measure 
demonstrates high internal consistency (α=0.88), good validity with other scales (DAFS 
r=0.86) and good test-retest reliability (r=0.91)57, 58. 
 
Symptoms 
The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale59 (clinical participants only) was included, a 
standardized instrument for assessing symptom severity in psychosis. This measure has 
good internal consistency (r=0.69 – 0.94), construct validity (r=0.77) inter-rater reliability 
(0.83 to 0.87)59,60. 
 
5.4 Analysis plan 
 
Missing data was considered as ‘Missing at random’ (MAR). For regression analyses, 
listwise deletion was used, as recommended61. For mediation analysis, full information 
maximum likelihood was used which combines available information to estimate 
population parameters62,63.  
 
Chi-squared analyses assessed differences in memory reported for specificity, integration, 
and content valence between individuals with FEP or healthy controls. Logistic regression 
analyses assessed whether neurocognitive and metacognitive ability were associated with 
likelihood of reporting a specific or integrated SDM. Linear regression analyses assessed 
whether specificity and integration of SDM predicted functional outcome, controlling for 
neurocognition and metacognition. Finally, a mediation model was developed to assess 
whether specificity and integration of SDM mediate the relationship between 
neurocognition and functional outcome, independent of metacognition. Due to sample 
size, the model was built through sequential steps: i) neurocognition to functional 
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outcome with metacognition as a single mediator, ii) with SDM as single mediator, iii) 
with all significant mediators.  
 
5.5 Results  
 
5.5.1 Sample characteristics 
 
A total of seventy-one participants with First Episode Psychosis completed the 
assessments (mean age = 25.93, S.D. 5.55, range 18-39). Fifty-seven healthy control 
participants completed the SDM measure (mean age = 24.84, S.D. 6.34, range 18-39). 
 
Table 7: Sample characteristics summary table.  
 FEP Healthy control Differences test 
Age, yrs. (SD) 25.93 (5.55) 24.84 (6.34) F(1, 125) = 36.78, p=.31 
Gender (M/F) 44/27 41/16 Ӽ² (1, 128) = 1.41, p 
=.24 
Symptoms (positive) 11.77 (3.46) 
Range 7-19 
  
Symptoms 
(negative) 
13.21 (4.85) 
Range 7-36 
  
Symptoms (general)  27.94 (6.49) 
Range 16-43 
  
Education (years) 12.8 (1.7) 
Range 11 – 17 
years 
13.37 (1.58)11 
Range 11-17 
years 
F(1, 127) = 2.86, p=.09 
 Data for healthy controls was captured as categories (e.g. GCSE, A-level, Degree, 
higher degree) which was subsequently converted into years of education to match the 
FEP group.  
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5.5.2 Data checking 
 
All variables were checked for skewness, kurtosis and outliers. UPSA total was positively 
skewed and, therefore, transformed using square root transformation. 
 
5.5.3 Frequency and descriptive statistics 
 
Sixty% of FEP and eighty-nine% of healthy controls provided three SDMs. Due to the 
limited number who provided all three memories, only the first SDM was coded. 
Frequency statistics for SDMs are presented in table 8 and appendix C.   
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Table 8: The frequency statistics for self-defining memories.  
																																																						
12	33% of SDMs were coded as specific positive in FEP group, compared to 47% in 
control group.	
13	9% of SDMs were coded as integrated positive in FEP group, compared to 40% in 
control group.	
 FEP sample Healthy 
control sample 
Difference tests 
Specific vs. non-specific 12 66% 34% 79% 21% Ӽ² (1, N = 128) = 
2.54, p=.11 
Integrated vs. non-integrated13 18% 82% 58% 42% Ӽ² (1, N = 128) = 
21.52, p<.001 
Positive vs. Negative content 52% 48% 65% 35% Ӽ² (1, N = 128) = 
2.12, p=.15 
Words per first memory, Mean 58.97 
(S.D=47.5,  
median=39, 
range 4-202 
words)  
119.04 
(S.D=92.5,  
median=98, 
range 21-491 
words) 
t(79.38)= -4.45, 
p<.001 
Type of event:      
Recreation/Exploration 22% (87% 
positive) 
33% (46% 
positive) 
 
Relationship 22% (6% 
positive) 
28% (24% 
positive) 
 
Achievement/Mastery 24% (100% 
positive) 
16% (24% 
positive) 
 
Guilt/shame 0% 5% (100% 
negative) 
 
Drug, alcohol or tobacco use 0% 2% (100% 
positive) 
 
Hospitalization/Stigmatization of 
illness 
6% (100% 
negative) 
0%  
Failure 6% (100% 
negative) 
2% (100% 
negative) 
 
Life threatening event 20% (7% 
positive) 
12% (100% 
negative) 
 
Event not classifiable  0% 2% (100% 
positive) 
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Descriptive statistics for neurocognitive, metacognitive, and outcome variables are 
presented in table 9. 
 
Table 9: Descriptive statistics for neurocognition, metacognition and functioning. 
 
 
 
5.5.4 Hypothesis testing 
 
Hypothesis 1  
Significant difference was found between groups on frequency of integrated memory 
reported, Ӽ² (1, N = 128) = 21.52, p<.001 (see figure 8). Table 9 highlighted 13 out of 71 
individuals with FEP reported an integrated memory, compared to 33 out of 57 healthy 
control participants.  
 
Cognitive/functioning 
measure 
Raw scores Z scores (created from 
age-scaled scores) 
Mean 
(S.D) 
Range Mean (S.D) Range 
Immediate verbal memory 
(0-75) 
28.76 
(10.93) 
10-55 -1.25 (1.13) -3.16-1.3 
Delayed verbal memory (0-
50) 
16.76 
(8.34) 
0-35 -1.21 (1.13) -3.33-1.11 
Letter-number sequence (0-
21) 
8.83 (2.47) 4-15 -.99 (.96) -2.78-1.18 
Verbal fluency (semantic) 18.85 
(4.59) 
9-29 -.34 (.87) -2.18-1.42 
Verbal fluency 
(phonemic) 
33.09 (9.4) 15-55 -.87 (.97) -2.85-1.5 
Vocabulary (0-80) 53.63 
(10.82) 
31-73 -.28 (1.16) -2.6-1.8 
Matrix reasoning (0-35) 26.03 
(4.16) 
13-34 .2 (8.5) -2.5-2 
Trail-Making Test (B-A) 46.93 
(31.24) 
6.64-
135.60 
.97 (2.45) -3.88-8.17 
MAI total (0-5) 2.85 (1.2) .44 – 4.88   
UPSA total (0-100) 72.98 
(14.5) 
36.62 – 
95.24 
  
Time Use SU (hours in 
activity per week) 
33.97 
(26.57) 
2.30 – 
96.74 
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Figure 8: Bar graph for percentage of reported integrated self-defining memories in 
FEP and healthy control sample. 
 
 
No difference was found for frequency of specificity (p =.11) and content valence (p =.15) 
between the groups.  
 
Hypothesis 2 
To understand the relationship between SDMs and neurocognition, a single 
neurocognitive factor was created using the z-scores of all neurocognitive variables, 
following research which assumes a single neurocognitive factor 34, 64-67. 
 
Logistic regression analysis assessed whether neurocognition could determine the 
likelihood of SDM to be specific or non-specific. This model was significant (Ӽ² = 8.0, 
df= 1, p=.005). Neurocognition explained 14.8% (Nagelkerke R²)	of the variance in 
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specificity and correctly classified 69% of the cases. Neurocognition did not predict 
integration (p=.28). 
 
Hypothesis 3 
Logistic regression analysis assessed whether metacognitive ability could determine the 
likelihood of SDM to be specific or non-specific. The model was significant (Ӽ² = 16.16, 
df=1, p<.001). Metacognition explained 28.7% (Nagelkerke R²)	of the variance in 
specificity and correctly classified 75.7% of the cases. Metacognition did not predict 
integration (p>.2).  
 
Hypothesis 4 
Specificity was a significant predictor of functional outcome, whilst controlling for 
metacognition (neurocognition was not significant after including metacognition). This 
model predicted 70.4% (adjusted r² = .70) of the variance in functional outcome score 
(R²=.70, F(2, 68) = 78.67, p<.001); specificity predicted 1.8% of this variance and 
improved the baseline model (ΔR²= .02, F(1, 66) = 4.08, p=.047). Individuals who 
reported a specific self-defining memory had a mean time-use score of 43.3 (SD=3.92) 
hours within structured activity per week, compared to those with non-specific SDM, 
mean of 14.92 (SD=2.44) hours.  
 
When including depression as a covariate, for 21 participants with individualised PANSS 
scores, depression did not predict functioning (p>.05) and specificity was still a 
significant predictor of functioning (ΔR²=.38, p=.003). 
 
Integration did not predict functional outcome. Functional capacity was not predicted by 
any SDM variable. 
 
Mediation model   
The mediation was conducted using Mplus with Multiple Mediation Model (structural 
equation modelling) using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), bootstrapping and 
corrected confidence intervals, following Preacher and Hayes (2008)68 causal steps of 
mediation. 
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A series of mediation models were conducted to identify the indirect mediating effect of 
specificity of SDM between neurocognition and functional outcome, independent of 
metacognition. A full multiple mediation model is presented.  
We aimed to confirm a single neurocognitive factor solution using a confirmatory factor 
analysis of neurocognition Z scores. However, a CFA demonstrated that a 1-factor 
solution for neurocognition was not a good fit to the data [χ2(20) = 79.5, p=.00, CFI = .75, 
TLI = .65, RMSEA = 0.21]. Instead, neurocognition was a 2-factor solution containing 
Factor 1 representing memory: Immediate and delayed logical memory and factor 2 
representing ‘other’ neurocognition: Letter-Number sequence, executive functioning, 
verbal and performance IQ. The model demonstrated an excellent fit [χ2(19) = 
18.92, p=.46, CFI = 1.0, TLI = 1.0, RMSEA = 0.00]. From this point forward, all analyses 
are conducted first with the memory neurocognitive factor then the ‘other’ neurocognitive 
factor. 
Firstly, the mediating effect of metacognition on the relationship between memory and 
functional outcome was tested. Significant direct pathways were found between memory 
and metacognition (β=.62, p<.001) and metacognition and functional outcome (β=78, 
p<.001). Metacognition significantly and fully mediated the relationship between 
memory and functional outcome (β = .48, p<.001, ±95% CI [0.36,0.6]). 
Secondly, the mediating effect of self-defining memories was tested. Significant direct 
pathways were found between memory and functional outcome (β=.31, p=.01), memory 
and specificity of SDM (β=.41, p=.01), and specificity of SDM and functional outcome 
(β= .61, p<.001). Specificity significantly and partially mediated the relationship between 
memory and functional capacity (β = .25, p=.02, ±95% CI [0.04,0.46]).  
Finally, a full multiple mediation model was conducted with mediating effect of 
metacognition and SDMs on the relationship between memory and functional outcome 
(figure 9). A significant direct pathway was found between memory and metacognition 
(β= .62, p<.001) and specificity of SDM (β = .41, p=.01). A significant direct pathway 
was found between metacognition and functional outcome (β= .58, p<.01), and specificity 
of SDM and functional outcome (β=.4, p<.001). Metacognition significantly mediated 
the relationship between memory and functional outcome (β = .36, p<.001, ±95% CI 
[0.22,0.5]) and specificity of SDM also significantly mediated the relationship between 
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memory and functional outcome (β = .16, p=.05, ±95% CI [0.02,0.32]). The direct 
pathway was non-significant suggesting a full mediation model. 
Factor 2: ‘other’ neurocognitive factor significantly predicted functional outcome, β = 
.47, p<.001. However, this factor did not predict specificity and, therefore, not included 
in the model.
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Figure 9: Mediation of the effect of neurocognition to functional outcome through two covarying mediators: specificity of self-defining 
memories and metacognition. ***p<.001, **p<.01, *p<.05. 
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5.6 Discussion 
 
This was the first study to demonstrate that individuals with FEP displayed different 
patterns of SDMs compared to healthy control participants. Those with FEP were less 
likely to report integrated SDMs, compared to controls. This supports research in chronic 
schizophrenia cohorts 8, 15, but demonstrates that deficits exist at first-episode rather than as 
a result of chronic illness. Integration may enable the individual to interpret events as 
meaningful to themselves and define who they are as a person. This may be disrupted in 
psychosis, as outlined in the ‘disrupted self’ framework69,70. Berna et al. (2011)8 
demonstrated that individuals with schizophrenia report fewer integrated memories and 
more trauma-related memories. It may be suggested that trauma memories are not 
integrated into the self, to avoid continued distress, but consequentially leave a fractured 
sense of self. 
 
Although non-significant, individuals with psychosis reported less specific memories and 
more negative memories which focused on i) negative relationships, ii) trauma, iii) 
failure, and iv) illness. This is aligned with research which suggest those with psychosis 
have poorer social relationships71,72 and more interpersonal, trauma memories73-76. The lack 
of significant difference between the groups may be because these memories may be less 
prominent in the early stages of psychosis. 
 
A small proportion of participants reported SDMs related to hospitalization/illness, in 
contrast to Raffard et al7. This may have been triggered by the hospital contextual cues in 
Raffard’s study, whilst the present study was conducted in a community setting. 
Alternatively, this FEP group may not have integrated the illness into their identities, 
compared to a chronic schizophrenia group. 
 
Memory specificity was significantly associated with functional outcome in FEP, 
independent of neurocognition and metacognition. This supports functional outcome 
models which suggest neurocognition27,28,31,32 and metacognition34 play an important role in 
functioning in psychosis, but demonstrates a role of a distinct, reflective process of 
reporting SDMs on functional outcome. Individuals with FEP who report a specific SDM 
spent 43.3 hours within structured activity per week, compared to those who reported a 
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non-specific SDM who were engaged in 14.9 hours. In comparison, Hodgekins et al26 
demonstrated that individuals with FEP spent 25.2 hours in structured activity compared 
to 19.7 hours for a delayed recovery group. The differences reflect important clinical 
differences in recovery trajectories.  
 
Integration and valence are important aspects of SDMs, and the fewer integrated 
memories in FEP is an important finding, but these aspects of SDMs did not predict 
functional outcome in FEP. This may be a power issue, due to the reduced number of 
integrated memories in FEP, or integration may be more related to trauma, and therefore 
symptoms77. Blagov & Singer3 and Singer, Rexhaj & Baddeley78 demonstrated a negative 
correlation between specificity and integration. However, Blagov & Singer3 explicitly 
requested important memories to one’s life which may have encouraged a focus on 
integration, at the expense of specificity, and Singer, Rexhaj & Baddeley78 demonstrated 
no such relationship in older participants, due to the greater ability of older adults to 
provide both integrated and specific SDMs. Following Conway and Pleydell-Pearce13, 
specificity needs to be present within event, general and lifetime memories in order to 
describe how the memory was integrated. An individual may need to have a certain level 
of specificity in SDM, in order to integrate this memory to influence functioning.  
 
Specificity, or the ability to report a detailed SDM, may have enabled the individual to 
reflect on their previous experiences in a coherent manner, to identify important 
memories to the self and identity. This identity may allow the individual to view 
themselves as a person with skills and draw specific detail into their SDMs to guide 
function. This ability may allow them to accurately reflect on their ability and monitor 
errors, which facilitates engagement in activities. This furthers research within a healthy 
sample1,3.  
 
The mean word count for the FEP group was lower than for the healthy control group and 
lower than that reported by Raffard et al7. The word count was greater than that reported 
by Jobson and O’Kearney79 and similar to Singer and Moffitt45. This FEP sample may have 
written fewer words due to the lack of specific memories, supported by a previous 
positive association between word count and specificity7, although it was possible to have 
memories that were brief (15 words) and specific. Alternatively, the lower word count 
may have been due to data collection (asking participants to write the memory down) or 
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lack of motivation, previously been linked to functioning80, 81. Future studies should explore 
these hypotheses. 
 
The impact of specificity on functioning was independent of metacognition, thus 
highlighting a novel contribution of SDMs. Metacognition significantly predicted the 
likelihood of reporting a specific memory, which suggests metacognition is associated 
with difficulties in recalling autobiographical memories and organizing one’s experience 
into a coherent narrative40.  
 
Neurocognition also significantly predicted the likelihood of reporting a specific SDM, 
supporting previous research9,10,82, however, both metacognition and SDMs have an 
independent role in predicting functioning. Theoretically, it is expected that SDMs are 
particularly pertinent to functioning in psychosis. They are associated with goal 
outcomes1, and the typical age of reported SDM is 20-24 years in controls, compared to 
15-19 years in a schizophrenia sample7, which is before the onset of psychosis83, 
highlighting the interest in understanding the connection between psychosis, SDMs and 
functioning. However, this might apply to autobiographical memories more broadly, not 
just self-defining memories. Future studies could include a control condition which asks 
participants to provide an autobiographical memory which is not self-defining.  
 
In terms of clinical implications, Lysaker and Klion (2017)84 recently outlined the 
Metacognition Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT), which is specifically aimed at 
improving metacognition85,86. In addition, narrative enhancement and cognitive therapy 
aims to construct positive narratives about the self87. Given the partial mediation effect of 
SDMs between neurocognition and functioning, therapies should focus on improving 
both metacognitive and neurocognition, e.g. Cognitive Remediation, shown to improve 
both neurocognition and real-life skills88.  
 
5.6.1 Limitations 
 
Firstly, the sample was small, particularly for analysis of binary variables, as larger 
samples are needed for complex mediation models89. Hence the use of single mediation 
models. Future studies should aim to replicate this finding in a sufficiently powered 
multiple mediation model. Secondly, in a sub-sample, the results remained after 
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controlling for depression. However, as depression was previously shown to influence 
functional outcome in schizophrenia90,91 and specificity of autobiographical memories92, a 
follow-up study should consider this further in order to replicate this finding. 
 
Thirdly, the self-defining memories questionnaire does not explicitly state that the 
memory description should explain why this memory is meaningful; characteristic of an 
integrated memory. This lack of instruction may have influenced integration in their 
reporting. Future studies should include a spontaneous and cued integration response; 
akin to Berna et al8. Using the Metacognitive Assessment Scale-Abbreviated93, assessing 
one’s acknowledgement of distress and management of difficulties, correlated with social 
functioning94, may provide different outcomes to MAI. Future studies could conduct a 
sensitivity analysis to replicate and build on these findings using the MAS-A. Due to 
power, this study was unable to fully separate the variance explained by neurocognition, 
metacognition and SDMs. Future studies should explore whether SDM is a distinct factor, 
or a proxy for neurocognition. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
This study was the first study to describe SDMs in FEP, and assess the impact on 
functional outcome. Specificity of SDMs predicted functioning in FEP, independent of 
metacognition. Individuals who reported a specific SDM were more likely to utilize their 
real-life functional skills to partake in structured activities. In terms of clinical 
importance, elaborating on specific SDMs within therapeutic contexts may be useful, and 
future intervention strategies should explore SDMs as a tool to improve functioning. 
 
 
5.8 References 
1. Singer JA, Blagov P, Berry M, Oost KM. Self-Defining Memories, Scripts, and 
the Life Story: Narrative Identity in Personality and Psychotherapy. J Pers. 
2013;81(6):569-582. doi:10.1111/jopy.12005. 
2. Conway MA, Singer JA, Tagini A. The Self and Autobiographical Memory: 
Correspondence and Coherence. Soc Cogn. 2004;22(5):491-529. 
doi:10.1521/soco.22.5.491.50768. 
3. Blagov PS, Singer JA. Four dimensions of self-defining memories (specificity, 
meaning, content, and affect) and their relationships to self-restraint, distress, and 
		
134	
repressive defensiveness. J Pers. 2004;72(3):481-511. doi:10.1111/j.0022-
3506.2004.00270.x. 
4. Berna F, Potheegadoo J, Aouadi I, et al. A Meta-Analysis of Autobiographical 
Memory Studies in Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder. Schizophr Bull. 
2016;42(1):56-66. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbv099. 
5. Riutort M, Cuervo C, Danion JM, Peretti CS, & Salamé P. Reduced levels of 
specific autobiographical memories in schizophrenia. Psychiatry Research. 
2003;117(1):35-45.  
6. Cuervo-Lombard C, Jovenin N, Hedelin G, Rizzo-Peter L, Conway MA, Danion 
JM. Autobiographical memory of adolescence and early adulthood events: An 
investigation in schizophrenia. J Int Neuropsychol Soc. 2007;13(2):335-343. 
doi:10.1017/S135561770707035X. 
7. Raffard S, D’Argembeau A, Lardi C, Bayard S, Boulenger JP, Van Der Linden 
M. Exploring self-defining memories in schizophrenia. Memory. 2009;17(1):26-
38. doi:10.1080/09658210802524232. 
8. Berna F, Bennouna-Greene M, Potheegadoo J, Verry P, Conway MA, Danion JM. 
Self-defining memories related to illness and their integration into the self in 
patients with schizophrenia. Psychiatry Res. 2011;189(1):49-54. 
doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2011.03.006. 
9. Allé MC, Gandolphe MC, Doba K, et al. Grasping the mechanisms of narratives’ 
incoherence in schizophrenia: An analysis of the temporal structure of patients’ 
life story. Compr Psychiatry. 2016;69:20-29. 
doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2016.04.015. 
10. Lysaker PH, France CM, Hunter NL, Davis LW. Personal Narratives of Illness in 
Schizophrenia: Associations with Neurocognition and Symptoms. Psychiatry 
Interpers Biol Process. 2005;68(2):140-151. doi:10.1521/psyc.2005.68.2.140. 
11. Harrison CL, Fowler D. Negative symptoms, trauma, and autobiographical 
memory: An investigation of individuals recovering from psychosis. J Nerv Ment 
Dis. 2004;192(11):745-753. doi:10.1097/01.nmd.0000144693.12282.11. 
12. Williams JM, Barnhofer T, Crane C, Herman D, Raes F, Watkins E, Dalgleish T. 
Autobiographical memory specificity and emotional disorder. Psychological 
bulletin. 2007:133(1):122. 
		
135	
13. Conway, M, and Pleydell-Pearce C. The construction of autobiographical 
memories in the self-memory system. Psychological review 107.2. 2000; 107(2): 
261-288. 
14. Mehl S, Rief W, Mink K, Lüllmann E, Lincoln TM. Social performance is more 
closely associated with theory of mind and autobiographical memory than with 
psychopathological symptoms in clinically stable patients with schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders. Psychiatry research. 2010:178(2):276-83. 
15. Raffard S, D’Argembeau A, Lardi C, Bayard S, Boulenger JP, Linden M Van der. 
Narrative identity in schizophrenia. Conscious Cogn. 2010;19(1):328-340. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.10.005. 
16. Ricarte JJ, Ros L, Latorre JM, Watkins E. Mapping autobiographical memory in 
schizophrenia: Clinical implications. Clin Psychol Rev. 2017;51:96-108. 
doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2016.11.004. 
17. Holm T, Thomsen DK, Bliksted V. Life story chapters and narrative self-
continuity in patients with schizophrenia. Conscious Cogn. 2016;45:60-74. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.08.009. 
18. Berna F, Bennouna-Greene M, Potheegadoo J, Verry P, Conway MA, Danion JM. 
Impaired ability to give a meaning to personally significant events in patients with 
schizophrenia. Conscious Cogn. 2011;20(3):703-711. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.12.004. 
19. Godden D, Baddeley A. When does context influence recognition memory? Br J 
Psychol. 1980;71:99-104. 
20. Reiser BJ, Black JB, Abelson RP. Knowledge structures in the organization and 
retrieval of autobiographical memories. Cogn Psychol. 1985;17(1):89-137. 
doi:10.1016/0010-0285(85)90005-2. 
21. Aleman A, Hijman R, de Haan EHF, Kahn RS. Memory impairment in 
schizophrenia: A meta-analysis. Am J Psychiatry. 1999;156(9):1358-1366. 
doi:10.1176/ajp.156.9.1358. 
22. Fioravanti M, Carlone O, Vitale B, Cinti ME, Clare L. A meta-analysis of 
cognitive deficits in adults with a diagnosis of schizophrenia. Neuropsychol Rev. 
2005;15(2):73-95. doi:10.1007/s11065-005-6254-9. 
		
136	
23. Forbes NF, Carrick LA, McIntosh AM, Lawrie SM. Working memory in 
schizophrenia: A meta-analysis. Psychol Med. 2009;39(6):889-905. 
doi:10.1017/S0033291708004558. 
24. Fowler D, Hodgekins J, Painter M, et al. Cognitive behaviour therapy for 
improving social recovery in psychosis: A report from the ISREP MRC trial 
platform study (improving social recovery in early psychosis). Psychol Med. 
2009;39(10):1627-1636. doi:10.1017/S0033291709005467. 
25. Harrison G, Hopper K, Craig T, et al. Recovery from psychotic illness: a 15-and 
25-year international follow-up study. Br J Psychiatry. 2001;178:506-517. 
doi:10.1192/bjp.178.6.506. 
26. Hodgekins J, French P, Birchwood M, et al. Comparing time use in individuals at 
different stages of psychosis and a non-clinical comparison group. Schizophr Res. 
2015;161(2-3):188-193. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2014.12.011. 
27. Beck AT, Rector NA. Cognitive Approaches to Schizophrenia: Theory and 
Therapy. Annu Rev Clin Psychol. 2005;1(1):577-606.   
28. Bowie CR, Leung WW, Reichenberg A, et al. Predicting Schizophrenia Patients 
’ Real-World Behavior with Specific Neuropsychological and Functional 
Capacity Measures. 2008:505-511. doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2007.05.022. 
29. Grant PM, Beck AT. Defeatist beliefs as a mediator of cognitive impairment, 
negative symptoms, and functioning in schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 
2009;35(4):798-806. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbn008. 
30. Greenwood KE, Landau S, Wykes T. Negative symptoms and specific cognitive 
impairments as combined targets for improved functional outcome within 
cognitive remediation therapy. Schizophr Bull. 2005;31(4):910-921. 
doi:10.1093/schbul/sbi035. 
31. Couture SM, Granholm EL, Fish SC. A path model investigation of 
neurocognition, theory of mind, social competence, negative symptoms and real-
world functioning in schizophrenia. Schizophr Res. 2011;125(2-3):152-160. 
doi:10.1016/j.schres.2010.09.020. 
32. Rector NA, Stolar N, Grant P. Schizophrenia: Cognitive theory, research, and 
therapy. Guilford Press; 2011.   
33. Berry C, Greenwood K. Beliefs in social inclusion: Invariance in associations 
among hope, dysfunctional attitudes, and social inclusion across adolescence and 
		
137	
young adulthood. Dev Psychopathol. 2017:1-17. 
doi:10.1017/S0954579417001195. 
34. Davies G, Fowler D, Greenwood K. Metacognition as a Mediating Variable 
between Neurocognition and Functional Outcome in First Episode Psychosis. 
Schizophr Bull. 2017;43(4):824-832. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbw128. 
35. Semerari A, Carcione A, Dimaggio G, et al. How to evaluate metacognitive 
functioning in psychotherapy? The metacognition assessment scale and its 
applications. Clin Psychol Psychother. 2003;10(4):238-261. 
doi:10.1002/cpp.362. 
36. Dimaggio G, Vanheule S, Lysaker PH, Carcione A, Nicolò G. Impaired self-
reflection in psychiatric disorders among adults: A proposal for the existence of a 
network of semi independent functions. Conscious Cogn. 2009;18(3):653-664. 
doi:10.1016/j.concog.2009.06.003. 
37. James AV, Hasson-Ohayon I, Vohs J, et al. Metacognition moderates the 
relationship between dysfunctional self-appraisal and social functioning in 
prolonged schizophrenia independent of psychopathology. Compr Psychiatry. 
2016;69:62-70. doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2016.05.008. 
38. Lysaker PH, McCormick BP, Snethen G, et al. Metacognition and social function 
in schizophrenia: Associations of mastery with functional skills competence. 
Schizophr Res. 2011;131(1-3):214-218. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2011.06.011. 
39. Lysaker PH, Leonhardt BL, Pijnenborg M, van Donkersgoed R, de Jong S, 
Dimaggio G. Metacognition in schizophrenia spectrum disorders: methods of 
assessment and associations with neurocognition, symptoms, cognitive style and 
function. Isr J Psychiatry Relat Sci. 2014;51(1):54-62. doi:10.4321/S0213-
61632010000400004. 
40. Lysaker PH, Vohs JL, Ballard R, Fogley R, Salvatore G, Popolo R, Dimaggio G. 
Metacognition, self-reflection and recovery in schizophrenia. Future Neurology. 
2013; 8(1): 103-115. 
41. Lysaker PH, Bob P, Pec O, et al. Synthetic metacognition as a link between brain 
and behavior in schizophrenia. Transl Neurosci. 2013;4(3):368-377. 
doi:10.2478/s13380-013-0131-4. 
42. Martin B, McNally J, Taggar S. Determining the importance of self-evaluation on 
the goal-performance effect in goal setting: Primary findings. Canadian Journal 
		
138	
of Behavioural Science/Revue canadienne des sciences du comportement. 
2016;48(2):91. 
43. Bandura A, Cervone D. Self-evaluative and self-efficacy mechanisms governing 
the motivational effects of goal systems. Journal of personality and social 
psychology. 1983:45(5):1017. 
44. Snyder CR, Harris C, Anderson JR, Holleran SA, Irving LM,  Sigmon 
ST....Harney P. The will and the ways: Development and validation of an 
individual-differences measure of hope. Journal of personality and social 
psychology. 1991:60(4):570.  
45. Singer JA, Moffitt KH. An experimental investigation of specificity and 
generality in memory narratives. Imagination, Cognition and Personality. 
1992:11(3):233-257. 
46. Singer J, Blagov P. Classification system and scoring manual for self-defining 
autobiographical memories. … manuscript, Connect Coll. 2000. 
http://www.selfdefiningmemories.com/Classification_System___Scoring_Manu
al_for_SDMs.pdf. 
47. Tombaugh TN, Kozak J, Rees L. Normative data stratified by age and education 
for two measures of verbal fluency: FAS and animal naming. Arch Clin 
Neuropsychol. 1999;14(2):167-177. doi:10.1016/S0887-6177(97)00095-4. 
48. Tombaugh TN. Trail Making Test A and B: Normative data stratified by age and 
education. Arch Clin Neuropsychol. 2004;19(2):203-214. doi:10.1016/S0887-
6177(03)00039-8. 
49. Wechsler D. WMS-R: Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised Manual. New York: 
Psychological Corporation; 1987.  
50. Wechsler D. Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI). San Antonio, 
TX: Psychological Corporation; 1999.  
51. Semerari A, Cucchi M, Dimaggio G, et al. The development of the Metacognition 
Assessment Interview: Instrument description, factor structure and reliability in a 
non-clinical sample. Psychiatry Res. 2012;200(2-3):890-895. 
doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2012.07.015. 
52. Short S. Review of the UK 2000 Time Use Survey. 2006;(July). 
53. Cella M, Edwards C, Wykes T. A question of time: A study of time use in people 
with schizophrenia. Schizophr Res. 2016;176(2-3):480-484. 
doi:10.1016/j.schres.2016.06.033. 
		
139	
54. Short S. The United Kingdom 2000 Time Use Survey Technical Report. Office for 
National Statistics; 2003.  
55. Hodgekins J. Investigating the Psychological Typology of Social Recovery in 
Individuals with First Episode Psychosis. Dr Thesis. 2008;(August):1-26. 
56. Patterson TL, Goldman S, McKibbin CL, Hughs T, Jeste D V. UCSD 
Performance-Based Skills Assessment: Development of a New Measure of 
Everyday Functioning for Severely Mentally Ill Adults. Schizophr Bull. 
2001;27(2):235-245. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.schbul.a006870. 
57. Harvey PD, Velligan DI, Bellack AS. Performance-based measures of functional 
skills: Usefulness in clinical treatment studies. Schizophr Bull. 2007;33(5):1138-
1148. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbm040. 
58. Mausbach BT, Bowie CR, Harvey PD, et al. Usefulness of the UCSD 
performance-based skills assessment (UPSA) for predicting residential 
independence in patients with chronic schizophrenia. J Psychiatr Res. 
2008;42(4):320-327. doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2006.12.008. 
59. Kay S, Fiszbein A, Opler L. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale for 
schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 1987;13(2):261-276. 
doi:10.1093/schbul/13.2.261. 
60. Kay SR, Opler LA, Lindenmayer JP. Reliability and validity of the positive and 
negative syndrome scale for schizophrenics. Psychiatry Res. 1988;23(1):99-110. 
doi:10.1016/0165-1781(88)90038-8. 
61. McKnight PE, McKnight KM, Sidani S, Figueredo AJ. Missing data: A gentle 
introduction. New York: The Guilford Press; 2007 
62. Dong Y, Peng C-YJ. Principled missing data method the researchers. Springer 
Plus. 2013;2(222):1-17. 
63. Schafer JL, Graham JW. Missing data: Our view of the state of the art. Psychol 
Methods. 2002;7(2):147-177. doi:10.1037//1082-989X.7.2.147. 
64. Keefe RSE, Goldberg TE, Harvey PD, Gold JM, Poe MP, Coughenour L. The 
Brief Assessment of Cognition in Schizophrenia: Reliability, sensitivity, and 
comparison with a standard neurocognitive battery. Schizophr Res. 2004;68(2-
3):283-297. doi:10.1016/j.schres.2003.09.011. 
65. Keefe RSE, Bilder RM, Harvey PD, et al. Baseline neurocognitive deficits in the 
CATIE schizophrenia trial. Neuropsychopharmacology. 2006;31(9):2033-2046. 
doi:10.1038/sj.npp.1301072. 
		
140	
66. Nuechterlein KH, Subotnik KL, Green MF, et al. Neurocognitive predictors of 
work outcome in recent-onset schizophrenia. Schizophr Bull. 2011;37(SUPPL. 
2):33-40. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbr084. 
67. Schmidt SJ, Mueller DR, Roder V. Social cognition as a mediator variable 
between neurocognition and functional outcome in schizophrenia: Empirical 
review and new results by structural equation modeling. Schizophr Bull. 
2011;37(SUPPL. 2). doi:10.1093/schbul/sbr079. 
68. Preacher KJ, Hayes AF. Assessing mediation in communication research. The 
Sage sourcebook of advanced data analysis methods for communication research. 
2008:13-54. 
69. Nelson B, Parnas J, Sass LA. Disturbance of minimal self (ipseity) in 
schizophrenia: Clarification and current status. Schizophr Bull. 2014;40(3):479-
482. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbu034. 
70. Lysaker PH, Lysaker JT. Narrative Structure in Psychosis Schizophrenia and the 
Dialogical Self. Theory Psychol. 2002;12(2):207-220. 
71. Sündermann O, Onwumere J, Kane F, Morgan C, Kuipers E. Social networks and 
support in first-episode psychosis: Exploring the role of loneliness and anxiety. 
Soc Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol. 2014;49(3):359-366. doi:10.1007/s00127-
013-0754-3. 
72. Erickson DH, Beiser M, Iacono WG., Fleming JA, Lin TY. The role of social 
relationships in the course of first-episode schizophrenia and affective 
psychosis. The American journal of psychiatry. 1989; 146(11), 1456. 
73. Stain HJ, Brønnick K, Hegelstad WT V, et al. Impact of interpersonal trauma on 
the social functioning of adults with first-episode psychosis. Schizophr Bull. 
2014;40(6):1491-1498. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbt166. 
74. Thompson AD, Nelson B, Yuen HP, et al. Sexual trauma increases the risk of 
developing psychosis in an ultra high-risk “prodromal” population. Schizophr 
Bull. 2014;40(3):697-706. doi:10.1093/schbul/sbt032. 
75. Van Nierop M, Viechtbauer W, Gunther N, et al. Childhood trauma is associated 
with a specific admixture of affective, anxiety, and psychosis symptoms cutting 
across traditional diagnostic boundaries. Psychol Med. 2015;45(6):1277-1288. 
doi:10.1017/S0033291714002372. 
		
141	
76. Mauritz MW, Goossens PJJ, Draijer N, van Achterberg T. Prevalence of 
interpersonal trauma exposure and trauma-related disorders in severe mental 
illness. Eur J Psychotraumatol. 2013;4(SUPPL.). doi:10.3402/ejpt.v4i0.19985. 
77. Varese F, Barkus E, Bentall RP. Dissociation mediates the relationship between 
childhood trauma and hallucination-proneness. Psychological medicine. 
2012;42(5):1025-36. 
78. Singer J, Rexhaj B, Baddeley J. Older, wiser, and happier? Comparing older 
adults’ and college students’ self-defining memories. Memory. 2007:15(8):886-
98. 
79. Jobson L, O'Kearney R. Cultural differences in retrieval of self-defining 
memories. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology. 2008;39(1):75-80.  
80. Gard DE, Fisher M, Garrett C, Genevsky A, Vinogradov S. Motivation and its 
relationship to neurocognition, social cognition, and functional outcome in 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia research. 2009 Nov 1;115(1):74-81. 
81. Nakagami E, Xie B, Hoe M, Brekke JS. Intrinsic motivation, neurocognition and 
psychosocial functioning in schizophrenia: testing mediator and moderator 
effects. Schizophrenia research. 2008 Oct 1;105(1-3):95-104. 
82. Lysaker PH, France CM, Hunter NL, Davis LW. Personal Narratives of Illness in 
Schizophrenia: Associations with Neurocognition and Symptoms. Psychiatry 
Interpers Biol Process. 2005;68(2):140-151. doi:10.1521/psyc.2005.68.2.140. 
83. Rajji TK, Ismail Z, Mulsant BH. Age at onset and cognition in schizophrenia: 
meta-analysis. The British Journal of Psychiatry. 2009:195(4):286-293. 
84. Lysaker PH, Klion RE. Recovery, meaning-making, and severe mental illness: a 
comprehensive guide to metacognitive reflection and insight therapy. Routledge; 
2017.  
85. Lysaker PH, Buck KD, Carcione A, Procacci M, Salvatore G, Nicolò G, 
Dimaggio G. Addressing metacognitive capacity for self reflection in the 
psychotherapy for schizophrenia: a conceptual model of the key tasks and 
processes. Psychology and Psychotherapy. Theory, Research and Practice. 
2011:84(1):58-69. 
86. de Jong S, van Donkersgoed RJM, Timmerman ME, aan het Rot M, Wunderink 
L, Arends J,.... Pijnenborg GHM. Metacognitive reflection and insight therapy 
		
142	
(MERIT) for patients with schizophrenia. Psychological medicine. 2008:1-11. 
87. Yanos PT, Roe D, Lysaker PH. Narrative enhancement and cognitive therapy: a 
new group-based treatment for internalized stigma among persons with severe 
mental illness. International Journal of Group Psychotherapy. 2011:61(4):576-
595. 
88. Cella M, Reeder C, Wykes T. Lessons learnt? The importance of metacognition 
and its implications for Cognitive Remediation in schizophrenia. Frontiers in 
psychology. 2016:6:1259. 
89. Thoemmes F, MacKinnon DP, Reiser MR. Power Analysis for Complex 
Mediational Designs. Struct Equ Model. 2010;17(3):510-534. 
doi:10.1080/10705511.2010.489379.POWER. 
90. Bejerholm U, Eklund M. Occupational engagement in persons with 
schizophrenia: Relationships to self-related variables, psychopathology, and 
quality of life. American Journal of Occupational Therapy. 2007:61(1): 21-32. 
91. Conley RR, Ascher-Svanum H, Zhu B, Faries DE, Kinon BJ. The burden of 
depressive symptoms in the long-term treatment of patients with 
schizophrenia. Schizophrenia research. 2007:90(1-3):186-197. 
92. Kremers IP, Spinhoven P, Van der Does AJW. Autobiographical memory in 
depressed and non-depressed patients with borderline personality disorder. British 
Journal of Clinical Psychology. 2004:43(1):17-29. 
93. Lysaker PH, Carcione A, Dimaggio G, Johannesen  JK, Nicolò G, Procacci M, 
Semerari A. Metacognition amidst narratives of self and illness in schizophrenia: 
Associations with insight, neurocognition, symptom and function. Acta 
Psychiatrica Scandinavica. 2005:112(1): 64-71. 
94. Lysaker PH, Shea AM, Buck KD, Dimaggio G, Nicolò G, Procacci M,…. Rand 
KL. Metacognition as a mediator of the effects of impairments in neurocognition 
on social function in schizophrenia spectrum disorders. Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica. 2010:112(5): 405-413. 
95. Thorne A. McLean KC. Manual for coding events in self-defining 
memories. University of California, Santa Cruz; 2001.  
 
 
 
		
143	
6. What is the association between metacognition and anomalous experiences 
and delusional beliefs? A systematic literature review. 
 
 
Abigail Wright* a, Professor David Fowler a b, Professor Kathryn Greenwood a b. 
a University of Sussex, School of Psychology 
b Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust  
 
Chapter 6 is written in the format to be submitted to Clinical Psychology Review.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
		
144	
6.1 Abstract 
6.1.1 Introduction 
Anomalous experiences are common within the general population, but the frequency and 
intensity is increased in psychosis and may later develop into anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs. Studies have demonstrated that perceptual biases may play a role in anomalous 
experiences and the appraisal of one’s experience (metacognition) may also be relevant 
for anomalous (delusional) beliefs. Metacognition and anomalous experiences can be 
measured in a variety of ways. The use of these different methodologies and samples has 
resulted in inconsistencies within the literature.  
6.1.2 Methods 
Three databases were searched (PsycInfo, Scopus and Web of Knowledge) for this 
systematic review. Three metacognitive variables were used frequently: ability, 
monitoring and sensitivity, and studies in this area were used to assess the relationship 
between anomalous experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs with metacognitive 
components.  
6.1.3 Results 
Thirty-three studies were included in the review with a total of 5986 participants with a 
mean age of 35.1 years (SD=11.25). Three studies assessed metacognitive ability and 
demonstrated an association with anomalous experiences, but highlighted the role of 
trauma. Eighteen studies assessed metacognitive monitoring and demonstrated an 
association with anomalous (delusional) beliefs. However, this may be a state-like 
relationship, which varies throughout the course of recovery. Thirteen studies assessed 
metacognitive sensitivity, demonstrating a moderate association with delusional beliefs. 
There was inconsistent association with metacognitive monitoring and sensitivity with 
anomalous perceptual experiences. 
6.1.4 Discussion 
This review demonstrated an association between anomalous experiences/beliefs and 
different components of metacognition. The association between anomalous perceptual 
experiences and metacognition is still unclear. Future studies should assess anomalous 
perceptual experiences using more specific measures and appropriate experimental 
controls. 
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6.2 Introduction 
 
Anomalous perceptual experiences are considered distortions of sensory events, such as 
hearing sounds which cannot be accounted for by the environment. Anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs are considered fixed false beliefs (Garety et al. 2001), most 
commonly, paranoia (Hemsley & Garety 1986). Research has suggested that anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs may be developed from anomalous perceptual experiences (Fletcher 
& Frith 2009; Corlett et al. 2009; Freeman et al. 2002). These experiences/beliefs are 
commonly experienced by individuals within the general population (Vaughan Bell et al. 
2006; Kelleher et al. 2012). However, the frequency and intensity of these anomalous 
experiences/beliefs are increased in those with psychosis or those with emerging severe 
mental health difficulties (Brett et al. 2009; Reininghaus et al. 2016).  
 
Many theories have been proposed to explain anomalous experiences or delusional 
beliefs. A literature review from Brookwell, Bentall and Varese (2013) was conducted to 
assess the relationship between different cognitive predictors of anomalous 
(hallucinatory) experiences, derived from models of source-monitoring, self-monitoring 
and signal detection mechanisms. This literature review demonstrated significant effects 
for signal detection and source-monitoring studies for explaining hallucinatory 
experiences in both clinical and non-clinical participants. Specifically, signal detection 
theory suggests that hallucinatory experiences appear due to a signal detection perceptual 
bias (bias towards detecting a stimulus as present within the environment, e.g. a voice) 
(Bentall & Slade 1985). Such perceptual biases have been consistently associated with 
hallucinations within the psychosis or psychosis-proneness literature (Teufel et al. 2015; 
Teufel et al. 2010; Mussgay & Hertwig 1990), whilst perceptual ability does not appear 
to be responsible for this effect (Mintz & Alpert 1972; Bentall & Slade 1985). Garety et 
al. (2001) suggest the role of negative (metacognitive) appraisal of the anomalous 
experience which leads these experiences to become distressing and, therefore, can lead 
to anomalous (delusional) beliefs.  
 
Metacognition is considered ‘thinking about thinking’ (Semerari et al. 2003a; Flavell 
1979) and Nelson and Narens (1990) outlined a metacognitive model suggesting an 
object-level (cognitive processes, such as perception and memory) and a meta-level (an 
abstract view of the object-level, considered metacognition), connected by metacognitive 
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processes. Literature highlights that metacognition may be fractionated and appear in 
many different forms, associated within a dynamic model (Nelson & Narens, 1990; Shea 
et al., 2014). Three levels of metacognition have been proposed. Firstly, metacognitive 
ability: capacity to think about one’s own cognitions, emotions and behaviour, and to use 
this reflection to respond to challenges (Lysaker et al. 2010; Lysaker, Erickson, et al. 
2011). Secondly, metacognitive experience: an online appraisal of one’s experience or 
performance, and thirdly, metacognitive sensitivity14: a sub-conscious awareness of 
confidence in performance during a task, which generates a “feeling of knowing” 
(Nelson, 1984). These metacognitive levels may influence each other via metacognitive 
controlling processes, (i.e. such that knowledge is used to control, guide and correct 
ongoing action) (Wells & Purdon, 1999), and metacognitive monitoring processes (i.e. 
monitoring of ongoing experience in order to recognise anomalies and update higher level 
beliefs) (Efklides 2006).  
 
It may be suggested that perceptual biases predispose an individual to have anomalous 
perceptual experiences. Then the individual may (metacognitively) appraise this 
experience as negative or threatening which can lead to the anomalous (delusional) belief. 
For example, if you are unable to accurately discriminate between a real or false 
perception, you may accept a false one as real (perceptual bias). After this, if you 
experience difficulty in monitoring your experiences or inaccurately interpret these 
experiences (metacognitive experience) or become confident in your error (metacognitive 
sensitivity), this may maintain this false perception or develop into an anomalous 
(delusional) belief. Following the range of measures of metacognition, it is important to 
further understand what particular aspects of the processing mechanisms are involved in 
anomalous experiences/beliefs. The manner in which all of these metacognitive concepts 
influence anomalous events has been considered in various studies. This literature review 
will consolidate and evaluate these studies. 
 
																																																						
14	Some studies use a measure of metacognitive efficiency, which uses the metacognitive 
sensitivity score but also takes into account objective performance on the task to provide a more 
robust measure of metacognition within the moment (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco & Lau, 
2012). To avoid confusion, within this review we have termed them both under “metacognitive 
sensitivity”.	
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Varese & Bentall (2011) previously conducted a literature review and meta-analysis on 
the association between metacognitive beliefs and hallucinatory experiences. This review 
solely focused on assessing metacognitive beliefs, using the Metacognitions 
Questionnaire (MCQ) (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004) and demonstrated little support 
for the association between hallucinatory experiences and metacognitive beliefs. Instead, 
uncontrolled comorbid symptoms may have played a role in previous significant results. 
Despite the systematic approach of the literature review, Varese and Bentall (2011) 
review only assessed hallucinations or hallucination-proneness and metacognitive beliefs. 
 
To the knowledge of the authors, no review has yet assessed the role of different aspects 
of metacognition on anomalous experiences and anomalous delusional beliefs within one 
single review. This current literature review aims to take a holistic approach to include 
various anomalous events: anomalous perceptual experiences as well as anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs, which may display different relationships with metacognition. Given 
the continuum perspective of anomalous experiences which suggest these occur within 
the general population, but more commonly for those with an experience of psychosis 
(Bentall et al. 1988), this review will focus on the presence of the anomalous event across 
various clinical and non-clinical groups. This is instead of focusing on the concept of 
schizophrenia or psychosis as this can be heterogeneous in its symptom presentation 
(Arango et al. 2000; Carpenter et al. 1988).  
 
6.2.1 Metacognitive variables 
 
Whilst literature has described different metacognitive components, for consistency and 
conciseness, this review will explore the association between three metacognitive 
components described above (metacognitive ability, monitoring, sensitivity), with 
anomalous experiences and delusional beliefs in both clinical and non-clinical studies.  
 
1. Metacognitive ability:  
Metacognitive ability is the capacity to think about one’s own cognitions, emotions and 
behaviour, as well as others’, and to use this reflection to respond to challenges and link 
to other relevant narrative events (Lysaker et al. 2010; Lysaker, Erickson, et al. 2011). 
This has been measured using a narrative interview: Metacognitive Assessment Scale-
Abbreviated (Lysaker, Carcione, et al. 2005) or Metacognitive Assessment Interview 
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(MAI) (Semerari et al. 2012) assessing the ability to understand “the self” and “the other”; 
termed as one multidimensional metacognitive ability construct.  
 
2. Metacognitive monitoring: 
Metacognitive monitoring is monitoring of ongoing experience in order to recognise 
anomalies and update higher level beliefs. This is measured by using the self-
reflectiveness subscale of Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck et al. 2004) which is an 
individual’s current capacity to evaluate his or her anomalous experiences and atypical 
interpretations of events (Degirmenci et al. 2013). The self-reflectiveness subscale 
specifically reflects objectivity and openness to feedback; e.g. “At times I have 
misunderstood other people’s attitudes towards me” (Engh et al. 2011).  
3. Metacognitive sensitivity: 
Metacognitive sensitivity is one’s ability to discriminate between task-related correct and 
incorrect decisions. This has been described as a “feeling of knowing” or “knowing that 
you know” (Sherman et al. 2015). Metacognitive sensitivity is assessed within-the-
moment using confidence ratings based on a specific task. Although some studies use a 
measure of metacognitive efficiency, which involves taking into account objective 
performance as a more robust measure (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco & Lau, 2012). 
To avoid confusion, within this review we have termed them both under “metacognitive 
sensitivity”.  
 
This review plans to address the following questions: i) Are anomalous experiences 
associated with metacognitive ability, monitoring and sensitivity? If so, is this 
relationship positive or negative? ii) Are anomalous (delusional) beliefs associated with 
metacognitive ability, monitoring and sensitivity? If so, is this relationship positive or 
negative? iii) Are there other factors which should be considered within future research 
studies?  
 
6.3 Methods 
 
6.3.1 Identification and selection of studies  
 
Metacognition is measured in a variety of ways. To be as inclusive as possible, the author 
consulted with numerous literature reviews, academics, and general metacognitive 
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literature to identify terms for metacognition. This incorporated metacognitive sensitivity, 
efficiency, experience, ability and metacognitive monitoring (e.g. cognitive insight or 
self-reflectiveness) and control processes, and higher-order thought.  
 
A comprehensive search of published studies up to 06/09/2017 was conducted using the 
following electronic databases: Psycinfo (810), Scopus (336), and Web of Knowledge 
(757). The search terms were: (anomal* OR "psychotic experience" OR delusion* OR 
schizotyp* OR hallucinat* OR depersonalization OR derealization OR dissociat* OR 
"self-experience" OR "psychotic-like experiences") AND (overconfiden* OR 
metacogniti* OR "cognitive insight" OR self-reflect* OR "Higher-order thought").  
 
6.3.2 Eligibility criteria 
 
Inclusion criteria: Studies were considered eligible for the literature review if they 
investigated the relationship between anomalous experiences and metacognition OR 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs and metacognition.  
 
Inclusion criteria included: i) observational studies, ii) cross-sectional studies, iii) 
longitudinal studies, iv) studies assessing symptomatology or anomalous events, 
regardless of population and diagnosis, and v) studies assessing metacognitive ability, 
monitoring or sensitivity.  
 
Exclusion criteria included: i) reviews, ii) qualitative studies, iii) trials/intervention 
studies, iv) studies which assessed clinical status only, e.g. psychosis or schizophrenia, 
but did not include specific relationships with symptomatology/experiences, and v) 
studies which include participants from other clinical populations than psychosis (which 
may effect the results by involving additional confounds).  
 
 
6.3.3 Quality assessment 
 
Studies meeting the eligibility criteria for the literature review were assessed for 
methodological quality and potential for bias using an adapted framework from the NIH 
Quality Assessment Tool for Observational Cohort and Cross-Sectional Studies (U.S. 
Department of Health & Human Services. n.d.) (Appendix D). Each study was assigned 
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a score by allocating a value of 0 (no) or 1 (yes) to the 14 questions in the tables in 
supplementary materials. If the study did not report the information or the question did 
not apply to the study, that particular question was allocated a score of 0, following Gu, 
Strauss, Bond, & Cavanagh (2015).  
 
The study titles and abstracts were screened by the first author. If the abstracts were 
suitable, then the full texts were screened. All ineligible papers were excluded. One 
additional paper was included from the references of the other papers, not captured within 
the literature review search terms (O’Connor et al. 2017). Information from each eligible 
study was extracted and tabulated using Microsoft Excel. Extracted data included sample 
(size, population, gender, country), setting and recruitment strategy, study design and 
analysis of interest, measure of anomalous experience/beliefs and measure of 
metacognition, quality score and key findings. The heterogeneity of the studies and broad 
nature of the review meant that it was not appropriate to conduct a meta-analysis.  
 
6.4 Results 
 
6.4.1 Search results 
 
The literature search yielded a number of relevant articles: Psycinfo (810), Scopus (336), 
and Web of Knowledge (757). Removal of duplicates, title and abstract screening left 141 
articles for full-text screening. One hundred and two did not meet the eligibility criteria. 
Reason for exclusion included: Therapy trials, reviews, measurement of metacognition 
(e.g. using the Metacognitive Beliefs Questionnaire), or the aims of the project were not 
relevant for the present review. Thirty-nine were assessed for eligibility and six were 
excluded. Reasons for exclusion included: measurement or scope of the article was not 
relevant for the present review. Thirty-three were deemed eligible for the inclusion in the 
systematic review (see figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Flow diagram for the systematic literature search results. 
	
 
 
Three tables summarising the 33 studies within the review.  
Metacognitive Ability included 3 studies; Metacognitive monitoring included 18 studies 
and Metacognitive Sensitivity included 13 studies (1 assessed both metacognitive 
monitoring and metacognitive ability; Bruno, Sachs, Demily, Franck, & Pacherie, 2012). 
 
In terms of the details of the articles: The number of individuals included in total = 5986 
participants. The mean age was 35.1 years (SD=11.25, mean range 20-73 years). The 
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most common recruiting method = in/out-patient clinics and the most common design 
was cross-sectional. The most common measurement for metacognition within this 
review was using the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale and for anomalous events was 
PANSS positive symptoms subscale.  
 
6.4.2 Quality assessment 
 
Studies included were generally of moderate quality. Quality scores for included studies 
ranged from 7 (low quality) to 11 (high quality). For this review, 7 were classified as of 
lower quality (and higher risk of bias) and 20 were classified as moderate quality, 6 were 
high-quality (and lower risk of bias).  
 
6.4.3 Metacognitive ability 
 
Three studies assessed the relationship between metacognitive ability, using 
Metacognitive Assessment Scale-Abbreviated (MAS-A) (Lysaker, Carcione, et al. 2005), 
and anomalous experiences and delusional beliefs, using Positive And Negative 
Symptom Scale (PANSS) (see table 10).  
 
McLeod et al. (2014) demonstrated that there was no simple correlation between 
anomalous experiences and beliefs (positive symptoms) and metacognitive ability. 
However, metacognitive ability significantly predicted positive symptoms, when 
controlling for gender, baseline symptoms, DUP and functioning. The use of covariates 
enabled the authors to detect the relationship between metacognitive ability and positive 
symptoms. Trauelsen et al. (2016) then aimed to clarify issues within the previous study 
design, suggesting an interaction between positive and negative symptoms may have 
concealed the association between positive symptoms and metacognitive ability. This 
study demonstrated, in First Episode Psychosis (FEP), even when controlling for negative 
symptoms, positive symptoms were not directly associated with MAS-A. Conversely, 
Leonhardt, Hamm, Belanger, & Lysaker (2015) demonstrated a positive association 
between positive symptoms; hallucinations and delusions, and metacognitive ability, for 
those with schizophrenia and childhood trauma. This association was not present for those 
with schizophrenia and no reported trauma, demonstrating a moderating role of trauma. 
It was unexpected that increased metacognitive ability was associated increased positive 
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symptoms. This result may be due to an increase in distress, as the individual becomes 
aware of past events/trauma, leading to positive symptoms.  
 
The three studies above demonstrated mixed results: a lack of direct association between 
metacognitive ability and positive symptoms (Trauelsen et al., 2016). However, McLeod 
et al. (2014) there was a relationship when controlling for covariates and, importantly, 
there was a moderating role of trauma in the association between metacognitive ability 
and positive symptoms (Leonhardt et al. 2015).  
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Table 10: Studies including metacognitive ability and anomalous experiences/beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
Author Sample 
(country, 
population, 
gender) 
Setting, 
recruitment 
strategy  
Study design, 
analysis of 
interest 
Anomalous 
events measure  
Metacognition 
measure   
Quality 
score 
Results 
Leonhardt et al. 
(2014) 
USA, 62 
individuals with 
schizophrenia, 
95% male  
Recruited from 
community 
mental health 
centres. 
Cross-sectional, 
correlational 
analysis 
Positive And 
Negative 
Syndrome Scale 
(PANSS) 
Metacognitive 
Assessment Scale 
– Abbreviated 
[MAS-A] (and 
Indiana 
Psychiatric Illness 
Interview [IPII])  
9 Significant 
positive 
association, 
only in 
those with 
trauma 
McLeod et al. 
(2014) 
UK, 45 
individuals with 
First Episode 
Psychosis, 69% 
male 
Subgroup from a 
12-month 
prospective study 
in FEP services in 
Scotland.  
Longitudinal, 
regression 
analysis  
PANSS MAS-A (and 
Adult Attachment 
Interview [AAI])  
10 Significant 
negative 
association, 
when 
controlling 
for other 
factors 
Trauelsen et al. 
(2016) 
Denmark, 101 
individuals with 
First Episode 
Psychosis and 
101 controls 
Clinical group: 
Early Intervention 
Centres. 
Control group: 
advertisements in 
newspapers, 
libraries, sport 
clubs etc. 
Cross-sectional, 
correlation 
analysis  
PANSS MAS-A (and 
Indiana 
Psychiatric Illness 
Interview [IPII]) 
8 No 
significant 
association 
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6.4.4 Metacognitive monitoring 
 
Eighteen studies assessed the relationship between metacognitive monitoring, using self-
reflectiveness subscale of Beck Cognitive Insight Scale, and anomalous 
experiences/beliefs (see table 11). Six studies demonstrated lower self-reflectiveness is 
associated with increased anomalous beliefs in those with psychosis or an At Risk Mental 
State (ARMS) (Buchy et al. 2009; Kimhy et al. 2014; O’ Connor et al. 2017; Bora et al. 
2007; Engh et al., 2011; Engh et al., 2010). This may be explained by the appraisal of 
anomalous experiences as Wüsten & Lincoln (2015) demonstrated, within Chilean 
participants with schizophrenia, that those with lower self-reflectiveness had less 
normalising and less communicative responses to paranoia. This highlights the potential 
role of metacognitive monitoring (self-reflectiveness) in responding to anomalous events, 
e.g. anomalous (delusional) beliefs. 
 
However, three studies demonstrated no association between self-reflectiveness and 
positive symptoms (Pedrelli et al. 2004; Kuokkanen et al. 2016; Engh et al. 2007). 
However, these studies did not distinguish between these different positive symptoms, 
instead focusing on a general psychopathology score, e.g. PANSS positive subscale 
(O'Connor et al., 2013), which means it is difficult to identify specific relationships. On 
the other hand, seven studies demonstrated anomalous (delusional) beliefs are associated 
with high self-certainty (overconfidence) and high (appropriate) self-reflectiveness in 
psychosis (Bruno et al. 2012; Warman et al. 2007; Ekinci et al. 2012; Guerrero & Lysaker 
2013; Engh et al. 2007; Kimhy et al. 2014), healthy controls (Warman & Martin 2006; 
Carse & Langdon 2013), and those who are considered ARMS and antipsychotic naive 
(Uchida et al., 2014). Carese and Langdon (2013) suggested the association between high 
self-reflectiveness and high delusional proneness may be due to a “ruminative self-
reflectiveness”, which may be detrimental to reflection.  
 
Recently, O’Connor et al. (2017) demonstrated that low self-reflectiveness predicted 
severity of positive symptoms in FEP at 4-year follow-up. This may highlight the 
prospective role of self-reflectiveness in predicting the maintenance of symptoms. Prior 
to this, Bora et al. (2007) previously conducted a longitudinal study within an in-patient 
unit and demonstrated that over time positive symptoms reduced and self-reflectiveness 
		
156	
improved. In both studies, self-certainty, an aspect of cognitive insight which assesses 
overconfidence in beliefs and may be less relevant to metacognition (Gilleen et al., 2016), 
demonstrated no change across time. This suggests self-certainty may be a more 
persistent factor of psychosis, but self-reflectiveness may be related to the fluctuation in 
anomalous experiences. If this is the case, it may be expected that there is a state-like 
association which differs depending on the stage of psychosis.  
 
To support this, Kimhy et al. (2014) demonstrated anomalous (delusional) beliefs were 
associated with low self-reflectiveness in schizophrenia, but, in those with ARMS, 
delusional beliefs were associated with high self-reflectiveness and high self-certainty 
(Kimhy et al., 2014). Therefore, in those with ARMS, anomalous (delusional) beliefs may 
be mostly driven by high self-certainty, but, in schizophrenia, low self-reflectiveness has 
a key role as experiences may become more frequent and individuals with psychosis may 
inaccurately appraise these experiences as threatening which leads to anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs. Then, over time, individuals with chronic schizophrenia begin to 
entertain the possibility of being mistaken in the past, which increases self-reflectiveness. 
However, due to their overconfidence in current judgments, there are continual 
difficulties with self-certainty in schizophrenia (Bruno et al. 2012; Warman et al. 2007). 
This supports the suggestion that there may be differences in associations within different 
groups or at across stages of the psychotic illness. Future longitudinal studies are required 
to assess this further. 
 
Five studies directly assessed this. In terms of anomalous perceptual experiences, the 
evidence is inconsistent. Three studies have demonstrated no association between 
metacognitive monitoring and anomalous perceptual experiences (Bora et al. 2007; Engh 
et al. 2007; Engh et al., 2011). One study demonstrated that hallucinations were 
associated with high self-reflectiveness and low self-certainty (Engh et al., 2010), 
opposite to anomalous (delusional) beliefs, which may potentially reflect open-
mindedness in accepting the presence of unknown stimulus (e.g. a voice). When using 
more detailed assessments of anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g. Eppendorf 
Schizophrenia Inventory), one study demonstrated associations with both high self-
certainty and high self-reflectiveness for individual aspects of anomalous experience 
(Mass, Wolf and Lincoln, 2012). For example, high self-certainty was associated with 
attention and speech impairment “if someone speaks to me, I often have trouble grasping 
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the meaning of the world correctly” and ideas of reference “Now and then events, 
broadcasts etc. seem to be related to me”. High self-reflectiveness is associated with ideas 
of reference, deviant perception “sometimes a part of my body seems to be smaller than 
it really is”; and auditory uncertainty “Even if I hear something very clearly, sometimes 
I am not sure whether I just imagined it”, rather than all anomalous perceptual experiences 
are associated with both cognitive insight mechanisms.  
 
Overall, these studies demonstrated a relationship between high self-certainty and 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs in schizophrenia, FEP, ARMS and healthy control groups. 
However, the relationship between lower self-reflectiveness and anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs appears more complicated and may change overtime with fluctuations of 
experiences/beliefs, being most prominent in schizophrenia or FEP. Finally, the literature 
within anomalous perceptual experiences is still fairly inconsistent with studies 
demonstrating no association or an association with self-reflectiveness. Future studies 
should aim to assess the relationship between metacognitive monitoring and specific 
anomalous perceptual experiences, e.g. visual, auditory, olfactory experiences. 
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Table 11: Studies including metacognitive monitoring and anomalous events. 
Author Sample 
(country, 
population, 
gender) 
Setting, 
recruitment 
strategy  
Study design, 
analysis of 
interest 
Anomalous 
events 
measure  
Metacognition 
measure   
Quality 
score 
Results 
Bora et al. 
(2007) 
Turkey, 93 
currently 
psychotic, 45 
currently non-
psychotic 
patients, 60% 
male  
Patients were 
recruited within 
an inpatient and 
outpatient unit.  
Longitudinal 
cross-
sectional 
design with 
comparison 
groups, t-test 
and 
correlational 
analyses   
PANSS  Beck Cognitive 
Insight Scale 
(BCIS); Scale 
of 
Unawareness 
of Mental 
Disorder 
(SUMD) 
9 Self-reflectiveness 
improved and 
symptoms reduced 
overtime, but self-
certainty did not 
change. 
Buchy et al. 
(2009) 
Canada, 13 
individuals 
with psychosis 
and active 
delusions, 53 
individuals 
with psychosis 
and no active 
delusions, 73% 
male  
Participants 
were part of a 
longitudinal 
naturalistic 
outcome study, 
both in- and 
out-patients.  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
ANOVA 
analyses  
PANSS BCIS 8 Those with FEP and 
delusions had lower 
self-reflectiveness, but 
equal self-certainty to 
those without active 
delusions 
Carse et al. 
(2013) 
Australia, 152 
psychology 
students, 11% 
male 
Recruited via 
email invitation 
and social 
networks  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
regression 
analyses 
Peters 
Delusion 
Inventory 
(PDI)  
BCIS  7 Those with delusion 
proneness had higher 
self-reflectiveness and 
higher self-certainty. 
Relationship between 
self-reflectiveness 
was reduced when 
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controlling for 
rumination. 
Ekinci et al. 
(2012) 
 
Turkey, 121 
patients with 
deficit or non-
deficit 
schizophrenia, 
64% male 
Patients were 
recruited from 
an outpatient 
clinic  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
correlational 
analyses 
Scale for the 
Assessment of 
Positive 
Symptoms 
(SAPS) 
BCIS; SUMD 8 Within those with 
deficit psychosis, no 
associations. Within 
those with non-deficit 
psychosis, only self-
certainty was 
positively associated 
with delusional 
beliefs.  
Engh et al. 
(2011) 
 
Norway, 102 
patients with 
psychosis, 
59% male  
Patients were 
recruited within 
an inpatient and 
outpatient units. 
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
correlational 
analyses 
PANSS  BCIS; 
Birchwood 
Insight scale 
(IS)  
7 Delusions were 
associated with low 
self-reflectiveness and 
high self-certainty. 
Engh et al. 
(2010) 
Norway, 143 
patients with 
schizophrenia 
with 
hallucinations 
and delusions, 
55% male   
Patients were 
recruited within 
an inpatient and 
outpatient units. 
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
correlational 
analyses 
PANSS; 
grouping of 
patients with 
hallucinations 
and delusion  
BCIS  8 Delusions were 
associated with low 
self-reflectiveness and 
high self-certainty. 
Hallucinations, 
without delusions, 
were associated with 
high self-
reflectiveness and low 
self-certainty.  
Engh et al. 
(2007)  
Norway, 143 
patients with 
schizophrenia, 
Patients were 
recruited within 
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
PANSS BCIS; PANSS 
insight scale.  
7 No associations with 
self-reflectiveness and 
PANSS measure. 
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92 with 
bipolar, 64 
controls, 49% 
male  
an inpatient and 
outpatient units.  
correlational 
analyses 
Guerrero and 
Lysaker 
(2013) 
Spain, 92 
participants 
with 
schizophrenia 
spectrum 
disorder, 87% 
male 
Participants 
recruited 
outpatient 
psychiatry 
service or 
mental health 
centre.   
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
regression 
and 
moderation 
analyses 
PANSS BCIS 9 PANSS positive 
symptoms were 
associated with high 
self-reflectiveness and 
high self-certainty. 
Those who were 
considered more 
socially naïve and had 
high self-certainty 
scores also had 
greater levels of 
delusions.  
Kuokkanen 
et al. (2016) 
20 inpatient 
males with 
schizophrenia, 
100% males  
Participants 
recruited using 
hospital’s 
patient registry 
and screened 
for diagnosis of 
schizophrenia.  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
correlational 
analysis  
PANSS BCIS 9 No associations with 
self-reflectiveness and 
PANSS measure. 
Kimhy et al. 
(2014) 
USA, 62 
ARMS, 59 
with 
schizophrenia-
spectrum 
disorders, 37 
healthy 
controls, 37% 
male   
ARMS and 
schizophrenia 
sample from a 
psychiatric 
institute;  
Healthy 
controls using 3 
previous studies  
 
Comparison 
cross-
sectional 
design, 
correlational 
analyses  
Structured 
Interview for 
Prodromal 
Syndrome 
(SIPS); Scale 
of Prodromal 
Symptoms 
(SOPS) 
BCIS 8 In schizophrenia 
sample, delusions 
were associated with 
high self-certainty. In 
ARMS, delusions 
(unusual thought 
content) was 
associated with lower 
self-reflectiveness.  
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Mass et al. 
(2012) 
Germany, 88 
patients with 
psychosis, 
clinical control 
participants, 
healthy control 
participants, 
49% male  
Clinical 
participants 
were inpatients, 
control 
participants 
were clinical 
staff or were 
friends/family.  
Comparison 
cross-
sectional 
design, 
regression 
analyses 
Eppendorf 
Schizophrenia 
Inventory 
(ESI)  
BCIS 8 High self-certainty 
and high self-
reflectiveness for 
individual aspects of 
anomalous perceptual 
experience. 
O’Connor et 
al. (2017) 
UK, 90 FEP 
participants, 
62% male 
Participants 
were recruited 
through mental 
health services 
through 
screening case 
notes.  
Longitudinal 
design, 
regression 
analysis   
PANSS BCIS 11 Low self-
reflectiveness 
predicted severity of 
positive symptoms at 
4-years.  
Pedrelli et al. 
(2004) 
USA, 164 
participants 
with 
schizophrenia 
spectrum 
disorder, 69% 
males.  
Participants 
recruited from 
the treatment 
and research 
centre.  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
correlational 
analyses 
PANSS BCIS 8 No associations with 
self-reflectiveness and 
PANSS measure. 
Uchida et al. 
(2014) 
Japan, 60 
ARMS, 200 
healthy 
students, 40% 
male 
ARMS from a 
specialised 
clinic, healthy 
controls from 
University.  
Comparison 
cross-
sectional 
design, t-test 
and 
correlational 
analyses 
Comprehensive 
Assessment of 
At-Risk Mental 
States 
(CAARMS) 
BCIS 9 High self-certainty 
was associated with 
delusional symptoms 
in ARMS. No 
association with self-
reflectiveness. 
Relationships not 
assessed in healthy 
control group.  
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Warman & 
Martin 
(2006) 
USA, 200 
healthy 
students, 23% 
male 
Recruited via 
course credits   
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
regression 
analyses 
PDI BCIS 7 High self-certainty 
and high self-
reflectiveness was 
associated with 
delusion proneness 
Warman et 
al. (2007) 
USA, 37 
individuals 
with psychosis 
and active 
delusions, 12 
individuals 
with psychosis 
and inactive 
delusions and 
60 healthy 
controls, 54% 
male  
VA medical 
centre 
(psychosis 
patients) or a 
college (healthy 
controls)  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
ANOVA and 
regression 
analyses 
PANSS BCIS  7 Individuals with 
psychosis and 
delusions had high 
self-certainty. Those 
without delusions had 
lower self-
reflectiveness.  
Wusten et al. 
(2015) 
Chile, 36 
patients with 
schizophrenia-
spectrum 
disorders, 39 
controls, 55% 
male  
Patients from 
in- or out-
patient clinics, 
healthy controls 
from 
neighbourhood 
initiative  
Cross-
sectional 
design, 
regression 
analyses 
Paranoia 
checklist; 
Responses 
from paranoia 
checklist 
(RePT)  
BCIS 10 Those with high self-
reflectiveness and 
self-certainty had 
more normalising 
responses to paranoid 
thoughts.  
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6.4.5 Metacognitive sensitivity 
 
Thirteen studies assessed the association between metacognitive sensitivity, using 
confidence ratings, and anomalous events (see table 12). Six studies have demonstrated 
that individuals who had high confidence, during a cognitive task, for incorrect responses 
were more likely to report higher level of anomalous (delusional) beliefs (Moritz et al., 
2005; Bruno et al. 2012), across a variety of tasks (Moritz et al., 2014) within clinical 
samples, including FEP and ARMS (Eisenacher et al., 2015; Moritz, Woodward, & Chen, 
2006), and controls (Warman, 2008). Eisenacher et al. (2015) demonstrated using a 
memory task, within FEP participants, that the confidence gap (decreased ability to 
distinguish between errors and correct responses) was significantly associated with 
positive symptoms. In addition, knowledge corruption (inaccurate, but confidently held 
errors; Eifler et al., 2015) was significantly associated with delusional conviction in FEP 
(Eisenacher et al., 2015). This association was not present within ARMS and healthy 
control groups, who displayed better metacognitive sensitivity.   
 
Six studies demonstrated no significant association between Positive And Negative 
Symptom Scale (PANSS) and metacognitive sensitivity (Moritz, Woodward, et al. 2006; 
Moritz et al. 2008; Kircher et al. 2007; Eifler et al. 2015a; Balzan et al. 2016; Cella, Swan, 
Medin, Reeder, & Wykes, 2014). This is unlike Moritz et al. (2005), although it should 
be noted that Moritz et al., (2005) was a lower quality study as i) it did not control for IQ 
between groups and ii) the controls were staff within the hospital, which may have biased 
the result with a specific demographic. 
 
The inconsistences within the overall literature described may be due to subjective 
competence as Moritz et al. (2015) demonstrated the overconfidence in errors in 
individuals prone to paranoia was exaggerated if the person felt competent or deemed the 
question easy. When the question was difficult, the differences were no longer significant 
highlighting the moderating role of subjective competence for the relationship between 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs and metacognitive biases (overconfidence). More 
recently, Balzan, Woodward, Delfabbro, & Moritz (2016) suggested individuals with 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs have poorer performance insight, making them unaware 
of their poor performance. Balzan et al. (2016) demonstrated there was a trend towards 
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higher overconfidence for incorrect answers in a group of individuals with schizophrenia 
and delusions, compared to high/low-delusion proneness control groups, showing that 
this group had greater confidence-accuracy miscalibration as they had little awareness of 
their performance. This suggests that cognitive deficits play a role (see Eifler et al., 2015) 
or difficulty of the task, which needs to be controlled for in future research. In addition, 
there is a need for future studies to directly assess metacognitive sensitivity, instead of 
overconfidence. 
 
In terms of anomalous perceptual experiences, three studies demonstrated a lack of 
association with metacognitive sensitivity (Gaweda, Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 
2013; Moritz et al., 2008; Moritz et al., 2005). Instead, it may be suggested that 
anomalous perceptual experiences (hallucinations) are related to objective performance 
on a task, rather than on metacognitive sensitivity or overconfidence on the task (Gaweda, 
Woodward, Moritz and Kokoszka, 2013).  
 
Overall, for metacognitive sensitivity, there is a large amount of inconsistency with few 
studies demonstrating an association with anomalous (delusional) beliefs. Instead, the 
differences may be due to varying experimental controls across the tasks, e.g. subjective 
competence or lack of experimental control of the objective performance, in order to 
accurately assess metacognition. Anomalous perceptual experiences show limited 
association with metacognitive sensitivity, but equally supports the extraneous role of 
objective performance.
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Table 12: Studies including metacognitive sensitivity and anomalous events. 
 
Author Sample 
(country, 
population, 
gender) 
Setting, 
recruitment 
strategy  
Study 
design, 
analysis of 
interest 
Anomalous 
events 
measure  
Metacognition 
measure   
Quality 
score 
Results 
Balzan et al. 
(2016) 
Australia, 75 
participants 
(25 
schizophrenia; 
50 non-
clinical), 50% 
male 
Schizophrenia 
group recruited 
via local health 
centre network, 
control group 
recruited using 
advertisements.   
Experimental 
design, 
ANOVA and 
correlational 
design  
PANSS and 
PDI-21 
General 
knowledge 
(half- or full-
scale answers) 
with confidence 
scale (50-100).  
8 Trend towards 
poorer 
metacognitive 
sensitivity and 
delusions for half 
the metacognitive 
items. Half the 
items showed a 
negative 
relationship with 
clinical delusions.  
 
Bruno et al. 
(2012) 
*metacognitive 
monitoring and 
metacognitive 
sensitivity* 
France, 28 
schizophrenia 
(with and 
without 
delusions); 14 
healthy 
controls, 71% 
male 
Schizophrenia 
group recruited 
via outpatient 
services; 
healthy 
controls 
recruited staff 
at hospital  
Experimental 
design, 
ANOVA  
SAPS  WCST 
metacognitive 
assessment 
(Koren, 2006); 
BCIS  
10 Those with 
delusions had high 
self-certainty (no 
association with 
self-reflectiveness), 
poor metacognitive 
sensitivity.  
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Cella et al. 
(2014) 
UK, 100 
schizophrenia, 
63% male 
Recruited 
within clinical 
teams and part 
of a CRT study 
Cross-
sectional, 
regression 
analysis  
Positive and 
negative 
symptoms 
scale 
(PANSS)  
Subjective scale 
to investigate 
cognition in 
schizophrenia: 
(SSTICS) 
10 PANSS positive did 
not contribute to 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
(awareness) score. 
Eifler et al. 
(2015) 
Germany, 32 
schizophrenia, 
25 matched 
controls, 75% 
male  
Recruited 
within mental 
health centres 
Cross-
sectional, 
correlational 
analysis  
PANSS; 
Psychotic 
Symptom 
Rating 
scales 
(PSYRATS) 
Metamemory 
task: 
Confidence 
gap, knowledge 
corruption 
9 No significant 
associations 
between 
metamemory and 
delusions 
Eisenacher et 
al. (2015) 
Germany, 32 
At Risk 
Mental State 
(ARMS), 38 
controls, 21 
FEP, 69% 
male  
FEP via 
inpatient unit; 
ARMS via 
help-seeking 
individuals; 
controls closely 
matched   
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
analysis  
PANSS; 
PSYRATS 
Metamemory 
task: 
Confidence 
gap, knowledge 
corruption 
10 In FEP, poor 
metacognitive 
sensitivity was 
associated with 
delusional 
conviction. No 
associations within 
ARMS and healthy 
control groups.   
 
Gaweda et al. 
(2013) 
Poland, 28 
psychosis with 
auditory 
hallucinations; 
26 psychosis 
without AH; 
34 healthy 
Participants 
with psychosis 
recruited via in- 
and outpatient 
clinics in 
Warsaw; 
control 
participant’s 
Experimental 
design, 
ANOVA  
PANSS Action memory 
task with 
confidence 
ratings  
9 Self-monitoring 
deficits were 
associated with 
auditory 
hallucinations. But 
not directly with 
metacognitive 
sensitivity.  
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controls, 64% 
male  
recruited via 
word of month 
and matched 
with psychosis 
group.  
Kircher et al. 
(2007) 
Germany, 27 
participants 
with 
schizophrenia 
and 19 healthy 
controls, 63% 
male 
Schizophrenia 
group were 
recruited from 
outpatient 
University 
hospital and 
healthy 
controls from 
community.  
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
design 
PANSS Metamemory 
with confidence 
ratings; self- or 
other-
characterisation 
with confidence 
ratings  
8 No significant 
association between 
PANSS and 
metamemory.  
Moritz et al. 
(2005) 
Germany, 30 
chronic 
schizophrenia 
group; 15 
healthy 
controls, 60% 
male 
Schizophrenia 
group recruited 
within an in-
patient unit; 
Controls 
recruited from 
hospital staff 
and general 
population  
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
analysis  
Signs and 
symptoms 
of psychotic 
illness 
(SSPI) 
rating scale 
(Liddle et 
al., 2002)  
Metamemory 
task: 
Confidence 
gap, knowledge 
corruption 
7 Delusions were 
associated with 
poorer 
metacognitive 
sensitivity, but 
hallucinations were 
not.  
Moritz et al. 
(2006) 
China, 49 FEP 
and 21 healthy 
control, 43% 
male  
FEP early 
psychosis 
clinics, controls 
matched and 
assessed on 
mental health  
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
analysis   
PANSS Metamemory 
task: 
Confidence 
gap, knowledge 
corruption 
9 No significant 
association between 
metacognitive 
sensitivity and 
anomalous 
experiences/beliefs.  
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Moritz et al. 
(2014) 
55 
schizophrenia; 
45 healthy 
controls; 58 
OCD, 36% 
male  
OCD and 
schizophrenia 
via lists of 
discharged 
patients; 
Healthy 
controls via 
online panels 
and word of 
mouth  
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
analysis   
Community 
Assessment 
of Psychic 
Experiences 
Scale 
(CAPS); 
Paranoia 
checklist  
Perceptual 
detection task 
with confidence 
ratings  
9 Metacognitive 
sensitivity was 
associated with 
self-reported 
paranoia.  
Moritz et al. 
(2015) 
Germany, 
2321 healthy 
controls, 41% 
male  
Online 
recruitment  
Online 
experimental 
design, 
ANOVA and 
correlational 
analysis  
Paranoia 
checklist  
Knowledge 
quiz with 
confidence 
ratings  
9 Poor metacognitive 
sensitivity was 
associated with 
increased paranoia; 
particularly when 
the items were 
considered easy on 
the task. 
Moritz et al. 
(2008) 
Germany, 68 
participants 
with 
schizophrenia 
spectrum 
disorder, 57% 
males 
Participants 
recruited from 
University 
medical centre 
and University 
hospital.  
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
analysis  
PANSS Visual memory 
task with 
confidence 
ratings   
9 No significant 
association between 
PANSS and 
metacognitive 
sensitivity. 
Warman 
(2008) 
USA, 70 
healthy 
controls: high 
vs. low 
delusion-
proneness, 
26% male  
Recruited via 
undergraduate 
degrees for 
course credits  
Experimental 
design, 
correlational 
analysis   
PDI Jumping To 
Conclusions 
(JTC) beads 
task with 
confidence 
ratings  
8 Individuals who 
were delusion 
prone, were more 
confident on the 
task. 
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6.5 Discussion 
 
This literature review assessed, evaluated and summarised the relationship between 
anomalous events, including anomalous perceptual experiences and anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs, and three types of metacognition: metacognitive ability, 
metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive sensitivity. Metacognitive ability overall 
had a lack of direct association with anomalous experiences/beliefs. On the other hand, 
metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive sensitivity appear to demonstrate similar 
relationships with anomalous (delusional) beliefs, suggesting they may be assessing 
similar concepts. A lack of direct association between anomalous perceptual experiences 
and all three metacognitive components suggests the role of additional factors (e.g. 
objective performance, or subgroups of individuals with these additional experiences or 
difficulties) or the relationship may be present for specific types of anomalous perceptual 
experience.   
 
In terms of metacognitive ability, the three studies demonstrated a lack of direct 
association with overall anomalous experiences/beliefs. Instead, metacognitive ability 
may be more likely associated with negative symptomatology (McLeod et al. 2014; 
Trauelsen et al. 2016) and highly correlated with functioning (Grant & Beck 2009b). 
There was a positive association between metacognitive ability and positive symptoms, 
in the presence of trauma (Leonhardt et al. 2015). The role of trauma was previously 
highlighted within the metacognitive belief literature, as Morrison and Petersen (2003) 
demonstrated that psychotic experiences may emerge as a coping strategy for trauma. In 
addition, Morrison and colleagues previously suggested that metacognitive beliefs 
(measured using Metacognition Questionnaire) were associated with anomalous 
experiences (Morrison, Haddock, & Tarrier, 1995;  Morrison, Wels, & Nothard, 2000), 
however, once emotional distress has been controlled for, this relationship was weaker 
(Debbané et al. 2009; Gaweda et al. 2013; Varese et al. 2011). This was later confirmed 
by systematic literature and meta-analysis (Varese & Bentall 2011). 
 
In terms of metacognitive monitoring, this metacognitive component entails the capacity 
and willingness to observe one’s own mental products, consider alternative explanations 
and own confidence in one’s beliefs (Engh et al. 2010). Metacognitive monitoring was 
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most closely associated with anomalous (delusional) beliefs in both clinical and non-
clinical samples. However, there were some inconsistent findings within this area as some 
studies demonstrated anomalous (delusional) beliefs were associated with lower self-
reflectiveness and other studies suggested self-reflectiveness was not related to these 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs. It may be suggested that the association between self-
reflectiveness and anomalous experiences or delusional beliefs may be a state-like 
relationship, which changes over time and is particularly prominent in FEP. Future 
research should aim to consider these associations longitudinally. It also appears that self-
certainty may play a role. Whilst this was not considered a metacognitive component (see 
Gilleen et al., 2016), this form of self-evaluation may have a key role in the maintenance 
of anomalous (delusional) beliefs. 
 
The relationship between anomalous perceptual experiences and metacognitive 
monitoring was less clear and mostly absent. Metacognitive monitoring appeared to be 
associated with individual aspects of anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g. Auditory or 
speech impairment, ideas of reference, deviant perception and auditory uncertainty; Mass 
et al., 2012), requiring future research to conduct more detailed assessments of anomalous 
perceptual experiences. Consideration should be given to the role of confounding 
variables, e.g. cognitive ability (Engh et al. 2011). Studies outside the scope of the review 
have previously demonstrated that difficulties with metacognition may be associated with 
poorer cognitions (Lepage et al. 2008) and anomalous events may occur due to cognitive 
disturbances (Garety et al. 2001). Following Garety et al.'s (2001) model, if cognitive 
ability has a role in anomalous experiences, and cognitive ability is associated with 
metacognition, then it may be expected that anomalous experiences are associated with 
metacognitive monitoring.  
 
For metacognitive sensitivity, there appears to be some evidence suggesting anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs are associated with overconfidence in errors. Although future studies 
need to consider the role of subjective competence and identify whether, in fact, it is 
metacognitive sensitivity which plays a role in development or maintenance of these 
beliefs. In terms of anomalous experience, these experiences may be more related to 
objective performance, although recent studies using ERP (not included within this 
review) suggest these experiences could be associated with monitoring errors (Chan et al. 
2015; Chan et al. 2015).  
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These results suggest that metacognitive components may be distinct and have 
independent connections to anomalous experiences and delusional beliefs. Therefore, 
future studies assessing metacognition should be clear on which metacognitive 
components are involved, in order to develop appropriate interventions to tackle these 
metacognitive components.  
 
6.5.1 Studies not included 
 
This review did not include studies on anomalous self-experience, e.g. dissociation, 
depersonalization or out-of-body experiences, due to the lack of research assessing the 
relationship with metacognition. Recent research has suggested anomalous self-
experiences are associated with positive symptom expression (Brent, Seidman, 
Thermenos, Holt, & Keshavan, 2014; Nelson & Raballo, 2015; Preti, Cella, Raballo, & 
Vellante, 2012) so it would be important to empirically test the connection between 
anomalous self-experiences and metacognition; a relationship considered Dokic & Martin 
(2012, 2015). This study did not include studies assessing metacognitive processes, using 
error monitoring (ERP) (Chan et al. 2015) and their association with anomalous 
perceptual experiences or delusional beliefs. It is unclear whether this is classified as 
‘metacognition’ and the limited number of studies in this area (N=2) meant that 
conclusions are still tentative. Finally, this review did not include another metacognitive 
component: metacognitive beliefs. These metacognitive beliefs are positive or negative 
beliefs about one’s own thoughts. The association between metacognitive beliefs and 
hallucinatory experiences have been explored in a review elsewhere (see Varese and 
Bentall, 2011). 
 
6.5.2 Limitations and future studies 
 
Metacognition is measured in a variety of different ways and the concept can be elusive 
and difficult to define. For example, metacognition in some studies involves actively 
taking part then later reviewing one’s abilities (Moritz et al., 2014, 2015), compared to 
others which involves predicting abilities (Cella et al. 2014). The research area needs a 
clearer understanding of the connection between the different metacognitive components. 
Due to this variability in measures, it was not possible to conduct a meta-analysis. Future 
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reviews could aim to conduct a smaller meta-analysis on this topic to clearly examine the 
size of the relationship.  
 
Equally, anomalous experiences or delusional beliefs were measured using a variety of 
assessments; some studies measuring general psychotic symptoms (PANSS) and others 
using a specific scale of anomalous-perceptual experiences (e.g. Eppendorf 
Schizophrenia Inventory). Whilst PANSS was the most commonly used scale, many 
studies typically assessed PANSS positive as a whole, rather than the individual items. 
This traditionally combines delusions, conceptual disorganization, hallucinations, 
excitement, grandiosity, suspiciousness/persecution, and hostility into one score (Kay et 
al. 1987); and in some factor analyses, this includes unusual thought content (van der 
Gaag et al. 2006). As this literature review describes specific relationships between 
metacognitive components and anomalous (delusional) beliefs, rather than anomalous 
perceptual experiences, the combination of various anomalous experiences or delusional 
beliefs does not allow for researchers to conclusively describe the association with 
metacognition. Future studies should assess specific anomalous experiences and their 
association with metacognition.  
 
In terms of the quality assessment, studies including control samples were not always 
appropriately matched on criteria important for metacognitive skill: such as Age (Palmer 
et al. 2015), Education, which is demonstrated to be a confound in the overconfidence 
measure so lower education is associated with overconfidence (Gaweda et al., 2013; 
Moritz et al., 2014), and IQ, although this was not necessarily correlated with knowledge 
corruption nor confidence in errors (Moritz et al., 2005). Some studies scored lower as 
they did not control for educational level of the participants or match IQ between the 
groups (Engh et al., 2011, 2007; Moritz et al., 2005), which may be a confound when 
assessing metacognition. Alike to this, studies which included University students only 
(Carse & Langdon, 2013; Warman & Martin, 2006), may not be directly applicable to 
psychosis samples. Despite this, studies which matched consistently on age, gender and 
educational level, demonstrated similar findings to the general consensus (Bruno et al., 
2012; Eisenacher et al., 2015; Ekinci et al., 2012).  
 
Within many of the clinical studies, medication was not controlled within the analysis. 
Antipsychotic medication aims to reduce unusual experiences or dampen the salience of 
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these experiences (Kapur, 2003) and dopamine is also shown to decrease certainty and 
confidence (Andreou et al. 2014; Lou et al. 2011). Therefore, studies which included 
chronic schizophrenia samples, who may have been taking antipsychotics for a longer 
period of time, may present different associations due to medication rather than 
anomalous experiences/beliefs per se. Associated with this, a number of studies recruited 
participants within both in-patient and out-patient units (those within inpatient settings 
may typically experience higher levels of anomalous experiences compared to a 
community based sample), but these samples were not differentiated within the studies. 
Future studies should clearly separate in-patient and community samples.   
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
This was a large and broad review of the association between anomalous experiences and 
delusional beliefs with metacognition in both clinical samples (e.g. psychosis), 
schizotypy and control samples. This review assessed a range of anomalous experiences 
and delusional beliefs and metacognitive components (ability, monitoring and 
sensitivity). The studies reviewed demonstrated a relationship between metacognitive 
ability and anomalous experiences, but factors such as trauma or negative symptoms may 
play a key role. In terms of metacognitive monitoring, this appeared to be related to 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs, but less so with anomalous perceptual experiences. 
Although this may be explained by a state-like relationship between these variables, 
which may change during the course of psychotic illness and recovery. In terms of 
metacognitive sensitivity, there appears evidence that anomalous (delusional) beliefs are 
associated, but future studies need more thorough, controlled assessment surrounding 
competence or objective performance. This review demonstrates a relationship between 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs and metacognition, with some evidence for the association 
with anomalous experiences. Future studies should aim to understand more about which 
particular aspects of anomalous events are related to these metacognitive components.  
	
 
NOTE: References at the end of the thesis 
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7.1 Abstract 
7.1.1 Introduction 
 
Anomalous experiences occur frequently within the general population and these 
anomalous experiences have been described to be a pre-requisite to positive symptoms. 
Signal detection theory (SDT) has been used to explain anomalous experiences in 
psychosis, but, recently, metacognition; appraisals of experience, has been suggested to 
play a role in maintaining these anomalous experiences. However, studies tend to focus 
on assessing only the auditory modality. 
7.1.2 Methods 
 
This study was a two-part experimental pilot study which investigated the modality-
specific association between anomalous experiences, metacognitive efficiency and 
perceptual biases within 125 non-clinical student controls. These associations were 
measured using anomalous experience questionnaires and two signal detection tasks, 
including a metacognitive measure. 
 
7.1.3 Results 
 
This pilot study developed and adapted two metacognitive tasks in a non-clinical group 
and developed the tasks to be applicable for testing within a clinical sample. This study 
demonstrated that anomalous perceptual and self-experiences are associated within the 
general population. However, there was no significant relationship between anomalous 
experiences and perceptual biases or metacognitive efficiency in this sample. This may 
be due to the low variance in scores within this heathy sample. 
 
7.1.4 Discussion 
 
The developments from this study will be applied to a large clinical study comparing 
individuals with FEP with age and education matched controls to assess both between-
group differences and anomalous experiences on a continuum. 
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7.2 Introduction 
 
 
Anomalous perceptual and self-experiences have been defined in this thesis (see 
introduction section 1.11) as referring to a rich number of various psychic phenomena. 
These experiences can be divided into i) anomalous self-experiences; the sense that you 
are not “real” (distortions in experience of self and being) and ii) anomalous perceptual 
experiences; hearing sounds which cannot be accounted for by the environment 
(distortions of sensory events in various modalities; auditory, visual; touch; taste). 
Anomalous experiences (e.g. hallucinations) most commonly occur within the auditory 
modality (Waters, Allen, et al. 2012; Shergill et al. 1998; McCarthy-Jones et al. 2017). 
Visual hallucinations are suggested to represent a more severe psychopathological 
profile; associated with stress or trauma (Read, Agar, Argyle, & Aderhold, 2003; Waters 
et al., 2014; Mueser et al., 1990) and commonly co-occurring with auditory hallucinations 
(McCarthy-Jones et al. 2017). Modality-specific anomalous perceptual experiences can 
be captured using the new measure: Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences 
Questionnaire (Mitchell et al. 2017), assessing experiences within 6 modalities: visual, 
auditory, taste, smell, touch, sensed presence. Using this measure, it may be possible to 
assess modalities of anomalous experiences, to understand their cognitive underpinnings.   
 
Studies using Signal Detection Theory (SDT) have demonstrated that anomalous 
perceptual experiences are associated with perceptual signal detection biases (Bentall & 
Slade 1985; Kok et al. 2015), present within both psychosis and psychosis-proneness 
samples (Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990; Teufel et al., 2015; Teufel, Kingdon, Ingram, 
Wolpert, & Fletcher, 2010; Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011). However, Varese et al. 
(2012) demonstrated, within a smaller group of patients with schizophrenia, no significant 
association between anomalous self-experience (dissociation) and auditory perceptual 
bias. The lack of association may be due to statistical power, which the authors note as a 
limitation.  
 
Garety et al. (2001) suggest the role of negative (metacognitive) appraisal of an 
anomalous experience which leads this to become distressing and, therefore, can lead to 
positive symptoms of psychosis. Metacognition is considered “thinking about thinking” 
(Semerari et al. 2003b). Metacognitive sensitivity, measured using confidence ratings 
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within a certain task (when controlling for objective performance this is termed 
metacognitive efficiency), has been demonstrated as poor in those with First Episode 
Psychosis (Davies et al. 2018; Bliksted et al. 2017), those with a propensity to psychotic 
symptoms (Bhatt et al. 2010), those with a history of hallucinations (Gaweda et al. 2013) 
and those at high risk (Gawęda et al. 2018). This supports that metacognitive 
sensitivity/efficiency may contribute to anomalous perceptual experiences. No study has 
yet assessed the role of metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency on anomalous self-
experiences. 
 
However, other studies which have assessed metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency and 
anomalous perceptual experiences demonstrated no significant association between 
anomalous experiences and metacognitive sensitivity (Moritz, Woodward, et al. 2006; 
Kircher et al. 2007; Eifler et al. 2015b). Chapter 6 highlighted the importance of assessing 
specific types of anomalous experiences and to identify clear associations with 
metacognitive sensitivity. Both perceptual ability and metacognitive ability are 
considered to be modality-specific (Segal & Fusella 1970; Fleming et al. 2014) and 
anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g. hallucinations) can vary in modalities (Mitchell 
et al. 2017). It is currently unclear whether there is also a modality-specific association 
between visual perceptual biases/metacognition with visual anomalous-perceptual 
experiences or whether auditory perpetual biases/metacognition may also predict visual 
anomalous experiences. Chapter 6 also suggested inconsistences in the literature may be 
due to additional factors, e.g. subjective competence (Moritz et al. 2015). Following the 
literature review in chapter 6, metacognitive sensitivity tasks should be designed with 
appropriate controls to assess metacognition, independent of objective performance. The 
main aim of the study is to develop two new signal detection tasks (visual and auditory) 
to capture modality-specific perceptual and metacognitive ability. From Varese et al. 
(2011), a small to moderate effect size (0.2) is expected for the relationship between 
anomalous experiences and perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency within this 
study. This pilot study will assess associations of interest for a larger clinical study within 
an FEP sample. 
 
Once developed, these tasks will be assessed within a large clinical sample of individuals 
with FEP. Signal detection theory studies typically involve a large number of trials (400 
trials), as smaller trials (~50 trials) show statistical bias and had higher variance in 
		
178	
measure of d’ (Barrett et al. 2013; Green, 1966). To ensure the feasibility of conducting 
this study within a clinical group, who may experience difficulty with attention and 
concentration (Silverman 1964), the two computer tasks will be developed in order to aid 
completion and a sensitivity analysis will be conducted to assess the number of trials to 
include.  
 
7.3 Phase 1 developmental phase  
 
7.3.1 Methods 
 
Participants 
All participants were aged between 18 and 65 years, had normal or corrected to normal 
(with glasses/lenses) hearing and vision and were not currently experiencing mental 
health difficulties. Participants were recruited through the University of Sussex via word 
of mouth, University student pool and social media. Non-University students were 
recruited via word of mouth and social media. Data collection was undertaken between 
June and September 2016. 
 
Design 
This present study was a developmental pilot study. This involved the development of 
two metacognitive tasks with a pilot phase and a main experimental phase. The first phase 
aimed to develop the two metacognitive tasks for later testing in a clinical psychosis 
sample and the second phase aimed to use these developed tasks to assess the relationship 
associations between perceptual biases, metacognitive ability and anomalous experiences 
in a healthy non-clinical sample. 
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by University of Sussex Cross-School Research Ethics 
Committee (C-REC) (ER/AW395/7-8, appendix I). All participants provided written 
informed consent before proceeding with the study. Participants were asked to complete 
questions on demographics (Date Of Birth, gender, handedness, educational level) 
anomalous experiences questionnaires and two signal detection tasks (visual and 
auditory), counterbalanced between participants. Participants were asked for verbal 
feedback on the experience of completing the task. 
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Measures 
Perceptual bias and metacognitive efficiency 
Two experimental tasks were programmed in MATLAB using Cogent 2000. The task 
stimuli were presented on a Dell Desktop Monitor and participants wore Psyc Wave S1 
Wireless Bluetooth Headphones (Psycs1) for the auditory stimulus presentation. The 
critical task in each paradigm is to make forced-choice binary judgments: A first order 
judgment of whether a visual or auditory stimulus (dot or tone) was present or absent 
within a noisy picture or a presentation of white noise, and then a second order judgment 
of either ‘confident’ or ‘guess’ with regard to their confidence. 
 
Visual paradigm 
Visual perceptual and metacognitive ability was assessed using a computerised visual 
detection task. The task involved reporting whether a Gaussian dot flashed in the middle 
of the screen within a display of moving noise. The participants were given a verbal 
explanation of the task and a demonstration to familiarise them with the task. The main 
experimental trials began with the presentation of a central fixation cross on a grey 
background followed by the presentation of moving static noise for 3000ms. In the 
stimulus present trials only, at a random time during the 3000ms display of moving noise, 
the Gaussian dot was flashed in the middle of the screen. To ensure the task was a visual 
detection task, not visual search task, the dot was presented to the fovea in the centre of 
the screen, associated with attention and raised visual detection thresholds (Juola, 1987; 
Plainis, Murray & Chauhan, 2001). The contrast of the dot was titrated for each 
participant at ~67% correct responses, using a staircase procedure which adjusted the dot 
contrast from a standardized starting contrast. Participants were told prior to starting the 
task that the probability of the target being present would be 50%. Participants had up to 
3000ms to make a decision (present or absent) before the program timed out. No feedback 
was given. Participants were then asked to indicate either confidence or guess decision. 
Participants completed 200 trials (see figure 11).  
 
The first judgment captured hits (positive responses given when the stimulus was 
present), false alarms (positive responses given when the stimulus was absent), misses 
(negative responses when the stimulus was present), and correct rejections (negative 
responses when the stimulus was absent). This was used to calculate perceptual sensitivity 
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(d’): the ability to correctly report the stimulus (dot/tone) as either present or absent. A 
higher perceptual sensitivity score suggested better ability to detect stimuli. These four 
scores can also be used to calculate perceptual bias (B):  the tendency to report one 
decision over the other, i.e. stating the stimuli was present when it was in-fact absent, or 
vice versa. A perceptual bias score was calculated according to Bentall and Slade (1985). 
A score below 1 suggests a bias towards reporting presence when absent and a score 
above 1 suggests a bias towards reporting absence of stimuli when present. Equally, the 
second judgment captures the same four scores for confidence which can be used to 
calculate a score for metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’): the ability to discriminate 
between correct and incorrect judgments. Meta-d’ greater or less than d’ indicates 
metacognition is better or worse than d’ (Morales et al. 2017). Metacognitive efficiency 
involves taking into account objective performance and is calculated as meta-d’/d’ 
(metacognitive sensitivity divided by perceptual sensitivity) (Fleming & Lau 2014; 
Maniscalco & Lau 2012).  
 
Figure 11: Visual metacognitive paradigm procedure. 
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Auditory paradigm 
Auditory perceptual and metacognitive ability was assessed using a computerised 
auditory detection task, matched with the visual paradigm in terms of structure, number 
of trials and procedure. The trials began with a presentation of auditory white noise for 
3000ms. In the stimulus present trials only, at a random time during the 3000ms of white 
noise, a brief tone was presented to both ears. The volume of the tone was titrated at ~67% 
correct, using a staircase procedure which adjusted the tone volume. Participants 
responded whether the tone was present or absent and rated their confidence in that 
decision (high/low confidence). Perceptual sensitivity/biases and metacognitive 
sensitivity/efficiency scores were also derived from this auditory task. Participants 
completed 200 trials (see figure 12).  
 
Figure 12: Auditory metacognitive paradigm procedure. 
 
 
Staircase 
The detection tasks required performance to be equated across the participants as this 
enabled an accurate measurement metacognitive sensitivity, independent of individual 
performance on the task. This involved ensuring individuals were scoring ~67% level of 
performance on the main task. This level of performance is standard for metacognitive 
tasks as this gives an individual the opportunity to detect the stimulus and rate both high 
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and low confidence. To do this, a staircase procedure was implemented which adjusted 
the dot contrast or tone volume/contrast, during the main trials, using a standardised 
starting contrast for all participants. This procedure was done before the main trials to 
generate a single individualised figure for the starting contrast of the dot or the volume 
of the tone within the two detection tasks. 
 
The staircase task involved detecting a stimulus (dot or tone) with either a first or second 
trial, e.g. “did the dot appear in the first or second screen?”. The staircase task was slightly 
different to the main task in order to prevent creating a potential bias towards stimulus-
present trials in the main task, as the participant’s performance would only be titrated for 
stimulus-present trials. The staircase procedure, on average, took 63 trials for visual 
paradigm and 76 trials for auditory paradigm to reach 67% accuracy.  
 
7.3.2 Results  
 
Fifty-one participants took part in this phase (M=25.08, SD=4.36, range 18-37). The 
majority of the participants were students recruited from University of Sussex. Data 
collection was undertaken between June and September 2016. 
 
Within the 200 main trials, the objective performance scores (e.g. % of correct responses 
to present vs. absent) was highly variable and individuals were scoring too high: Visual, 
(M=76%, SD=8%, range=56%-89%) and auditory (M=75%, SD=10%, range=53%-
93%). This suggests the staircase procedure at the start of the task did not appropriately 
titrate performance. This staircase was only used at the start of the task, not throughout. 
This procedure was insufficient to hold performance constant throughout the task, which 
impacted on the validity of the metacognitive scores. This was potentially due to the 
separate titration task being different to the main task which may have resulted in the 
differences in performance when transferred to the main task (e.g. scores range from 53-
93 in the main auditory task). This separate task for the staircase (different compared to 
the main trials) was used in order to prevent the possibility of titrating the participant’s 
performance only on present trials. Whereas the staircase task (see staircase section), 
which involved the stimuli being present in either the first or second screen, enabled the 
titration of both present and absent performance. This avoided a bias in response. To 
rectify this issue, the staircase procedure was included within the main task itself. This 
		
183	
involved a 1-up-2 down staircase procedure to maintain performance at ~67% throughout 
the task. 
 
A sensitivity analysis was conducted to assess the number of trials to be included in the 
main analysis to ensure feasibility for a clinical group, whilst maintaining reliable and 
valid scores. To do this, we assessed the relationship between visual and auditory 
sensitivity and bias in 200 trials, 150 trials and 100 trials with the expectation that 
perceptual sensitivity and bias should not be associated, in order to confirm the number 
of trials chosen can accurately measure sensitivity, as an independent component to bias. 
For the auditory task, no significant associations between sensitivity and bias were 
demonstrated in any of the three groups of trials. For the visual task, a significant 
association between sensitivity and bias for 100 trials (r=.39, p=.02), for 150 trials (r=.56, 
p=.01). However, no significant association was demonstrated for 200 trials (p<.05). This 
suggests the use of 200 trials appears to be most appropriate number of trials.   
 
Participants were asked about their experience in completing the two studies. Some 
participants noted it was tiresome and suggested the inclusion of more frequent breaks 
and longer breaks. A previous study using an auditory and visual psychophysical 
detection task demonstrated the use of breaks (e.g. 10-minute task followed by 5-minute 
break) restored performance on the task (Arrabito et al. 2015). From this, more breaks 
were included (1 break every 5 minutes) and breaks were made longer (30-seconds x 4 
breaks and 1-minute x 1 break), whilst keeping testing time to a minimum.  
 
7.4 Phase 2 full study 
 
7.4.1 Methods 
 
Participants 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria and recruitment strategy was the same as phase 1. 
Data collection was undertaken between October and December 2016. 
 
Procedure 
This study was approved by University of Sussex Cross-School Research Ethics 
Committee (C-REC) (ER/AW395/7-9). Participants were asked to complete 
questionnaires on demographic information and anomalous experience scales. 
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Participants then completed two signal detection tasks (visual and auditory) with the 
confidence ratings (metacognitive efficiency). See page 115 for full details of the 
procedure.  
 
Measures 
Perceptual bias and metacognitive efficiency  
The procedure was the same as phase 1. However, following phase 1, an additional 
staircase procedure was included within the task (in addition to the staircase before the 
start of the main trials) which involved a 2-up-1-down procedure to titrate performance 
at ~67% throughout the task.  
 
Anomalous experience measures 
Anomalous self-experiences: Cambridge depersonalisation scale (trait and state versions) 
(Sierra & Berrios, 2000). The trait version includes 29 items assessing anomalous self-
experiences over the last 6 months, with 4 suggested subscales: ‘alienation from 
surroundings’, ‘anomalous subjective recall’, ‘emotional numbing’ and ‘anomalous body 
experience’ (Sierra et al., 2005). For example: “Out of the blue, I feel strange, as if I were 
not real or as if I were cut off from the world”. Participants respond on frequency of each 
statement, ranging from 0 (never) to 5 (all the time), and the duration of this experience, 
ranging from 1 (few seconds) to 6 (more than a week). Four scores are calculated from 
this measure: number of items endorsed (0-29), average frequency (0-5), average duration 
(1-6), and a total score calculated by summing total scores for both frequency and 
duration, ranging from 0 to 319. For alienation from surroundings (9 items with total 
score 0-99), anomalous subjective recall (6 items with total score 0-66), emotional 
numbing (5 items with total score 0-55) and anomalous body experience (4 items with 
total score 0-44). This scale demonstrates high internal consistency (>0.6) and good 
construct validity with Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES) (r= .48*) and with 
depersonalisation subscale of DES (r= .8***), and good reliability (α= 0.89) (Sierra & 
Berrios, 2000). This scale is useful for assessing depersonalisation in a schizophrenia 
group (Perona-Garcelán et al. 2011) and the general population (Perona-Garcelán et al. 
2012). 
 
The state version includes 22 items measuring anomalous self-experiences in a ‘here and 
now’ rating. The scale includes statements such as “I am feeling so detached from my 
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thoughts that they seem to have a ‘life’ of their own”. Participants respond on a visual 
analogue scale from 0-100. Scores range from 0 to 2200 and the total score is used in the 
analysis. The scale shows validity as it is sensitive to symptom change in 
depersonalization disorder (Hunter et al. 2005; Jay et al. 2016). Studies have validated 
this measure in non-clinical participants (Hunter et al. 2013).  
 
Anomalous perceptual experiences: Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences 
Questionnaire (Mitchell et al. 2017) is a 43-item scale measuring anomalous 
perceptual/sensory experiences with 6 subscales: auditory, visual, smell, taste, bodily 
sensations, and sensed presence, e.g. auditory: “My ears have played tricks on me”. 
Participants are asked to respond to the statements on a 5 point likert scale from never (0) 
to frequently (4). Scores are totalled for each modality (auditory [0-28], visual [0-32], 
smell [0-32], taste [0-32], bodily sensations [0-32], and sensed presence [0-16]). MUSEQ 
total score is obtained by summing all the subscale scores (0-172). Both the full scale and 
subscales have been demonstrated as possessing good reliability (auditory r=0.72, visual 
r=0.72), internal consistency (auditory α=0.82, visual α=0.88), discriminant validity 
between clinical and non-clinical groups (Cohen’s d = 0.96) and construct validity with 
other anomalous experience scales [e.g. Launay-Slade Hallucination Scale (L-SHS) 
(r= .75**) and Cardiff Anomalous Perception Scale (CAPS) (r= .69**)] (Mitchell et al. 
2017) . The auditory subscale (7 questions with score total of 28), visual subscale (8 
questions with a score total of 32) and total (total of 172) will be used.  
 
Cardiff anomalous perceptions scale (CAPS) (Bell et al. 2006) is a well-established 
measure used to assess anomalous perceptual experiences within the general population 
(Bell et al. 2006). This measures a range of anomalous experiences and will be used to 
validate data from the MUSEQ. This is a 32-item questionnaire asking for a binary 
judgment of presence and then 3 subscales assessing distress, intrusiveness and frequency 
of the anomalous experience. For example, “Do you ever notice that sounds are much 
louder than they would normally be?”: yes or no. If the participant answers “yes”, they 
are subsequently asked to rate on three scales, each ranging from 1-5, how distressing, 
intrusive and frequent those experiences are. Four scores are calculated: total number of 
items endorsed [0 (low) to 32 (high)], distress (0-160), intrusiveness (0-160), and 
frequency (0-160) of endorsed experiences. Bell et al. (2006) demonstrated a mean total 
score for number of items endorsed of 7.3 (S.D=5.8) from the general population, 18.3 
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for distress, 21.9 for intrusiveness, 18.2 for frequency. Bell, Halligan & Ellis (2006) 
highlighted that the CAPS has good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 
.87) and good test-retest reliability (Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of .92) for both clinical 
and non-clinical samples and also has good convergent validity with the PDI-21 (r=.61*) 
and O-LIFE (r=.57*) (Bell, Halligan & Ellis, 2006). 
 
7.4.2 Planned analysis  
 
Firstly, a correlational matrix will be used to assess the relationship between the 
anomalous experience scales. Next, regression analyses will be conducted to assess the 
modality-specific relationship between perceptual biases, metacognition 
sensitivity/efficiency and the anomalous experience measures. The regression analysis 
will be used to assess the selective predictions by modality, e.g. between visual perceptual 
biases and metacognition with visual subscale of MUSEQ, compared to auditory subscale 
of MUSEQ, to assess the strength of correlation, and vice versa for auditory perceptual 
biases and metacognition. 
 
7.4.3 Results  
 
Seventy-four participants took part. This sample had a mean age of 21.66 (SD=6.67, 
range 18-55), 14% male (10 males and 64 females) and 96% were right-handed (71 right 
and 3 left handed). The majority of the participants were students from University of 
Sussex (85% had A-level qualifications, 21% had a degree-level qualification and 3% 
had a higher degree qualification).  
 
This study used a strict 1.5 S.D. from the mean performance accuracy as an exclusion 
threshold for the two tasks. We used the 1.5 S.D. from the mean as a limit for inclusion 
and exclusion as this allowed for a small amount of flexibility in the performance level, 
but excluded those scoring too high or too low. This limit was previously used in 
metacognitive studies (Sherman et al., 2015). Due to the variation in scores within the 
visual and auditory tasks, the 1.5 S.D. from the mean range resulted in different ranges: 
auditory task between 56% and 79.9% and visual task between 59% and 78%.  
 
For the visual task, 56 participants were included in the main analysis. For the auditory 
task, 68 participants were included in the main analysis. As studies using psychophysical 
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signal detection tasks requires the participant to achieve a specific level of performance 
to assess metacognitive ability, it is usual to remove ~10% of the participants due to poor 
performance (Palmer, David & Fleming, 2015; Sherman et al., 2015).  
 
Eight participants scored perfect accuracy on one of the tasks, implying an infinite d’ for 
absent trials only. Following current research, there is an adjustment which can be used 
to avoid infinite values which is common use (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005). This 
involves converting proportions of 0 and 1 to 1/(2N) and 1-1/(2/N), respectively, where 
N is the number of trials on which the proportion is based. This strategy was used and 
resolved the infinity scores. Due to the differences in acceptable ranges for the two 
metacognitive tasks, auditory and visual task were analysed separately. After these 
participants were removed from the data analysis, data was checked for skewness and 
outliers. Data was within acceptable limits.  
 
The new staircase within the task appropriately titrated performance for both tasks: Visual 
(M=68%, SD=6%, range=55%-86%) and auditory (M=67%, SD=6%, range=43%-91%). 
 
Participants were asked about their experience completing the two tasks. Some 
participants noted that it was difficult to decide whether they were confident or guessing 
as they felt they were not fully confident, whilst not completely guessing, which led them 
to commonly choose one decision over the other. It was suggested that the wording could 
be changed to “high confidence” or “low confidence” to enable opportunity to rate each 
option.   
 
Correlational analysis  
A correlational matrix was conducted to assess the relationship between anomalous 
experiences for all participants in phase 1 and phase 2 (N=125) (See table 13).
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Table 13: Correlational matrix for anomalous experience measures for 125 participants in phase 1 and phase 2. 
 
 CAPS 
total 
endorsed 
CAPS 
Distress 
CAPS 
intrusiveness  
  
CAPS 
frequency  
MUSEQ 
auditory 
MUSEQ 
visual 
MUSEQ 
total 
CDS 
trait 
total  
CDS 
state 
total 
CDS 
(trait) 
ABE 
CDS 
(trait) 
EN 
CDS 
(trait) 
ASR 
CDS 
(trait) 
AFS 
CAPS total  1 r=.89 
p<.001 
r=.93 
p<.001 
r=.9 
p<.001 
r=.59 
p<.001 
r=.66 
p<.001 
r=.72 
p<.001 
r=.54 
p<.001 
r=.4 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.51 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
r=.4 
p<.001 
CAPS 
distress  
 1 r=.95 
p<.001 
r=.87 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.6 
p<.001 
r=.65 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.4 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
r=.47 
p<.001 
r=.42 
p<.001 
r=.36 
p<.001 
CAPS 
intrusiveness  
  1 r=.9 
p<.001 
r=.56 
p<.001 
r=.62 
p<.001 
r=.65 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.4 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
r=.47 
p<.001 
r=.42 
p<.001 
r=.36 
p<.001 
CAPS 
frequency 
   1 r=.57 
p<.001 
r=.65 
p<.001 
r=.72 
p<.001 
r=.51 
p<.001 
r=.41 
p<.001 
r=.46 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
r=.45 
p<.001 
r=.36 
p<.001 
MUSEQ 
Auditory 
    1 r=.7 
p<.001 
N/A r=.46 
p<.001 
r=.33 
p<.001 
r=.41 
p<.001 
r=.38 
p<.001 
r=.46 
p<.001 
r=.43 
p<.001 
MUSEQ 
Visual 
     1 N/A r=.51 
p<.001 
r=.34 
p<.001 
r=.45 
p<.001 
r=.42 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
r=.4 
p<.001 
MUSEQ 
Total 
      1 r=.55 
p<.001 
r=.37 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.47 
p<.001 
r=.54 
p<.001 
r=.41 
p<.001 
CDS trait 
total 
       1 r=.7 
p<.001 
N/A N/A N/A N/A 
		
189	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CDS state 
total 
        1 r=.69 
p<.001 
r=.57 
p<.001 
r=.62 
p<.001 
r=.55 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) 
ABE  
         1 r=.7 
p<.001 
r=.72 
p<.001 
r=.65 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) 
EN 
          1 r=.73 
p<.001 
r=.71 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) 
ASR 
           1 r=.68 
p<.001 
 
NOTE: CDS ABE = Anomalous Bodily Experience; CDS EN = Emotional Numbing; CDS ASR = Anomalous Subjective Recall; CDS AFS 
= Alienation From Surroundings. All correlations were significant so bold signifies moderate-high correlations, when controlling for multiple 
comparisons. N/A = Scores are not able to be correlated as they contain the same data, e.g. total vs. subscales of a measure.  
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Table 14: Descriptive statistics for anomalous experiences in main analysis sample. 
 Healthy non-clinical 
sample (N=74) 
Full sample (125) 
CAPS total (0-32) 9.32 (5.42) 8.5 (5.3) 
CAPS distress (0-160) 21.62 (16.84) 19.57 (15.9) 
CAPS Intrusiveness (0-160) 25.14 (18.28) 22.52 (17.3) 
CAPS frequency (0-160) 18.35 (13.11) 16.9 (12.97) 
MUSEQ auditory (0-28) 19.8 (5.9) 18.86 (6.1) 
MUSEQ visual (0-32) 18.53 (5.83) 17.91 (6.1) 
MUSEQ total (0-172) 92.93 (26.17) 88.8 (27.27) 
CDS state total (0-2200) 192.6 (226.4) 164.7 (209.7) 
CDS trait total (0-319) 43.3 (35.5) 41.34 (33.5) 
CDS trait – anomalous bodily 
experience (0-99) 
9.1 (10.1) 8.59 (9.42) 
CDS trait – emotional numbing 
(0-66) 
8.8 (9.25) 8.46 (9.0) 
CDS trait – anomalous 
subjective recall (0-55) 
10.14 (7.22) 9.63 (7.05) 
CDS trait – alienation from 
surroundings (0-44) 
8.36 (6.84) 8.25 (6.9) 
Note: CAPS = Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale; MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual 
Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale.  
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Perceptual biases and metacognition 
Firstly, descriptive statistics were provided, separately, for the visual and auditory 
metacognitive paradigm (see table 15). 
 
Table 15: Descriptive statistics for signal detection tasks.  
 Visual (N=56) Auditory (N=67) 
Perceptual sensitivity 1.09 (S.D .32) 1.09 (.28) 
Perceptual bias (increased 
score = bias towards absent) 
.48 (S.D .31) .56 (.33) 
Metacognitive sensitivity .83 (S.D .31) .79 (.28) 
Metacognitive efficiency .76 (S.D .22) .74 (.25) 
Note: See section 7.3.1 for details 
 
Next, correlational analysis were conducted to assess the relationship between perceptual 
biases and metacognition sensitivity/efficiency, separately for the visual and auditory 
task. For the visual modality, visual perceptual sensitivity was significantly associated 
with metacognitive sensitivity (r=.68, p<.001) and visual perceptual biases (r=.39, 
p=.003).  
For auditory modality, auditory perceptual sensitivity was significantly associated with 
metacognitive sensitivity (r=.38, p=.002) and auditory perceptual biases (r=.65, p<.001). 
Auditory perceptual bias was significantly associated with metacognitive efficiency (r=  
-.41, p<.001).  
 
Correlational analysis  
In order to test the modality-specific relationship between perceptual biases, 
metacognition sensitivity/efficiency and the anomalous experience measures, regression 
analyses were conducted (see table 16 and 17). These analyses were conducted separately 
for each task with visual and auditory anomalous experiences, to assess the selected 
predictions by modality, e.g. visual perceptual biases and metacognition with MUSEQ 
visual will be stronger than relationship between to auditory perceptual biases and 
metacognition with MUSEQ auditory, and CAPS scores as validation.  
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Visual computer task  
Table 16: Pearson correlations between visual perceptual and metacognitive ability 
with anomalous experience measures. 
 
 
N=56 
MUSEQ 
visual 
MUSEQ 
auditory 
MUSEQ 
total 
CAPS total 
endorsed 
CDS 
state 
CDS 
trait 
Visual 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
r= -.03 
p=.82 
r=.07 
p=.62 
r= -.08 
p=.55 
r= -.17 
p=.2 
r= -
.02 
p=.9 
r= -.1 
p=.46 
Visual 
perceptual bias 
r= -.05 
p=.69 
r=.07 
p=.59 
r= -.05 
p=.69 
r= -.14 
p=.29 
r=.01 
p=.96 
r= -.03 
p=.83 
Visual 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
r= -.03 
p=.84 
r=.03 
p=.8 
r= -.12 
p=.37 
r= -.14 
p=.28 
r= -.1 
p=.43 
r=.0 
p=.99 
Visual 
metacognitive 
efficiency 
r= .08 
p=.57 
r=.08 
p=.58 
r=.05 
p=.74 
r=.06 
p=.67 
r=.02 
p=.88 
r=.2 
p=.14 
CAPS = Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale; MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual 
Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale.  
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Auditory computer task  
Table 17: Pearson correlations between auditory perceptual and metacognitive ability 
with anomalous experience measures. 
 
 
N=67 
MUSEQ 
visual 
MUSEQ 
auditory 
MUSEQ 
total 
CAPS 
total 
endorsed 
CDS 
state 
CDS 
trait 
Auditory 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
r= -.09 
p=.49 
r=.02 
p=.89 
r= -.07 
p=.58 
r= -.06 
p=.66 
r= -.1 
p=.42 
r= -.06 
p=.62 
Auditory 
perceptual bias 
r= -.09 
p=.5 
r=-.14 
p=.26 
r= -.15 
p=.22 
r= -.09 
p=.45 
r=-.08 
p=.54 
r= -.12 
p=.35 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
r=.03 
p=.79 
r=.09 
p=.5 
r= -.02 
p=.89 
r= -.02 
p=.87 
r= -.1 
p=.41 
r=-.11 
p=.36 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
efficiency 
r=.1 
p=.44 
r=.07 
p=.56 
r=.02 
p=.87 
r=-.01 
p=.94 
r=-.05 
p=.71 
r=-.09 
p=.49 
CAPS = Cardiff Anomalous Perceptions Scale; MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual 
Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale.  
 
There were no significant relationships between the perceptual/metacognitive measures 
and anomalous experiences in the non-clinical sample. Due to this, no further regression 
analyses were conducted.  
 
7.5 Discussion 
 
This two phase pilot study involved the development of two metacognitive signal 
detection tasks (visual and auditory) in a large sample of non-clinical students. Within 
the second piloting stage, the relationship between modality-specific perceptual biases 
and metacognitive ability with anomalous experiences was explored.  
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7.5.1 Development of the task 
 
The staircase procedure was better able to titrate objective performance within phase 2 of 
this study. However, participants were still performing too high or too low which led to 
the removal of a number of participants from the main analysis, particularly for the visual 
task. Participants may have been scoring too high because i) the staircase at the start did 
not properly converge or ii) the separate staircase task, before the main trials, was 
significantly more difficult to complete. This meant that the separate staircase procedure 
may have been a hindrance. From this, the first staircase procedure will be removed, 
continuing to use the staircase procedure within the main task, following recent 
metacognition research (Fleming & Dolan 2014; Fleming et al. 2014). The sensitivity 
analysis in phase 1 suggested the use of 200 trials for appropriate scoring and the removal 
of the staircase procedure at the start enable us to continue to include 200 trials per 
paradigm at a maximum of 30 minutes per task. On the other hand, some participants 
were scoring too low because of i) attention/fatigue, ii) failure to follow instructions or 
iii) lack of motivation. Studies have demonstrated that providing financial reimbursement 
may undermine the intrinsic motivation for an activity (Frey & Gotte 1999; Kressler 
2003), leading participants to underperform. Future studies should discuss the importance 
of appropriate effort and involvement with participants to produce valid results.  
 
Whilst this current study was being conducted, the author met with a service user 
involvement forum; a group of service users who provide consultation on research 
studies. The group suggested including a large number of trials would not be feasible 
within a sample of individuals with FEP, due to difficulty with attention and 
concentration; a documented issue (Silverman 1964). Following this and feedback from 
this study, we included more frequent and longer breaks within the main trials and the 
exclusion of staircase procedure, at the start of the task, to ensure each paradigm took 30 
minutes to complete.  
 
Another development for this study concerned the confidence rating. The confidence 
rating within these current signal detection task: “confident” or “guess” were used as they 
were considered easy for individuals to quickly decide. However, some participants 
expressed difficulty using these binary ratings as participants noted that they were usually 
‘confident’ or ‘slightly confident’, but rarely would state their decision was a complete 
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‘guess’. Previous metacognition measures have used a likert scale (0-7) (Palmer et al. 
2015; Fleming et al. 2014). Given the difficulties with a likert scale, e.g. it is unclear what 
constitutes a difference between a 5 or 6 rating, and the ease of rating for clinical 
participants, the task will keep the binary rating but alter the names to ‘high’ or ‘low’ 
confidence, to align with up-to-date metacognitive tasks (Maniscalco & Lau 2014; Kok 
et al. 2015). From these changes, the task could be feasibly conducted in a clinical sample 
whilst upholding the validity of the task and provides reliable results. 
 
It should be noted that within the main analysis, only 14% were male which is not typical 
of the psychosis group. Psychosis samples are usually ~70% males, as risk ratios for men 
to develop schizophrenia relative to women were 1.42 (Aleman et al. 2003), particularly 
at the start of the illness (Häfner et al. 1995). Females display better metacognitive 
abilities; unrelated to intelligence or psychopathology (Abu-Akel & Bo 2013), which 
could have an influenced the results.  The next study will include a FEP group and a non-
clinical control group who will be matched on gender, age, and educational level to ensure 
gender differences do not impact the results between the groups.  
 
7.5.2 Application to theory  
 
There were high levels of anomalous experience within this non-clinical student sample 
for both MUSEQ (Mitchell et al. 2017 demonstrated a score in the general population of 
77.38 and this study had a score of 88.8) and CAPS scores (Bell et al., 2006 demonstrated 
a score in the general population of 7.3 and this study had a score of 8.5). This supports 
the use of these scores in the general population (Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Kelleher 
et al., 2012) and that different anomalous experiences are associated (Nelson et al. 2014). 
As CAPS is highly associated with MUSEQ, this suggests it is feasible and useful to 
capture anomalous perceptual experiences using this new measure.   
 
Despite the presence of anomalous perceptual and self-experiences, the results 
demonstrated no significant association between perceptual biases and metacognitive 
efficiency with anomalous experiences within this non-clinical sample. This is 
inconsistent with previous research (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990; 
Varese et al., 2011), but may be due to limited sample size and consequential lack of 
variance to detect associations. Following this, chapter 8 will explore these associations 
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within a clinical (FEP) and non-clinical group to enable more variance in the scores, as 
research has demonstrated those with psychosis have poorer metacognition (Bliksted et 
al. 2017; Davies et al. 2018) and higher likelihood of perceptual biases (Varese et al., 
2012). Following the effect size (.2) from Varese et al. (2012), a sample size calculation 
with 80% power suggests a sample of 150. 
 
Alternatively, anomalous experiences may be present within the non-clinical group, via 
an alternative route, e.g. through anxiety (Garety et al., 2001), rather than perceptual 
biases. Whilst experiencing high levels of anomalous experience, this current sample 
were not experiencing difficulties with mental health, suggesting presence of a protective 
factor; high metacognition. A recent study from Rouault, Seow, Gillan, & Fleming (2018) 
suggested that those within the general population and high anxiety, demonstrated high 
levels of metacognitive sensitivity/efficiency. This study, alongside Garety et al. (2001) 
model, suggests that those in the general population with high anxiety may experience 
more anomalous experiences, but possessing high metacognitive sensitivity may prevent 
those individuals from experience distress from the experiences or from transitioning into 
psychotic episode. Whilst this study aimed to exclude those with current mental health 
difficulties, this was not confirmed using questions. Future studies should include more 
rigorous screening methods. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
 
This was a large cross-sectional experimental pilot study assessing the associations 
between metacognitive efficiency/sensitivity, perceptual biases and anomalous 
experiences within a non-clinical population. This study demonstrated that anomalous 
perceptual and self-experiences occur within the general population and are associated. 
However, the small non-clinical sample size within the main analysis resulted in lack of 
variance in the perceptual biases and metacognition scores. Moving forward from this 
study, this pilot study will enable us to conduct this study within a clinical group to 
assess associations between metacognition and anomalous experience, with more 
variance in scores.  
 
NOTE: References at the end of the thesis.  
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8.1 Abstract 
 
8.1.4 Introduction 
Anomalous self-experiences have been described as a prerequisite for anomalous 
perceptual experiences. Whilst research has proposed that perceptual biases may be 
associated with the presence of anomalous perceptual experiences, limited research has 
assessed the association with anomalous self-experiences. These anomalous perceptual 
experiences may then be metacognitively appraised as distressing, maintaining these 
experiences and later leading to anomalous (delusional) beliefs. This model of 
anomalous events may potentially be driven by perceptual biases and metacognitive 
deficits. 
8.1.5 Methods 
This cross-sectional study explored the association between perceptual biases, 
metacognition and anomalous self- and perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs in 
First Episode Psychosis (FEP) and a matched healthy control sample. Two signal 
detection tasks (visual and auditory paradigms) were used to measure perceptual 
sensitivity, bias, metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’) and efficiency (meta-d’/d’) and 
anomalous experience measures were used (Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences 
Questionnaire; Cambridge depersonalization scale [state and trait]; Schizotypal Symptom 
Inventory). 
8.1.6 Results 
Fifty-eight individuals with FEP and seventy-two healthy controls were included in the 
main analysis. Increased auditory perceptual biases were significantly associated with 
increased state and trait anomalous self-experiences, in particular alienation from 
surroundings and emotional numbing. No significant associations were found between 
metacognitive efficiency and anomalous experiences. 
8.1.7 Discussion 
These findings may be consistent with the minimal self-disturbance model of 
schizophrenia spectrum vulnerability, particularly with the hyperreflexivity concept. The 
lack of significant association with explicit anomalous perceptual experiences suggests 
the relationship may be more implicit, related to an underlying causal vulnerability to 
anomalous experiences.  
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8.2 Introduction 
 
Anomalous experiences refer to a rich variety of psychic phenomena. These experiences 
can be divided into three main categories: anomalous self-experiences (distortions in 
experience of self and being); anomalous perceptual experiences (distortions of sensory 
events); and anomalous (delusional) beliefs (unusual thoughts or beliefs). Anomalous 
self-experiences may precede and generate anomalous perceptual experiences 
(hallucinations) (Nelson, Parnas, & Sass, 2014; Nelson & Raballo, 2015; Raballo, 2012; 
Raballo, 2017) and anomalous (delusional) beliefs may develop from anomalous 
perceptual experiences (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009). These 
experiences/beliefs may be common within the general population (Bell, Halligan, & 
Ellis, 2006; Kelleher et al., 2012) but their intensity and/or frequency is increased in those 
with psychotic or other mental disorders (Brett, Johns, Peters, & McGuire, 2009; 
Reininghaus et al., 2016; Yung, Phillips, Yuen, & McGorry, 2004). Therefore, 
understanding the cause of such experiences may be important for understanding factors 
that drive the onset of psychosis. As existing models suggest that these anomalous 
experiences/beliefs work in a hierarchy, it is important to understand anomalous self-
experiences (the foundational level of this hierarchy) first. 
 
Studies have suggested anomalous self-experiences may be explained by the following 
factors: perceptual biases (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2011), e.g. perceiving a stimulus 
(a voice) as present when it was absent; source-monitoring deficits (Nelson, Whitford, 
Lavoie, & Sass, 2014), e.g. difficulties in the internal monitoring and comparator system 
(Frith, 1987; Frith 1992; Blakemore et al. 1999); and aberrant salience (Nelson, Whitford, 
Lavoie, & Sass, 2014b), e.g. difficulty in failing to suppress attention to irrelevant or 
familiar information (Hemsley, 1993). The aberrant salience hypothesis suggested that 
aspects of the environment are more salient in order to help the individual avoid 
threatening situations (Dodgson & Gordon, 2009). This aberrant salience may, in fact, at 
times lead to perceptual biases, which have been tested using signal detection theory 
(SDT). SDT studies have demonstrated that anomalous experiences are associated with 
perceptual signal detection biases (Bentall & Slade, 1985; Kok, Kouider, Lange & Supe, 
2015; Barkus et al., 2010; Mussgay & Hertwig, 1990). These studies also highlight that 
those with psychosis have a lower threshold for accepting a stimulus as present (Moritz, 
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Woodward, Jelinek, & Klinge, 2008; Moritz et al., 2017; Veckenstedt et al., 2011), which 
has recently been associated with aberrant salience in vivo (Reininghaus et al., 2018).  
 
Together, these neurocognitive factors (aberrant salience, source-monitoring deficits, and 
perceptual biases) may contribute to i) diminished self-presence, i.e. a weakened sense of 
existing as a subject of awareness and ii) hyperreflexivity, i.e. a heightened awareness of 
or attention to aspects of experience that are normally implicit (Nelson et al., 2014a, 
2014b). This has been recently described in a bio-pheno-social model of anomalous self-
experiences (Sass, Borda, Madeira, Pienkos and Nelson, 2018). This model suggests the 
role of “primary” hyper-reflexivity or diminished self-presence, as a result of 
salience/bias, can undermine an individual’s sense of being grounded within a shared 
world and is likely to alienate the self, possibly leading to an array of “secondary” 
anomalous self-experiences (varieties of depersonalisation, disturbances in stream of 
consciousness, distorted bodily experiences and existential reorientation (Nelson, Sass, 
& Škodlar, 2009; Sass & Parnas, 2017). As a result of the perceptual biases and 
diminished self-presence/hyperreflexivity an individual overly focuses on (generally 
implicit) bodily sensations (anomalous bodily experiences), may find it difficult to make 
sense of their surroundings or previous events, as there is an overload of information 
(alienation from surroundings; anomalous subjective recall) and may therefore 
downregulate emotional responsivity in order to prevent overstimulation or distress 
(emotional numbing) (Sierra, Baker, Medford, & David, 2005). 
 
Anomalous self-experiences are suggested to give rise to anomalous perceptual 
experiences (Nelson, Parnas, & Sass, 2014; Raballo, 2017; Raballo & Preti, 2018a) as 
these experiences become strengthened and thematized (Raballo, 2012; Raballo & Preti, 
2018b). Hemsley (1993) described the presence of anomalous perceptual experience as a 
“weakening” of top-down influences, leading to a mismatch between top-down and 
bottom-up processing (John & Hemsley, 1992; Gray, 1995). Predictive processing 
framework has been used to explain how individuals understand or interpret their 
environment or experiences, using a combination of bottom-up and top-down processes. 
These models have suggested that, within psychosis, there is a disruption in this predictive 
coding in such that there is a weakening of use of prior beliefs and overrelliance on 
sensory occurrences (Sterzer et al., 2018). This loss of top-down predictions leads extra 
weight to be given to external influences which means everything becomes salient and 
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surprising to the individual (Adams et al., 2013). This results in ambiguous sensory 
processing and may explain the presence of perceptual biases. Auditory perceptual biases 
are higher in a group of individuals with schizophrenia and hallucinations than those with 
schizophrenia and no hallucinations (Varese, Barkus, & Bentall, 2012), suggesting a 
specific association with hallucinatory experiences. Therefore, anomalous perceptual 
experiences may be predicted by perceptual biases, via anomalous self-experiences, or 
directly.  
 
In comparison to anomalous self-experiences, anomalous perceptual experiences are 
more explicit and can be modality-specific; occurring in a variety of modalities, e.g. 
visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, and touch. For example: “I have heard my phone 
ring then found it wasn’t ringing at all” or “I have looked at a pattern object and a figure 
or face has emerged” (Mitchell et al., 2017). These experiences involve an aspect of 
(metacognitive) appraisal to understand the experience. Metacognition is defined as 
“thinking about thinking” (Flavell, 1979; Semerari et al., 2003) and an appraisal of 
cognitive processes, self, abilities and experiences (Nelson & Narens, 1990). 
Metacognitive efficiency, assessed by within-task confidence ratings, has been shown to 
be significantly poorer in psychosis compared to a control group (Bliksted et al., 2017; 
Davies et al., 2018) and those with psychosis have a tendency to be overconfident in 
incorrect responses (metacognitive bias) (Gaweda, Woodward, Moritz, & Kokoszka, 
2013; Gaweda, Holas, Kokoszka, & Gaweda, 2012). These metacognitive deficits are 
present in those with a history of hallucinations (Gaweda et al., 2013) and those at high 
risk (Gawęda et al., 2018). This suggests the role of perceptual biases and metacognitive 
sensitivity/efficiency in psychosis and anomalous experiences.  
 
However, this research has not been consistent (see Chan, Spencer, West, Viegas and 
Bedwell, 2015; Gaweda et al., 2013). The inconsistencies in this area may be due to 
varying experimental controls across the tasks, e.g. subjective competence of the task; 
shown to exaggerate metacognitive deficits (Moritz et al., 2015), and objective 
performance; associated with anomalous perceptual experiences (hallucinations) 
(Gaweda, Woodward, Moritz and Kokoszka, 2013). The lack of experimental control of 
the objective performance, in order to accurately assess metacognition, which may have 
impacted metacognitive efficiency scores (Balzan, Woodward, Delfabbro, & Moritz, 
2016; Fleming & Lau, 2014). In addition, perceptual ability/metacognition can be 
		
202	
modality-specific abilities (Fleming, Ryu, Golfinos, & Blackmon, 2014; Morales, Lau, & 
Fleming, 2017) and anomalous perceptual experiences can occur across several 
modalities (see Mitchell et al., 2017). It may be suggested that as experiences become 
more explicit or conscious, there may be potential for a modality-specific association 
between perceptual biases, metacognition and anomalous perceptual experiences.  
 
Metacognitive appraisal not only maintains the anomalous perceptual experience but, 
later, this higher-level, metacognitive strategy may be used to interpret the anomalous 
perceptual experiences (Corlett et al., 2007). The interpretation of these anomalous 
experiences as distressing can lead to anomalous (delusional) beliefs (Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, Freeman, & Bebbington, 2001), e.g. paranoia (Maher, 1974; 1988; 2005). This 
hierarchical framework from anomalous experiences to beliefs has been suggested by 
many theories (Corlett et al., 2009; Fletcher & Frith, 2009; Freeman, Garety, Kuipers, 
Fowler, & Bebbington, 2002). Therefore, metacognitive efficiency may also predict 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs; supported by current research (Cella, Swan, Medin, 
Reeder, & Wykes, 2014; Moritz et al., 2014; Moritz, Woodward, & Moritz, 2006; Moritz, 
Woodward, Whitman, & Cuttler, 2005; Warman, 2008). Paranoia is particularly of 
interest as it is most commonly experienced in psychosis and in the general population 
(Freeman et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 2002; Hemsley & Garety, 1986) and Moritz et al. 
(2015) has demonstrated that metacognitive errors were present in paranoia-prone 
individuals. This highlights the potential importance of metacognition for anomalous 
(delusional) beliefs. 
 
Integrating this research, it may be suggested that anomalous self- and perceptual 
experiences and delusional beliefs are associated within a hierarchical framework. It is 
hypothesized that there is an indirect relationship between anomalous self-experience and 
anomalous (delusional) belief, mediated by anomalous perceptual experiences.  It is 
hypothesized that anomalous self-experiences may be predicted by perceptual biases and 
hyperreflexivity. Then, as anomalous self-experiences may predict anomalous perceptual 
experiences, it is hypothesized that there is an association between perceptual biases and 
anomalous perceptual experiences. These anomalous perceptual experiences may be 
metacognitively interpreted and if metacognition is poor then these may be interpreted as 
distressing or unwanted, leading to anomalous (delusional) beliefs. As experiences 
become more explicit/conscious, it is hypothesised that there is a modality-specific 
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association; visual perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency may be associated with 
anomalous visual experiences and auditory perceptual biases and metacognitive 
efficiency may be associated with auditory anomalous experiences (see figure 13).  
 
Figure 13: Proposed theoretical model for the associations between anomalous self- and 
perceptual experiences, anomalous delusional beliefs, perceptual biases and 
metacognitive efficiency. 
 
 
 
8.3 Methods 
 
8.3.1 Design 
 
This present study involved a cross-sectional design with experimental tasks and 
questionnaires to investigate the association between perceptual biases, metacognition 
and anomalous self- experiences, anomalous perceptual experiences, and delusional 
experiences in FEP and healthy controls matched on age, gender and education level.  
 
8.3.2 Procedure  
 
Ethical and Health Research Authority approval was obtained through Camberwell St. 
Giles Research Ethics Committee (reference number: 17/LO/0055, appendix F and G). 
All participants provided informed consent to take part. Participants were asked to 
complete two signal detection tasks, counterbalanced between participants. They also 
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completed additional measures, which can be reviewed in Wright, Fowler and 
Greenwood (2018) (chapter 2).  
 
8.3.3 Participants 
 
Individuals with psychosis were recruited through a convenience sample from Early 
Intervention in Psychosis services in Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, and a 
minority were re-recruited from a previous first episode psychosis (FEP) sample (Davies, 
Fowler & Greenwood, 2017). All had been given a formal diagnosis of First Episode 
Psychosis (F29), including both affective and non-affective psychosis, by a psychiatrist 
at entry into the study. As this study involved re-contacting individuals from an early 
cohort study, one participant was above the 18-40 range.  Participants with primary 
diagnoses of substance misuse disorder or organic neurological impairment were 
excluded. Healthy control participants were recruited as a comparison group, matched 
with the FEP group on age and gender (Table 18 provides information on difference 
statistics). Participants with current mental health problems or family history of psychosis 
were excluded following screening questions. Data collection was undertaken between 
March 2017 and May 2018.  
 
8.3.4 Measures 
 
Anomalous experience measures 
Anomalous self-experiences: Cambridge depersonalisation scale (trait and state versions) 
(Sierra & Berrios, 2000). The trait version includes 29 items assessing anomalous self-
experiences over the last 6 months, with 4 suggested subscales: ‘alienation from 
surroundings’, ‘anomalous subjective recall’, ‘emotional numbing’ and ‘anomalous body 
experience’ (Sierra et al., 2005). For example: “Out of the blue, I feel strange, as if I were 
not real or as if I were cut off from the world”. Participants respond on frequency of each 
statement, ranging from 0 (never) to 5 (all the time), and the duration of this experience, 
ranging from 1 (few seconds) to 6 (more than a week). Four scores are calculated from 
this measure: number of items endorsed (0-29), average frequency (0-5), average duration 
(1-6), and a total score calculated by summing total scores for both frequency and 
duration, ranging from 0 to 319. For alienation from surroundings (9 items with total 
score 0-99), anomalous subjective recall (6 items with total score 0-66), emotional 
numbing (5 items with total score 0-55) and anomalous body experience (4 items with 
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total score 0-44). Psychometrics and further details of this measure (and all others below) 
can found in the protocol paper in BMJ open (Wright et al., 2018). The state version 
includes 22 items measuring anomalous self-experiences in a ‘here and now’ rating. The 
scale includes statements such as “I am feeling so detached from my thoughts that they 
seem to have a ‘life’ of their own”. Participants respond on a visual analogue scale from 
0-100. Scores range from 0 to 2200 and the total score is used in the analysis.  
 
Anomalous perceptual experiences: Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences 
Questionnaire (Mitchell et al., 2017) is a 43-item scale measuring anomalous 
perceptual/sensory experiences with 6 subscales: auditory, visual, smell, taste, bodily 
sensations, and sensed presence, e.g. auditory: “My ears have played tricks on me”. 
Participants are asked to respond to the statements on a 5 point likert scale from never (0) 
to frequently (4). Scores are totaled for each modality (auditory [0-28], visual [0-32], 
smell [0-32], taste [0-32], bodily sensations [0-32], and sensed presence [0-16]). MUSEQ 
total score is obtained by summing all the subscale scores (0-172). The auditory subscale 
(7 questions with score total of 28), visual subscale (8 questions with a score total of 32) 
and total (total of 172) was used.  
 
Anomalous (delusional) beliefs: Schizotypal Symptom Inventory (Hodgekins et al., 
2012). This is a 20-item measure assessing subthreshold psychotic symptoms which 
provides a total score with separate subscales for paranoia, anomalous experience and 
social anxiety (Hodgekins et al., 2012). Participants are asked to rate statements or 
questions on a five-point Likert scale to assess the recent frequency of each item (0 = not 
at all, 1 = occasionally, 2 = sometimes, 3 = often, 4 = all of the time). Scores on the SSI 
range from 0 to 296. This study used the paranoia subscale [6 items with a score total of 
24 (e.g. “I often feel that others have it in for me”).  
 
Symptom measure  
Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (Kay & Fiszbein, 1987) (clinical participants 
only) is the mostly widely used standardised instrument for assessing symptom severity 
in schizophrenia (Hermes, Sokoloff, Scott Stroup, & Rosenheck, 2012). This measure 
provides three separate scores for positive and negative symptoms and general 
psychopathology.  
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Perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency 
Experimental tasks were programmed in MATLAB using Cogent 2000. The task stimuli 
were presented on a Dell Laptop and participants wore Psyc Wave S1 Wireless Bluetooth 
Headphones (Psycs1) for the auditory stimulus presentation.  
 
Visual paradigm 
Visual perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency were assessed using a 
computerised visual detection task. The task involved reporting whether a Gaussian dot 
flashed in the middle of the screen within a display of moving visual noise. The 
participants were given a verbal explanation of the task and a demonstration to familiarise 
them with the task. The main experimental trials began with the presentation of a central 
fixation cross on a grey background followed by the presentation of moving static noise 
for 3000ms. In the stimulus present trials only, at a random time during the 3000ms 
display of moving noise, the Gaussian dot was flashed in the middle of the screen. The 
contrast of the dot was titrated for each participant at ~67% correct responses, using a 
staircase procedure which adjusted the dot contrast with a standardized starting contrast. 
Participants were told prior to starting the task that the probability of the target being 
present would be 50%. Participants had up to 3000ms to make a decision (present or 
absent) before the program timed out. No feedback was given. Participants were then 
asked to indicate either high or low confidence decision (see figure 14).  
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Figure 14: Visual detection metacognitive paradigm. 
 
 
The first judgment captured hits (positive responses given when the stimulus was 
present), false alarms (positive responses given when the stimulus was absent), misses 
(negative responses when the stimulus was present), and correct rejections (negative 
responses when the stimulus was absent). This was used to calculate perceptual sensitivity 
(d’): the ability to correctly report the stimulus (dot/tone) as either present or absent. A 
higher perceptual sensitivity score suggested better ability to detect the stimulus. These 
four scores can also be used to calculate perceptual bias (B):  the tendency to report one 
decision over the other, i.e. stating the stimuli was present when it was in fact absent, or 
vice versa. A perceptual bias score was calculated according to Bentall and Slade (1985). 
A score below 1 suggests a bias towards reporting presence when absent and a score 
above 1 suggests a bias towards reporting absent of stimuli when present. Equally, the 
second judgment captures the same four scores for confidence which can be used to 
calculate a score for metacognitive sensitivity (meta-d’): the ability to discriminate 
between correct and incorrect judgments. Meta-d’ greater or less than d’ indicates 
metacognition is better or worse than d’ (Morales et al., 2017). Metacognitive efficiency 
involves taking into account objective performance (Fleming & Lau, 2014; Maniscalco 
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& Lau, 2012), and is calculated as meta-d’/d’ (metacognitive sensitivity divided by 
perceptual sensitivity) (Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010).  
 
Auditory paradigm 
Auditory perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency were assessed using a 
computerised auditory detection task, matched with the visual paradigm in terms of 
structure, number of trials and procedure. The trials began with a presentation of auditory 
white noise for 3000ms. In the stimulus present trials only, at a random time during the 
3000ms of white noise, a brief tone was presented to both ears. The volume of the tone 
was titrated at ~67% correct, using a staircase procedure which adjusted the tone volume. 
Participants responded whether the tone was present or absent and rated their confidence 
in that decision (high/low confidence). Perceptual sensitivity/biases and metacognitive 
sensitivity/efficiency scores were also derived from this auditory task (see figure 15).  
 
Figure 15: Auditory detection metacognitive paradigm. 
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8.4 Planned analysis 
 
A correlational matrix assessed the relationship between the anomalous self- and 
perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs within the full sample. A mediation model 
was used to explore the indirect relationship between anomalous self-experience and 
anomalous (delusional) beliefs to confirm this hierarchical framework. Next, 
correlational analysis were used to assess the relationship between perceptual biases, 
metacognition sensitivity/efficiency and the anomalous experience/beliefs measures. A 
Bonferroni-corrected p-value (in this case, p-value divided by the total number of 
comparisons, Weissten, n.d) accounted for multiple comparisons. Multiple regression 
analyses were conducted to assess the role of perceptual biases on anomalous 
experiences/beliefs, whilst controlling for perceptual sensitivity.  
 
8.5 Results 
 
Missing data 
Five participants did not complete both metacognitive tasks (4 FEP and 1 control), due 
to an inability to finish assessment or not consenting to the tasks. A threshold cut-off for 
performance above or below 61-71% for both auditory and visual task as this was 
within 1.5 to 2 S.D from the mean [Visual (M=65.7%, SD=2.5, range=59%-73%); 
Auditory (M=64%, SD=5%, range=49%-92%)]. This was considered an appropriate 
threshold for signal detection tasks that have assessed metacognitive efficiency 
(Sherman et al., 2015) (see appendix E for additional information). Data from 58 FEP 
and 72 healthy control participants were used for analysis. 
 
Sample characteristics 
Data was analysed from 58 FEP and 72 healthy control participants. Thirty-eight FEP 
participants were using psychotropic medication.  
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Table 18: Sample characteristics and descriptive statistics summary table. 
 FEP (N=58) Healthy Control 
(N=72) 
Difference 
tests 
Age, yrs. (SD) 27.17 (S.D 1.3) range 
18-43 
25.7 (S.D 6.6) range 
18-40 
t(128) -
1.34,p=.18 
Gender M/F (% 
males) 
42/16 (72%) 51/21 (71%) Ӽ²(1, N = 
128) = .04, 
p=.84 
Education (level, 
%) 
No qualifications-
GCSE: 33% 
A-levels: 37% 
Degree or higher: 
30%15 
No qualifications-
GCSE: 8% 
A-levels: 64% 
Degree or higher: 
28% 
Ӽ² (2, N = 
129) = 14.79, 
p=.01 
2-part IQ  105.32 (S.D 14.9) 106.2 (S.D 10.75) t(124) -.38, 
p=.7 
MUSEQ Auditory 
(0-28) 
19.2 (7.2) 17.9 (5.64) t(106.1) 1.21, 
p=.24 
MUSEQ Visual (0-28) 18.3 (8.0) 16.7 (5.8) t(100.7) 1.37 
p=.17 
MUSEQ full total 
(0-172) 
89.7 (34.8) 86.0 (26.2) t(128) .69, 
p=.49 
CDS trait total (0-319) 49.95 (45.2) 40.7 (28.9) t(93.0) 1.41, 
p=.16 
CDS state total (0-2200) 185.9 (255.5) 87.4 (125.2) t(77.12) 2.87, 
p=.01 
CDS trait ABE (0-44) 11.2 (13.8) 8.9 (9.11) t(94.9) 1.09, 
p=.28 
CDS trait EN (0-55) 10.9 (10.4) 8.89 (7.8) t(128) 1.28, 
p=.2 
																																																						
15	Due	to	the	way	educational	level	was	measured	and	the	assumptions	of	Chi-Square	tests,	we	had	to	
collapse	the	groups	into	GCSE	(no	qualifications	or	GCSE-level),	A-levels,	Degree	(degree	or	higher	
degree).	1	FEP	participant	preferred	not	to	state	but	this	was	removed	from	this	analysis.		
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CDS trait ASR (0-66) 10.6 (8.9) 8.96 (6.6) t(103.2) 1.17, 
p=.24 
CDS trait AFS (0-99) 10.6 (10.1) 7.9 (6.0) t(88.3) 1.83, 
p=.07 
SSI paranoia (0-24) 12.98 (6.0) 11.1 (4.0) t(95.5) 2.05, 
p=.04 
MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge 
Depersonalisation Scale; ABE = Anomalous Bodily Experiences; EN = Emotional Numbing; ASR = 
Anomalous Subjective Recall; AFS = Alienation From Surroundings; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom 
Inventory. Bold: These ANOVAs were significant.  
 
Anomalous experience measures 
A correlation matrix was created for association between anomalous self- and 
perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs measures in the full sample (See table 19). 
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Table 19: Correlation matrix for associations between anomalous experiences measures in the full sample. 
N=130 MUSEQ 
Auditory 
MUSEQ 
Visual 
MUSEQ 
Total 
CDS 
state 
total 
CDS 
trait 
total 
CDS ABE CDS EN CDS ASR CDS AFS SSI 
Paranoia 
SSI 
Anomalous 
experiences 
MUSEQ 
Auditory 
1 r=.77 
p<.001 
r=.81 
p<.001 
r=.43 
p<.001 
r=.54 
p<.001 
r=.43 
p<.001 
r=.47 
p<.001 
r=.52 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
r=.54 
p<.001 
r=.56 
p<.001 
MUSEQ 
Visual 
 1 N/A r=.44 
p<.001 
r=.56 
p<.001 
r=.55 
p<.001 
r=.46 
p<.001 
r=.46 
p<.001 
r=.48 
p<.001 
r=.54 
p<.001 
r=.65 
p<.001 
MUSEQ Total   1 r=.48 
p<.001 
r=.64 
p<.001 
r=.58 
p<.001 
r=.55 
p<.001 
r=.58 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.57 
p<.001 
r=.65 
p<.001 
CDS state total    1 r=.6 
p<.001 
r=.5 
p<.001 
r=.47 
p<.001 
r=.55 
p<.001 
r=.57 
p<.001 
r=.43 
p<.001 
r=.59 
p<.001 
CDS trait total     1 N/A 
 
N/A N/A N/A r=.45 
p<.001 
r=.49 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) 
ABE 
     1 r=.69 
p<.001 
r=.64 
p<.001 
r=.69 
p<.001 
r=.35 
p<.001 
r=.42 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) EN       1 r=.73 
p<.001 
r=.74 
p<.001 
r=.42 
p<.001 
r=.37 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) 
ASR 
       1 r=.66 
p<.001 
r=.48 
p<.001 
r=.58 
p<.001 
CDS (trait) 
AFS 
        1 r=.38 
p<.001 
r=.44 
p<.001 
SSI Paranoia          1 r=.6 
p<.001 
Note: MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; CDS ABE = Anomalous Bodily Experiences; 
CDS EN = Emotional Numbing; CDS ASR = Anomalous Subjective Recall;  CDS AFS = Alienation From Surroundings; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom Inventory. 
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Mediation model  
A mediation analysis was conducted using Mplus with Multiple Mediation Model 
(structural equation modelling) using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), 
bootstrapping and corrected confidence intervals, following Preacher and Hayes (2008) 
causal steps of mediation. This mediation model was used to identify the indirect 
mediating effect of anomalous perceptual experiences between anomalous self-
experience and anomalous (delusional) beliefs to confirm a hierarchical framework 
within the full sample. All scores were converted to z scores using sample means and 
standard deviations. Significant direct pathways were found between anomalous self-
experience and anomalous perceptual experience (β=.64, p<.001) and anomalous 
perceptual experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs (β=.5, p<.001). Anomalous 
perceptual experiences significantly and fully mediated the relationship between 
anomalous self-experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs (β = .32, p<.001, ±95% 
CI [0.19, 0.45]). The pathway between anomalous self-experience and anomalous 
delusional beliefs was non-significant (p>.05) (see figure 16).  
Figure 16: Mediation model for anomalous self-experiences, anomalous perpetual 
experiences and anomalous (delusional) beliefs within the full sample (N=130). 
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Comparison between groups 
Table 20 reported ANOVAs used to assess the differences in perceptual sensitivity, 
bias, metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency across FEP and healthy control groups.  
Table 20: Descriptive statistics for the two signal detection tasks, with difference tests. 
 FEP sample (N=58) Healthy 
control sample 
(N=72) 
Difference 
tests 
Visual perceptual 
sensitivity16 
1.25 (S.D .33) 1.09 (S.D .39) F(1, 117)= 
3.65, p=.059 
Visual perceptual bias 
(increased score = bias 
towards absent)17 
.76 (S.D .35) .74 (S.D .38) F(1, 117)= 
.97, p=.33 
Visual metacognitive 
sensitivity 
.69 (S.D .42) .78 (S.D .37) F(1, 117)= 
.09, p=.77 
Visual metacognitive 
efficiency 
.58 (S.D .37) .7 (S.D .33) F(1, 117)= 
1.44, p=.23 
Auditory perceptual 
sensitivity18 
1.11 (S.D 4.2) 1.19 (S.D .39) F(1, 113)= 
.05, p=.8 
Auditory perceptual bias 
(increased score = bias 
towards absent) 
.77 (S.D .47) .72 (S.D .45) F(1, 113)= 
.28, p=.6 
Auditory metacognitive 
sensitivity 
.66 (S.D .44) .67 (S.D .31) F(1, 113)= 
.34, p=.56 
Auditory metacognitive 
efficiency 
.62 (S.D .37) .67 (S.D .31) F(1, 113)= 
.78, p=.38. 
There were no significant differences in measures (table 20). Therefore, the next 
analyses will be conducted on the full sample.  
																																																						
16	Due to threshold, 6 participants were excluded for the visual task analysis (4 FEP and 2 controls). 
17	Twenty-four participants (9 FEP and 15 controls) had a perfect score on absent trials, implying an 
infinite d’. We converted proportions of 0 and 1 to 1/(2N) and 1-1/(2/N), respectively, where N is the 
number of trials on which the proportion is based; following recommended research (Macmillan & 
Creelman 2005)	
18Due to threshold, 13 participants were excluded for the auditory task analysis (7 FEP and 6 controls).  
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Correlational analyses - Visual signal detection task 
Table 21: Correlational matrix for association between visual signal detection task measures and anomalous experiences in full group. 
N=114 Visual 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
Visual 
perceptual 
bias 
Visual 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
Visual 
metacognitive 
efficiency 
MUSEQ 
visual 
MUSEQ 
auditory 
MUSEQ 
total 
CDS 
trait 
CDS 
state 
SSI 
paranoia 
Visual 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
1 r= .81*** 
p<.001 
r= .11 
p=.24 
r= -.64*** 
p<.001 
r= -.15 
p=.11 
r= .02 
p=.88 
r= .19*  
p=.04 
r= -.18 
p=.06 
r= -
.12 
p=.21 
r= -.02 
p=.87 
Visual 
perceptual 
bias 
 1 r= .13 
p=.15 
r= -.48*** 
p<.001 
r= -.09 
p=.33  
r= -.04 
p=.66 
r= -.1 
p=.3 
r= -.12 
p=.19 
r= -
.04 
p=.7 
r=.06 
p=.51 
Visual 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
  1 N/A r= -.01 
p=.91 
r= .14 
p=.14 
r= -.07 
p=.48 
r= -.14 
p=.13 
r= -
.07 
p=.43 
r= -.11 
p=.23 
Visual 
metacognitive 
efficiency 
   1 r= .06 
p=.5 
r= .1 
p=.32 
r= .05 
p=.6 
r= -.01 
p=.88 
r= -
.04 
p=.7 
r= -.11 
p=.25 
MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom Inventory. Bold: 
These correlations held after multiple comparison correction.   
After correcting for multiple comparisons, there were no significant associations between visual perceptual biases or metacognitive 
efficiency with anomalous self- or perceptual experiences nor with anomalous (delusional) beliefs. No further analyses were conducted.  
Auditory signal detection task   
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Table 22: Correlational matrix for association between auditory signal detection task measures and anomalous experiences in full group.  
N=114 Auditory 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
Auditory 
perceptual 
bias 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
efficiency 
MUSEQ 
Auditory  
MUSEQ 
Visual  
MUSEQ 
Total 
CDS 
Trait 
CDS 
State 
SSI 
Paranoia 
Auditory 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
1 r= .79*** 
p<.001 
r= .3*** 
p<.001 
r= -.64*** 
p<.001 
r= .02 
p=.9 
r= .04 
p=.68 
r= -.03 
p=.73 
r= -.19* 
p=.04 
r= -.21* 
p=.03 
r= .08 
p=.41 
Auditory 
perceptual bias 
 1 r= .24* 
p=.01 
r= -.51*** 
p<.001 
r= -.04 
p=.72 
r= -.04 
p=.7 
r= -.13 
p=.19 
r= -.27** 
p=.004 
r= -.3** 
p=.001 
r= .03 
p=.73 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
  1 N/A r= .13 
p=.17 
 
r= .06 
p=.53 
 
r= .04 
p=.66 
r= -.19* 
p=.05 
r= -.16 
p=.09 
r= .18 
p=.06 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
efficiency 
   1 r= .1 
p=.32 
r= .01 
p=.93 
r= .06 
p=.51 
r= .02 
p=.84 
r= .05 
p=.61 
r= .11 
p=.24 
MUSEQ = Multimodal Unusual Sensory Experiences Questionnaire; CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; SSI = Schizotypal Symptom Inventory. Bold: 
These correlations held after multiple comparison correction.   
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After multiple comparison correction, there was a significant negative relationship 
between CDS state with auditory perceptual biases. Following this, a stepwise regression 
analysis was conducted with auditory perceptual bias (independent variable) and CDS 
state (dependent variable), with auditory perceptual sensitivity as a covariate. Even when 
controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this model was significant and explained 
10.3% of the variance in CDS score, R2=.32, [adjusted r2 .1], F(2, 112) 6.35, p=.002). 
Auditory perceptual biases predicted a significant change in CDS state score, (ΔR²=.06, 
F(1, 110) 7.16 p=.009 (see table 23). As the perceptual bias measure is negatively scored, 
this result demonstrates that increased perceptual biases towards rating ‘present’ was 
associated with increased CDS state measure. 
 
Table 23: Regression table to demonstrate associations with state anomalous 
experiences. 
  B SE B β p value CI  
Model 2       
 Constant 189.9 50.68    
 Auditory 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
44.53 67.31 .097 .51 -88.95, 177.81 
 Auditory 
perceptual bias 
-160.29 59.92 -.39 .009 -279.03, -41.55 
*= p<.05, **=p<.01      
 
 
There was also a significant negative relationship between CDS trait with auditory 
perceptual biases (see table 22). Further analyses were conducted to assess the 
associations with individual subscales of CDS trait measure (table 24). After multiple 
comparisons, there was a significant negative relationship between auditory perceptual 
bias and CDS trait emotional numbing (EN) and alienation from surroundings (AFS) 
subscale in the full sample.  
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Table 24: Correlational matrix for association between auditory perceptual sensitivity, 
bias, metacognitive sensitivity and efficiency with subscales of anomalous self-
experiences in full sample. 
N=109 CDS trait 
ABE 
CDS trait EN CDS trait ASR CDS AFS 
Auditory 
perceptual 
sensitivity 
r= -.17 
p=.07 
r= -.18 
p=.05 
r= -.14 
p=.16 
r= -.18 
p=.06 
Auditory 
perceptual bias 
r= -.21* 
p=.03 
r= -.28** 
p=.01 
r= -.12* 
p=.03 
r= -.27** 
p=.01 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
sensitivity 
r= -.19* 
p=.04 
r= -.16 
p=.09 
r= -.12 
p=.21 
r= -.14 
p=.15 
Auditory 
metacognitive 
efficiency  
r= -.11 
p=.26 
r= -.05 
p=.62 
r= -.03 
p=.76 
r= -.04 
p=.7 
 
Note: CDS = Cambridge Depersonalisation Scale; ABE = Anomalous Bodily 
Experiences; EN = Emotional Numbing; ASR = Anomalous Subjective Recall; AFS = 
Alienation From Surroundings. Bold: These correlations held after multiple comparison 
correction. 
 
A stepwise regression analysis was used to assess the association between auditory 
perceptual bias and CDS alienation from surroundings (AFS), independent of auditory 
perceptual sensitivity. Even when controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this 
model was significant and explained 7.8% of the variance in CDS AFS score,  R²=.078, 
[adjusted r2 .06], F(2, 113) 4.69, p=.011). Auditory perceptual biases predicted 4.6% of 
this variance and improved the model (ΔR²= .046, F(1, 111) = 5.55, p=.02). Another 
stepwise regression analysis was conducted to assess the association between auditory 
perceptual bias and CDS emotional numbing (EN), independent of auditory perceptual 
sensitivity. Even when controlling for auditory perceptual sensitivity, this model was 
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significant and explained 7.9% of the variance in CDS EN score, R²=.079, [adjusted r2 
.062], F(2, 113) 4.74, p=.011). Auditory perceptual biases predicted 4.5% of this variance 
and improved the model (ΔR²= .045, F(1, 111) = 5.46, p=.021). As the perceptual bias 
measure is negatively scored, these results demonstrate that increased perceptual biases 
towards rating ‘present’ was associated with higher scores on the CDS AFS/EN measure. 
 
Finally, the correlations were split by group (FEP and healthy control) to assess 
differences in the groups. In the FEP group, there was a significant negative relationship 
between auditory perceptual bias and AFS (r=.48, p=.002) and anomalous bodily 
experiences (ABE) (r=.42, p=.002) subscales, which held after multiple comparison 
corrections. However, these two correlations were non-significant in the control group.  
 
After correcting for multiple comparisons, there were no significant associations with 
auditory perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency and anomalous perceptual 
experiences or with anomalous (delusional) beliefs. 
 
8.6 Discussion 
	
This experimental cross-sectional study demonstrated that auditory perceptual biases (a 
lower threshold for accepting an auditory stimulus as present) was associated with 
increased state and trait anomalous self-experiences (alienation from surroundings and 
emotional numbing) in the full sample, and specifically within the FEP group.  
 
This perceptual bias towards noticing a stimuli as present (within the environment) may 
be closely linked with the phenomenological concept of hyperreflexivity (heightened 
awareness of aspects of experience that are normally sub-conscious/implicit (Sass et al., 
2018) and the neurocognitive concept of aberrant salience (Kapur, 2003). Therefore, an 
individual who has a lower threshold for noticing auditory stimulus within the 
environment may be overly aware of themselves or their environment which makes 
aspects are overly salient. A lower threshold for detecting a signal (message) from 
meaningless noise was demonstrated in those deemed as Ultra-High Risk (UHR) and later 
transitioned to psychosis (Hoffman et al., 2007). It may be this hypervigilance and 
hyperawareness of stimuli can alienate the individual, leave them feeling detached and 
experience difficulty identifying themselves from their environment (alienation from 
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surroundings). From this hyperawareness, the individual may feel an information 
overload and as a consequence they “shut-down” their emotions or reactions to these 
anomalous experiences (emotional numbing); potentially as a compensatory mechanism 
to avoid further distress.  
 
Recently, Powers et al. (2017) demonstrated the role of top-down cognitive biases, via 
predictive processing models, on auditory hallucinations in clinical participants. In a 
response to Powers et al., Nelson and Hartmann (2017) suggested that predictive 
processing models could also explain disturbance of the “minimal” self; in this case, 
dissociation. The use of predictive processing to explain self-disturbance has also been 
suggested by Clowes et al. (2017) as imprecise predictions must be explained, which may 
lead to hyperreflexivity and, therefore, dissociation (Seth, Suzuki & Critchley, 2011; 
Seth, 2013). Recently, Garfinkel et al. (in preparation) was able to demonstrate an 
association between interoceptive metacognition, e.g. confidence in detecting heart rate, 
and alienation from surrounding and anomalous subjective recall from CDS, with a trend 
negative relationship observed with emotional numbing subscale. The similarity of the 
subscales with this current study suggests a potential overlap between auditory perceptual 
biases and interoceptive awareness. Difficulties with both perceptual biases and 
interoceptive awareness may lead to hyperreflexivity; heightened awareness or/attention 
to aspects of experience that are normally implicit (Nelson et al., 2014a, 2014b), which 
can undermine an individual’s sense of being grounded within a shared universe and is 
likely to alienate the self, leading to the anomalous self-experiences (see Sass et al., 2018). 
 
Both perceptual biases and anomalous self-experiences may be considered low-level or 
sub-conscious (e.g. not involving higher-level cognitive appraisals/interpretations). It is 
important to note, in this sample, individuals with FEP had fewer symptoms and better 
functioning compared to other FEP studies (Leucht et al., 2005; Fitzgerald et al. 2004; 
McLeod et al., 2014; Hodgekins et al. 2015), and intact metacognitive efficiency. As a 
result, this underlying, low-level, causal relationship between perceptual biases and 
anomalous self-experiences may have been easier to capture as it was not confounded by 
symptoms. Perceptual biases may be a cognitive marker for individuals who may have a 
propensity to have anomalous-self experiences. This is a tentative hypothesis and future 
studies should aim to assess this within a large model, e.g. with groups of individuals at 
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ranging levels of psychotic experiences/symptoms [Ultra High risk (UHR), FEP, chronic 
schizophrenia].  
 
Mediation model supported the hierarchical framework (Fletcher & Frith, 2009), in which 
anomalous self-experiences may lead to surface-level anomalous perceptual experiences 
then, after appraisal, may develop into higher-level (delusional) beliefs (Garety et al., 
2001; Freeman et al., 2002; Nelson, Parnas & Sass, 2014). However, despite the 
association between perceptual biases and anomalous self-experiences, contrary to the 
literature, perceptual biases did not predict anomalous perceptual experiences (see Bentall 
& Slade, 1985; Kok, Kouider, Lange, & Supe, 2015; Barkus et al., 2010; Mussgay & 
Hertwig, 1990). Interestingly, Haarsma et al. (2018) demonstrated strong evidence for 
weakened perceptual priors in ARMS group, compared to FEP and healthy controls. But 
stronger cognitive priors in the FEP group, compared to ARMS and healthy controls. 
Haarsma et al. suggested that high-level cognitive priors may develop from weak low-
level priors as a compensation (see Adams et al., 2013; Sterzer et al., 2018; Heinz et al., 
2018). Future studies could assess perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency within 
various different clinical groups, e.g. UHR, FEP, chronic psychosis, schizotypal 
personality disorder and psychometrically-defined schizotypy, to assess presence of these 
relationships across groups of individuals with varying symptomatology. 
 
Of importance here is that metacognitive efficiency was not associated with any of these 
anomalous experiences or beliefs. As suggested above, these individuals with FEP had 
fewer symptoms and both groups had intact metacognitive efficiency.  Therefore, intact 
metacognitive efficiency may prevent the negative appraisal of anomalous experiences, 
which typically maintains anomalous perceptual experiences and can develop into 
delusional beliefs. 
 
This lack of association with anomalous perceptual experiences/delusional beliefs may 
be because individuals within this FEP sample were currently, or recently, involved 
within the Early Intervention Service (EIS) which provides pharmacological (typically, 
antipsychotic medication to reduce the salience of anomalous experiences) or 
psychological interventions (typically, CBT-p to alter the response to anomalous 
experiences and prevent maintenance of anomalous delusional beliefs), this may have had 
an impact on improving metacognitive capacities. Kapur (2003) suggested antipsychotics 
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“dampen the salience” of these anomalous experiences, which means individuals 
experience reduced salience of anomalous experiences; hence equal levels of anomalous 
experiences between the clinical and non-clinical groups. Next, CBT-p aims to reduce 
distress associated with anomalous experiences (Birchwood & Trower, 2006), by 
changing the way in which an individual (metacognitively) appraises these experiences. 
This has shown positive effects (Gould et al., 2015; Turner et al., 2014; Hazell et al., 
2016; Tarrier et al., 1998). This highlights the importance of a well-resourced Early 
Intervention Services (Bertolote & McGorry, 2005; Marshall & Rathbone, 2011), to 
intervene with metacognitive difficulties and distressing anomalous experiences. From 
this, it may be hypothesized that metacognitive efficiency has a key role in anomalous 
experiences/beliefs, and is more impaired, when more symptomatic in psychosis. 
Assessing these variables across clinical groups will enable detection of core difficulties 
at different stages of illness to identify which factors are the main triggers of anomalous 
experiences.  
 
It is important to also consider the alternative argument that metacognitive efficiency may 
not be associated with anomalous experiences. A small number of studies have assessed 
metacognitive efficiency, using meta-d’, and those that have have demonstrated limited 
association with brain function or other psychotic symptoms in psychosis and healthy 
controls (Davies et al., 2018; Powers et al., 2017; Corcoran et al., 2018).  
 
8.7 Limitations 
	
There are limitations to the study. Firstly, many participants were biased towards the 
stimuli being absent, showing a strict and conservative approach to accepting the stimulus 
as present. For the FEP group, the progressed stage of their recovery may explain their 
conservative approach. Future studies could aim to assess the fluctuations in symptoms 
over time using a repeated longitudinal measure. Secondly, the study demonstrated an 
association within only the auditory modality. Auditory anomalous experiences were 
slightly higher than other modalities; in support of research suggesting hallucinations are 
most common within the auditory modality (McCarthy-Jones et al., 2017; Shergill, 
Murray, & McGuire, 1998; Waters et al., 2012). Therefore, this modality-specific result 
may be an effect of the nature of the experience. Future studies could explore this within 
individuals with and without auditory hallucinations compared to other modalities. 
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Finally, educational level was significantly different between the groups, which has been 
a previous confound in metacognition measures (Gaweda et al., 2013; Moritz et al., 2014). 
However, IQ was not significantly different between the two groups, which is a more 
detailed measure. Future studies should use IQ as a measure of comparison, rather than 
educational level which may not be best suited to capture ability. 
 
8.8 Conclusion 
	
This study identified increased auditory perceptual biases were associated with increased 
anomalous self-experiences; in particular alienation from surroundings and emotional 
numbing. Anomalous self-experiences, as a result of perceptual biases, may be the 
underlying causal vulnerability of these experiences, which can be particularly distressing 
and disorienting. This study demonstrated auditory perceptual biases may represent an 
early causal vulnerability for anomalous self-experiences. This may be a therapeutic 
target for those with anomalous-self experiences to prevent initial or re-occurrence of 
anomalous perceptual experiences and delusional beliefs.  
	
 
NOTE: References at the end of the thesis. 
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9. General discussion 
 
Psychosis is a serious mental health disorder characterised by positive symptoms 
(experiences that are in addition to normal experience, e.g. hearing voices), negative 
symptoms (dampening of normal experiences, e.g. loss of motivation), cognitive deficits, 
disorganized symptoms and, importantly here, an impairment in functioning. Beck and 
Rector (2005) proposed a model of functional outcome in schizophrenia, suggesting the 
path between neurocognition and functioning is mediated by functional capacity and 
cognitive processes. These cognitive processes can include metacognition, considered 
‘thinking about thinking’. Metacognition was proposed to work in a hierarchy between 
the object- and meta-level, outlined within Nelson and Narens (1990) model, including 
several metacognitive components: metacognitive ability, experience and efficiency, 
connected by metacognitive processes (monitoring and control).  
 
Many of these metacognitive components are impaired in psychosis and these 
metacognitive deficits were suggested to predict both what people do in their everyday 
lives (functional outcome) and how people feel about their everyday lives (subjective 
recovery outcome). It was also proposed that metacognition could be expanded to include 
the way one thinks about oneself through important memories, e.g. self-defining 
memories (SDMs). The role of SDMs as an additional predictor of functioning in 
psychosis, alongside metacognition, was explored.  
 
Metacognitive efficiency, in particular, has been used to explain the presence of 
anomalous experiences. Anomalous experiences refer to a rich number of various psychic 
phenomena, including anomalous self-experiences (e.g. the sense that you are not “real”); 
anomalous perceptual experiences (e.g. hearing sounds which cannot be accounted for by 
the environment); and anomalous delusional beliefs (e.g. holding unusual beliefs outside 
the cultural norm). These experiences are common with FEP, and in those with emerging 
severe mental health difficulties, and may be associated with difficulties in 
metacognition. This thesis has presented a series of studies exploring the role of 
metacognitive components on anomalous experiences, functional outcome and subjective 
recovery outcome in young people with and without psychosis. 
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The thesis aim is: 
The first aim of the thesis is to assess the connection between metacognitive variables 
and which metacognitive components are important for difficulties in functioning in 
psychosis (Chapter 2 & 3) 
The second aim of the thesis to assess both objective and subjective function will allow 
a more in-depth understanding of functional recovery and the variables which are 
associated with this. However, limited research has assessed whether other metacognitive 
components are relevant in poor functional outcome in FEP (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) 
Given the limited longitudinal research, the third aim of the thesis is to assess whether 
metacognitive ability can predict functional outcome across a longer follow-up period, 
particularly within FEP; where recovery is more likely (Chapter 4).  
The fourth aim of the thesis is to assess the role of cognitive and metacognitive 
processes on anomalous experiences and delusional beliefs (Chapter 6, 7 and 8) 
 
9.1 Integration overview of findings 
 
Contrary to our hypothesis, there was not an overall metacognitive hierarchy. Instead, 
metacognitive factors loaded onto separate factors, with limited correlation between the 
metacognitive components, which supported the idea that these are distinct reflective 
processes. Current findings demonstrated a role for metacognitive ability and 
metacognitive experience in predicting functional capacity, and role for metacognitive 
ability and control processes for predicting functional outcome in individuals with and 
without psychosis. Metacognitive ability also predicted subjective recovery outcome in 
FEP cross-sectionally, independently of negative emotion (see figure 17).  
 
Following this, the thesis examined the role of metacognition in predicting functional 
outcome across a three-year period, following First Episode Psychosis (FEP). Current 
findings demonstrate that better metacognitive ability at baseline significantly predicted 
improvement in functioning in FEP, from baseline to three-year follow-up, independent 
of neurocognition and functional capacity. This thesis highlights that metacognitive 
ability, in particular, should be used as an early marker for risk of later poor functioning 
in psychosis and should be a target for interventions in FEP.  
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Current findings demonstrate that metacognition may be expanded to include the way one 
thinks about oneself through important memories, e.g. self-defining memories (SDMs). 
This highlights that reflecting on oneself and one’s experiences, in a variety of different 
ways, is important for functioning in FEP.  
 
In order to explore associations between anomalous experiences and delusional beliefs, 
this thesis initially conducted a systematic literature review. This review demonstrated 
that metacognitive ability was not directly associated with anomalous experiences or 
beliefs. For both metacognitive monitoring and metacognitive sensitivity, there was a 
clear association with anomalous (delusional) beliefs. Although this relationship 
appeared to vary across the recovery trajectory; metacognitive monitoring appears to be 
specifically linked to anomalous (delusional) beliefs during FEP and less so for those 
with an At Risk Mental State (ARMS). However, the relationship with anomalous 
perceptual experiences was less consistent. This was possibly due to the lack of consistent 
and specific measures of anomalous perceptual experiences or rigorous experimental 
controls. 
 
Following this, this thesis developed and piloted two metacognitive tasks (visual and 
auditory tasks) in healthy student sample. These two metacognitive tasks were later used 
to examine the relationship between anomalous self- and perceptual experiences and 
delusional beliefs, metacognitive sensitivity and perceptual biases within young people 
with and without psychosis. This study demonstrated that those with higher dissociative 
experiences, particularly alienation from surroundings and emotional numbing, had 
higher level of auditory perceptual biases. This may be an underlying causal vulnerability 
for these anomalous self-experiences and, therefore, a cognitive marker for individuals 
who may have a propensity to have anomalous-self experiences. However, no significant 
associations were found between these perceptual biases or metacognitive efficiency 
(appraisals) and anomalous perceptual experiences or delusional beliefs. This was 
inconsistent with the initial hypothesis and may suggest that the presence of intact 
metacognitive efficiency in FEP and healthy control group may prevent the maintenance 
of anomalous experiences or development of anomalous (delusional) beliefs.  
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Figure 17: Final model of metacognitive influences on anomalous experiences and 
outcomes in FEP. Note: Solid lines arrows signify significant relationship demonstrated 
within the young people with and without psychosis. Solid red arrows signify 
significant relationship demonstrated within FEP only. Solid blue line demonstrated an 
inverse correlation. Orange boxes demonstrate intact within psychosis in this current 
thesis.  
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9.2 Main findings, clinical and research implications 
 
9.2.1 Metacognition has a key role in First Episode Psychosis  
 
Current findings demonstrate that all metacognitive components load onto separate 
factors which supports the idea that these are distinct reflective processes (chapter 3). Due 
to the lack of association between metacognitive components and the fractionation in 
metacognition, in both FEP and healthy controls, the hierarchy proposed for 
metacognition is not consistent within this current research. Metacognition includes a 
range of different, distinctive abilities or experiences. Surprisingly, the metacognitive 
factors were not associated with each other suggesting that either these are independent 
processes, or the method of assessment was not capturing the appropriate connections or, 
alike to the association with anomalous perceptual experiences, these metacognitive 
components may change over the course of recovery.  
 
Metacognitive ability, capacity to reflect on oneself, experiences, and others in a holistic 
and flexible manner, is poorer in FEP, compared to healthy controls, and predicts 
functional and subjective recovery outcome (chapter 3, 4 and 5). Metacognitive control 
processes, ability to set-shift and be flexible in one’s thinking, was poorer in FEP 
compared to the healthy control group. This suggests a potential fault within the 
metacognitive system in FEP. However, contrary to our hypotheses, metacognitive 
experience or “online” accuracy in prediction of ability, was better in FEP compared to 
healthy control participants (chapter 3); previously suggested by Gilleen, Greenwood and 
David (2014) within schizophrenia. Healthy control participants underrated their 
performance more than those with FEP. In the same vein, metacognitive monitoring 
process was higher in FEP compared to healthy controls (chapter 3). This suggests a 
dissociation between higher-order metacognitive ability and control processes, which is 
impaired in psychosis, compared to intermediate metacognitive experience and 
monitoring which is intact. It is metacognitive ability, and use of this ability within 
everyday life, which has the largest impact on functioning rather than focus on 
performance on a task within-the-moment. This FEP group were further along in 
recovery, which may have influenced by reporting within the BCIS questionnaire (see 
limitations section 9.3.5), but also highlights the potential persistent nature of the deficits 
in metacognitive ability.  
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To support the assumption that the FEP group may be further along in their recovery, 
there were no differences in metacognitive efficiency between the groups, inconsistent 
with previous studies in this area (Davies et al., 2018; Bilkstead et al., 2016). Following 
this, there was no significant association between metacognitive efficiency and 
anomalous experiences or delusional beliefs in our sample, despite previously being 
demonstrated within the literature (chapter 6). As this FEP group may have been more 
recovered, supported by reduced levels of symptoms and higher functioning than 
previous FEP samples (Hodgekins, French, et al., 2015; Leucht et al., 2005), these 
individuals display higher levels of metacognitive experience and self-reflectiveness 
which may have limited the frequency of distressing anomalous experiences/delusional 
beliefs.  
 
Clinical and research implications 
 
The different metacognitive components have seemingly separate roles or functions at 
different stages of the psychotic illness. Therefore, future research should aim to test these 
components within different clinical groups, with varying symptomatology, to explore 
differences across recovery. This research will enable research to identify key 
metacognitive components to tackle within an ARMs where metacognitive efficiency 
may play a large role, or chronic psychosis group where different metacognitive 
components may be more apparent.  
 
All individuals were currently, or recently, involved with the Early Intervention Service 
(EIS) which provides pharmacological (typically, anti-psychotics) and psychological 
interventions (typically, CBT-p), which may have impacted on metacognition. However, 
this thesis was not able to empirically test these suggestions regarding interventions. 
Future research or clinical practice could obtain these data to replicate the findings with 
more explicit measures of treatment. 
 
9.2.3 Predictors of functioning in people with and without psychosis  
 
Functional outcome was predicted by metacognitive ability in individuals with and 
without psychosis, independent of IQ (chapter 3). Those who were better able to reflect 
on themselves as a person with skills, abilities and experiences, and were able to utilise 
their skills, were more likely to be engaged in more hours of structured activities per 
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week. The metacognitive ability measure, Metacognitive Assessment Interview (MAI), 
involves an individual reflecting on a difficult interpersonal situation and then explaining 
this situation, their experiences and how another person may have viewed the situation. 
The scoring is partially based on how the individual discusses this situation verbally, in 
terms of the spontaneity and sophistication of their answer. Whilst typically good verbal 
IQ is associated with good metacognitive ability, metacognitive ability still predicted 
functioning independent of IQ.   
 
However, within the FEP group, the role of metacognitive ability on functional outcome 
did not hold after controlling for negative symptoms (chapter 3). This may suggest a role 
for negative symptoms such as poverty of speech/lack of spontaneity or difficulty in 
abstract thinking in the MAI scores. Therefore, the MAI may be capturing aspects of 
negative symptoms which are associated with, and difficult to separate from, 
metacognitive ability (Hamm et al. 2012; McLeod et al. 2014). The three-year follow-up 
study (chapter 4) was able to demonstrate role of metacognitive ability on functional 
outcome was supported longitudinally, independent of negative symptoms. This suggests 
that, whilst metacognitive and negative symptoms may be related, metacognition has a 
distinct role in predicting functioning, independent of negative symptoms across-time.  
 
Alongside metacognitive ability, holding specific self-defining memories was 
demonstrated to predict engagement in more hours of structured activity in FEP (chapter 
5). Therefore, this ability to reflect on one’s own life experiences, more broadly; including 
memories and current abilities, is shown to have a role in functional outcome in FEP.  
 
Functional outcome has been previously, and strongly, associated with functional 
capacity in psychosis. Metacognitive ability and metacognitive control process were 
shown to predict real-life functional capacity in individuals with and without psychosis, 
independent of IQ. This suggests that those with more flexible thinking within the 
moment (control) or ability to think about themselves as a person as a whole with skills 
(metacognitive ability), were more likely to be able to use these skills within the moment 
to complete a real-life task. However, metacognitive experience was shown to be a 
predictor of functional capacity and this was independent of both IQ and negative 
symptoms. However, this was an inverse relationship, suggesting those who were more 
accurate in rating their performance after completion of a visual task were likely to 
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perform more poorly on the functional capacity task. This suggests a negative effect of 
focusing on specific cognitive abilities. This was unexpected and may suggest that it is 
more useful for an individual to focus on their overall ability, experiences and themselves 
as a whole, to improve metacognitive ability, to later improve functional outcome for 
both individuals with and without psychosis. 
 
Clinical and research implications  
The predictive effects of metacognitive ability on functional outcome, both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally, have important clinical implications for Early Intervention 
Services which provide treatment to individuals experiencing symptoms of psychosis. 
These findings can be taken forward in two ways: i) poor metacognitive ability may be a 
marker for poor outcome in psychosis later on and patients should be provided with more 
support, particularly to enhance their metacognitive abilities, and ii) metacognitive ability 
may be a key target for interventions in FEP to improve functioning. Metacognition 
Reflection and Insight Therapy (MERIT), specifically aimed at improving metacognitive 
ability (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2011), may be a useful intervention for FEP. de Jong et al. 
(2018) recently demonstrated, in a trial of MERIT for individuals with schizophrenia, that 
MERIT improved metacognitive ability, but not functioning; which may be accounted by 
other factors, e.g. functional capacity or cognitions (see Davies et al. 2017; Koren et al. 
2006) or the short follow-up period. The role of additional factors may suggest that the 
combination of training cognitive and metacognitive abilities is a more powerful 
intervention. RCTs for metacognitive therapies are ongoing and consideration should be 
made to include metacognitive therapies within UK health services.  
 
These findings may also have important implications for healthy young people who want 
to engage in more activities, particularly those economically inactive adolescents and 
young adults, considered Not in Education Employment or Training (NEET) (Scott et al., 
2013), to prevent future mental health difficulties or functional decline. In addition, 
research needs to focus on understanding at which point and why deficits in 
metacognitive ability develop. As suggested in chapter 3, the role of verbal IQ or negative 
symptoms (e.g. poverty of speech) may contribute but neither fully explains this deficit. 
Prospective longitudinal studies will help to identify at which point intervening on 
metacognitive ability is most appropriate, and which preventative mechanisms could be 
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targeted to reduce decline in metacognitive ability in psychosis. Research within NEET 
groups or within individuals with At Risk Mental State (ARMS) could be informative.  
 
In terms of metacognitive experience, Cognitive Remediation Therapy (CRT) aims to 
improve cognitive ability (and consequentially real-world functioning) and has recently 
begun including metacognitive training (training and encouraging the use of strategies to 
improve skills) to enhance standard CRT (Breitborde et al., 2015; Reeder et al., 2017). 
This CRT metacognitive training particularly focuses on improving metacognitive 
experience; “online” awareness of abilities. Studies using CRT, alongside vocational 
training, demonstrated an improvement in an individual’s cognitive composite score 
(McGurk et al., 2015) and an improvement in Trails B:A which can be viewed as a 
metacognitive control process (Gilleen et al., 2016). Current CRT trials using 
metacognitive training within EIS in the UK are ongoing and a recent trial within a 
schizophrenia sample provides support for this therapy (Reeder et al. 2017). Future trials 
should continue to focus on both cognitions, metacognitions and real-life skills in FEP to 
improve outcomes (e.g. Cella et al. 2015). 
 
Metacognitive ability is a comprehensive and sophisticated skill and improving 
metacognitive abilities may be challenging for some, particularly those with lower 
cognitive ability. Alongside this, metacognitive therapy, e.g. MERIT, can be distressing 
for individuals who become more metacognitively aware of previous traumatic or 
negative life experiences. These individuals may disengage from therapy or find it too 
difficult. Therefore, metacognitive therapy may not be a panacea. Alternatively, in light 
of the findings for the impact also of self-defining memories on functional outcome, 
engaging in therapies which focus on reflecting on important, positive and specific self-
defining memories may be a more positive and equally valuable starting point. This can 
help the individual develop the technique of self-reflection, laying the foundations for 
later metacognitive therapy once the individual is motivated and able to engage.  
 
9.2.4 Subjective recovery in FEP  
 
Recent research has begun to consider subjective perspective on recovery from severe 
mental health difficulties. This is alongside functional recovery, to understand the 
‘breadth of success’ across various domains of recovery (Harvey & Bellack, 2009). 
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Current findings demonstrate subjective recovery scores were higher in this sample than 
in a schizophrenia group (Neil et al., 2009), suggesting recovery within an FEP group 
may be more likely. There was an association between functional outcome and subjective 
recovery outcome in FEP (Chapter 3). Current findings demonstrate that metacognition 
is a key factor which is associated with both modes of recovery. Importantly, an 
individual’s ability to think about themselves, their different states of mind, and their 
experiences is an important aspect of mental health recovery. Whilst this is in support for 
previous research (Kukla, Lysaker and Salyers, 2013; Phalen, Viswanadhan, Lysaker, 
Warman, 2015; Lysaker et al., 2005), the current study was the first to demonstrate this 
within FEP, demonstrating that metacognitive ability, functional outcome and subjective 
recovery outcome are intertwined and inherent to the disorder, and important for 
recovery.  
 
Clinical and research implications 
Current findings provide additional support for the use of metacognitive therapies, e.g. 
MERIT, in improving both functional outcome and subjective recovery in FEP. Due to 
the lack of longitudinal research, it is unclear whether metacognitive ability is having a 
direct impact on subjective recovery or whether this is via functional outcome. Future 
studies exploring this can provide additional evidence to support the use of metacognitive 
therapies in tackling subjective recovery outcomes.  
 
Subjective recovery outcome was only assessed within chapter 3, not in the follow-up 
study. Therefore, this thesis was not able to explore the direction of the relationship 
between functional outcome, subjective recovery outcome and metacognitive ability. In 
addition, the relationship between subjective recovery and functional outcome was not as 
high as expected which may suggest these two factors could be dissociable for some 
individuals, for example as a result of diminished insight, demoralization, or reduced life 
expectations (Goldberg & Harrow, 2005). Future research should aim to further 
understand the longitudinal or causal relationship between subjective recovery and 
functional outcome, across the recovery trajectory within psychosis.  
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9.2.3 Predictors of anomalous experiences 
 
Anomalous self-experiences, particularly alienation from surroundings and emotional 
numbing, were associated with increased auditory perceptual biases in FEP (chapter 8). 
Perceptual biases are suggested to be related to hyperreflexivity which leads the 
individual to become overly aware of their environment and themselves such that they 
experience anomalous self-experiences. Recent research demonstrated a negative 
relationship between metacognition, in terms of detecting interoceptive signals e.g. heart 
rate, and dissociation (Garfinkel et al., in preparation). Perceptual biases and interoceptive 
awareness appear to be low-level processes and may be related to hyperreflexivity; 
heightened awareness or/attention to aspects of experience that are normally implicit 
(Nelson et al., 2014a, 2014b), which can undermine an individual’s sense of being 
grounded within a shared universe and is likely to alienate the self, leading to the 
anomalous self-experiences (see Sass et al., 2018).  
 
Auditory perceptual biases may constitute an underlying causal vulnerability or cognitive 
marker for propensity to anomalous self-experiences. Anomalous self-experiences were 
also associated with anomalous perceptual experiences, which were, in turn, associated 
with anomalous (delusional) beliefs (chapter 7), via a hierarchical mediation model 
(chapter 8). Therefore, tackling anomalous self-experiences at the lowest level may 
prevent further anomalous experiences or the development of anomalous (delusional) 
beliefs.  
 
However, contrary to the literature, perceptual biases predicted only self-experiences and 
did not predict anomalous perceptual experiences directly (see Bentall & Slade, 1985; 
Varese et al., 2011). Importantly here also, whilst metacognitive efficiency, within-the-
moment confidence ratings on a task, was associated with perceptual bias it was not 
associated with anomalous perceptual experiences or anomalous (delusional) beliefs in 
FEP nor healthy control groups. Metacognitive efficiency was intact within the FEP 
group (chapter 3 and 8) and, therefore, intact metacognitive efficiency may be a protective 
factor which prevents the individual from experiencing anomalous perceptual 
experiences and, from this, prevents the development of anomalous (delusional) beliefs.  
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Clinical and research implications 
Current findings imply that auditory perceptual biases may be an underlying cognitive 
marker for propensity to anomalous self-experiences. Future research could aim to 
understand the development of auditory perceptual biases, in order to understand the 
causal path from auditory perceptual biases to anomalous self-experiences.  
 
As chapter 8 did not demonstrate an association between anomalous 
experiences/delusional beliefs with metacognitive efficiency, this may suggest a more 
complex relationship which may vary across the course of recovery or psychotic illness 
trajectory. Future studies should aim to assess the presence of these relationships across 
groups of individuals with varying symptomatology. As it is evident that anomalous 
experiences demonstrate fluctuations across time and within daily life (Reininghaus et 
al., 2016), future research could investigate the fluctuations in anomalous experiences, 
perceptual biases and metacognitive efficiency through the use of Experience Sampling 
Method or Ecological Momentary Assessment. These two streams of research may 
highlight specific relationships during different stages of the illness or during time at 
which anomalous experiences are frequently present. This research could then later lead 
to personalised or tailored interventions, depending on the stage of illness and the most 
prominent difficulty.  
 
9.3 Limitations 
 
9.3.1 Terms used  
 
There are debates within the metacognitive literature about the terms used and the 
structure of the metacognitive model. This thesis has focused on Nelson and Narens 
(1990) model to provide a foundation to the metacognitive components. However, other 
metacognitive models exist, including Morrison (2011); Wells and Matthews (1996) S-
REF model; or cognitive literature which has solely focused on metacognitive 
sensitivity/efficiency (Fleming & Lau, 2014). The different models label metacognitive 
components in different ways. To overcome this, this thesis attempted to use consistent 
terms that had been used within earlier metacognitive models to explore various 
metacognitive components and their relationship.   
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9.3.1 Participants 
 
Within chapter 3, 4, 5 and 8 all FEP participants had been within Early Intervention 
Services for at least 3 months before entry into the study. All participants received a 
diagnosis of F29 at entry to the study. For the majority of participants, the study was the 
first entry-point and for a minority, (26 participants), this study was at a later time-point 
as they formed part of a Psychosis Cohort Study (Davies, Fowler & Greenwood, 2017). 
As a result, this was a heterogeneous group. Within chapter 3 and 4, the individuals with 
FEP were engaged in significantly fewer hours of structured activity per week and 
reduced functional capacity skills, compared to the matched control group. However, this 
FEP sample were engaged in more hours than a typical FEP sample (Hodgekins et al., 
2015), and scored higher on subjective recovery measure (Questionnaire of Process of 
Recovery), compared to previous studies in schizophrenia samples (Neil et al., 2009) and 
there was no difference in IQ between the groups. From this, the FEP sample in this study 
may have been further along in their recovery, supported by the relatively low symptoms 
on PANSS compared to other studies (Leucht et al., 2005; Fitzgerald et al. 2004; McLeod 
et al., 2014). Chapter 8 highlighted the possible role of medication or psychological 
therapy, which may also have contributed to the lack of association with metacognition 
in chapter 8, compared to early studies (Gaweda et al., 2013; Gawęda et al., 2018). From 
this, caution should be taken when comparing the results to a group of individuals with 
FEP who are acutely unwell or experiencing high levels of psychotic symptoms.  
 
This may represent a wider research issue; individuals who are less symptomatic are more 
willing to engage in research than those who are less well; or those who are less well are 
less able to provide reliable responses within these research studies. Future studies could 
aim to accommodate for various difficulties or needs of the participants and aim to work 
closely with service users, continually throughout the research process, to engage service 
users of different abilities or experiences.  
 
9.3.2 Sample size  
 
All planned analyses were conducted with sufficient power. Contrary to our hypothesis, 
there were limited associations between the metacognitive variables despite sufficient 
power for these individual correlations, which meant that the final mediation model on 
which this last power calculation was based, was not conducted. Instead, the relationship 
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between the metacognitive variables were assessed using an adequately powered 
correlation analysis and their separate impact on functioning was assessed.   
 
It is important to consider that the lack of significant interaction between the 
metacognitive components may also be due to lack of power. This may have reduced the 
ability to detect weaker relationships. A factor analysis was conducted in chapter 3 with 
135 participants. This sample size may be considered appropriate, following MacCallum 
et al. (2001). Future studies could aim to replicate this study within a larger sample in 
healthy controls, following a 20:1 suggestion from MacCallum for factor analyses with 
low communalities.  
 
The sample size for the follow-up stage chapter 4 was small (26 participants). This limited 
power and it was not possible to explore the full impact of negative symptoms in this 
model. Finally, chapter 5 sample size was small for the binary variables. The Monte Carlo 
method suggests that a larger sample than the current study is needed for sufficient power 
in complex mediation models (Thoemmes, MacKinnon, & Reiser, 2010), hence the use 
of single mediation models. Future studies should aim to replicate findings in a 
sufficiently powered multiple mediation model. 
 
9.3.3 Omitted variables 
 
Substance use has been previously associated with employment outcomes in Severe 
Mental Illness (SMI) (McGurk et al., 2009; Richardson & Stephen, 2017) and, whilst 
chapters 3, 4, 5 and 8 excluded individuals who had a diagnosis of substance misuse 
disorder, use of substances in SMI is high (Dharmawardene & Menkes, 2015; 
RachBeisel, Scott, & Dixon, 1999) and under-reported (Bahorik, Newhill, Queen, & 
Eack, 2014). Due to the high proportion of individuals using substances; potentially as 
self-medication (Addington & Duchak, 1997; Khantzian, 1997; Margolese, Malchy, 
Negrete, Tempier, & Gill, 2004), we aimed to exclude individuals with substance-induced 
psychosis, and initially, we attempted to also exclude individuals with ‘regular’ substance 
misuse. However, after a review of the literature and the various methods to assess 
substance use, it was apparent that operationalising ‘regular’ substance use was difficult. 
Therefore, we had those with a diagnosis of substance misuse disorder as an exclusion 
criterion. During recruitment, staff within Early Intervention Services noted that 
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individuals within the service commonly use substances but are rarely given the formal 
diagnosis of substance misuse disorder. Future research should aim to replicate this study 
whilst using more rigorous controls for substance use or using this as a covariate or 
moderating variable.  
 
9.3.4 Self-report measurement 
 
Functioning measures 
The Time-Use Survey (Short, 2003, 2006) is an appropriate, valid and reliable measure 
of functional outcome in psychosis which captures functioning in an objective manner. 
However, this measure does rely on memory over a certain time period (one month 
preceding the study). This may be an issue for individuals who experience psychosis, who 
may experience memory difficulties; a common cognitive difficulty in schizophrenia 
(Aleman, Hijman, de Haan, & Kahn, 1999; Fioravanti, Carlone, Vitale, Cinti, & Clare, 
2005; Forbes, Carrick, McIntosh, & Lawrie, 2009). However, this measure has been used 
within many cross-sectional studies within different FEP groups (Davies et al., 2017; 
Hodgekins, Birchwood, et al., 2015b; Hodgekins, French, et al., 2015) and clinical trials 
(Fowler et al., 2009). Future studies should continue to make use of apparatus such as 
diaries, calendars or prior notice for those who struggle with cognitive difficulties. 
 
The UPSA was a useful measure of real-life functional capacity. However, this measure 
requires some level of abstract thought processes, e.g. imagine you are getting the bus, 
which can introduce difficulties within the scoring which may not be present in real life. 
UPSA measure, in parts, may reflect cognitive difficulties in abstract thinking (Harrow, 
Adler, & Hanf, 1974), which have been linked to functioning (Lysaker, Bryson, Davis, 
& Bell, 2005), rather than difficulties in applying the cognitive skill to everyday life. 
Difficulty in abstract thinking may be particularly prominent for those with autistic 
spectrum disorder (Solomon, Buaminger, & Rogers, 2011); commonly comorbid with 
psychosis (Konstantareas & Hewitt, 2001; Stahlberg, Soderstrom, Rastam, & Gillberg, 
2004). Future studies should aim to separate these diagnoses or explore different capacity 
measures.  
 
Metacognition measures 
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The Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (BCIS) used within chapter 3, and investigated within 
the literature review, aimed to capture self-reflectiveness; objectivity and openness to 
feedback. However, due to the state-like nature of the concepts asked within the 
questionnaire and the stage of recovery within the FEP group, it is unclear whether 
participants should rate past thinking (which may be subject to biases and appraisals) or 
current thinking. This was particularly difficult for individuals who were engaged in the 
study as part of the follow-up study, as they noted the experiences in the past were 
frequent, but they are infrequent now. Therefore, changes and variation over the illness 
impacted the way people reflected and responded. Finally, most importantly, questions 
could be raised as to whether it is appropriate to ask someone to reflect and rate their own 
metacognitive ability; a complex and comprehensive ability, using a questionnaire.  
 
Anomalous experiences 
The potential issue with regard to the trajectory of illness and self-reported behaviours or 
experiences are also applicable for the Schizotypal Symptom Inventory (SSI). This scale 
was originally developed to assess the levels of sub-threshold psychotic symptoms in the 
recovery phase (Hodgekins et al., 2012). However, despite being valid for healthy 
controls, this scale may be interpreted differently for those with an experience of 
psychosis (regardless of stage of illness), in comparison to individual who have not 
experienced difficulties with their mental health. For example, for an individual with a 
previous history of experiencing telepathy, the question: “Do you believe in telepathy?” 
may be rated at the lower end of the scale if they are now better able to reflect on their 
past experiences, identify this may have been linked to their mental health, and 
acknowledge that this belief is inconsistent with their current belief system. However, for 
an individual who has not experienced clinical levels of anomalous experiences/beliefs, 
may rate higher than the FEP group, if they have believed this throughout anytime in their 
life. Therefore, it appears that for the two groups there were different thresholds of 
reporting the experience and therefore this could have influenced the reporting. Future 
studies or questionnaire developments may benefit from providing a timescale to capture 
experiences, e.g. within the last 6 months, which provides a more current view of 
experiences or more informative anchors to encourage all to rate according to the same 
criteria.  
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Anomalous self-experiences 
In terms of anomalous self-experiences, these experiences may be underreported due to 
shame, and fear of stigma, particularly for young people with emerging mental health 
difficulties (Nelson, Fusar-Poli, & Yung, 2012). Alternatively, Henriksson & Parnas 
(2014) suggested that the anomalous self-experiences have been present for so long in the 
psychosis group that they are inherent to the person’s identity, a “trait-like feature” 
(p.546), which means that anomalous self-disturbance may be unreported and under-
researched. Associated with this, it may be suggested that anomalous self-experiences are 
dampened and therefore less noticeable to the individual. Whilst Cambridge 
Depersonalisation Scale (CDS) was appropriate, valid and reliable for assessing 
anomalous self-experiences in both clinical and non-clinical groups (see Sierra & Berrios, 
2000; Perona-Garcelán et al., 2011; Perona-Garcelán et al., 2012), studies have detailed 
interviews conducted by trained intervewers to detect subtle differences or experiences. 
For example, Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience (EASE (Parnas et al., 2005; 
Sass et al., 2013). This is a symptom checklist using a semi-structured exploration of 
experiential anomalies of self-awareness. This may overcome the difficulties with self-
report measures and could be considered for future studies.  
 
9.4 Conclusion 
 
Findings presented in this thesis build on understanding of functional outcome and 
subjective recovery outcome and the role of metacognitive ability. Results lend support 
to current metacognitive literature suggesting the role of metacognitive ability on 
functioning and that metacognition is a multi-faceted phenomenon. In particular, contrary 
to hypothesis, metacognitive components are not related within a hierarchy and the 
dissociation between impaired metacognitive ability and control processes, compared to 
intact intermediate metacognitive experience, efficiency and monitoring processes in 
psychosis. It is the former, metacognitive ability, which has the largest impact on real-
world functioning. Findings additionally suggest roles for self-defining memories, 
neurocognition and negative symptoms as additional predictors of functioning. These 
findings encourage a greater focus of interventions on targeting metacognition, 
particularly metacognitive ability and self-defining memories, to reduce functional 
disability and improve subjective recovery in FEP. Evidence also was obtained for the 
role of perceptual biases on anomalous self-experiences, which may be proposed as an 
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underlying, subconscious causal vulnerability which may later lead to anomalous 
perceptual experiences or delusional beliefs. 
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11. Appendices 
 
11.1 Appendix A: Supplementary material for Chapter 3 
 
Supplement A 
Table 1: Exploratory factor loadings for MAI (one factor) 
Item MAI factor 
(factor 1) 
MAI: Monitoring  .79 
MAI: Differentiation .81 
MAI: Integration .85 
MAI: Decentralization .8 
 
 
Figure 1: Scree plot for EFA for MAI.  
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Supplement B 
 
Table 2: Exploratory factor loadings for BCIS (SR) (one factor) 
Item BCIS (factor 
1) 
BCIS (SR) 1: At times, I have misunderstood other people’s 
attitudes towards me 
-.39 
BCIS (SR) 2: Other people can understand the cause of my 
unusual experiences better than I can 
-.33 
BCIS (SR) 3: I have jumped to conclusions too fast -.36 
BCIS (SR) 4: Some of my experiences that have seemed very 
real may have been due to my imagination 
-.74 
BCIS (SR) 5: Some of the ideas I was certain were true turned 
out to be false 
-.79 
BCIS (SR) 6: Even though I feel strongly that I am right, I 
could be wrong 
-.12 
BCIS (SR) 7: If somebody points out that my beliefs are 
wrong, I am willing to consider it 
-.06 
BCIS (SR) 8: There is often more than one possible 
explanation for why people act the way they do 
.09 
BCIS (SR) 9: My unusual experiences may be due to my being 
extremely upset or stressed 
-.41 
 
Figure 2: Scree plot for EFA for BCIS-9 
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Supplement C 
Table 3: Exploratory factor loadings for BCIS (SR-6) (one factor) 
Item BCIS (factor 
1) 
BCIS (SR-6) 1: At times, I have misunderstood other people’s 
attitudes towards me 
.39 
BCIS (SR-6) 2: Other people can understand the cause of my 
unusual experiences better than I can 
.33 
BCIS (SR-6) 3: I have jumped to conclusions too fast .37 
BCIS (SR-6) 4: Some of my experiences that have seemed 
very real may have been due to my imagination 
.74 
BCIS (SR-6) 5: Some of the ideas I was certain were true 
turned out to be false 
.79 
BCIS (SR-6) 9: My unusual experiences may be due to my 
being extremely upset or stressed 
.41 
 
Figure 3: Scree plot for EFA for BCIS (SR-6) (6 items) 
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Supplement D 
 
Figure 4: Scree plot for EFA for metacognitive variables. 
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11.2 Appendix B: Supplementary material from Chapter 4 
 
Supplement A 
 
Table 1: Correlation matrix for neurocognition, metacognition, symptoms, functional capacity and functional outcome at baseline and 
follow-up.  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Neurocognitive 
factor (baseline) 1 
-             
Metacognition 
(baseline) 2 
.61** -            
Positive symptoms 
(baseline) 3 
-.22  -.15 -           
Negative symptoms 
(baseline) 4 
.43** -.64** .17 -          
General 
psychopathology 
symptoms 
(baseline) 5 
-.22  -.39** .59** .52** -         
UPSA (baseline) 6 .48** .53** -.09 -.44** -.15 -        
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Time-use (baseline 
)7 
.48** .84** -.1 -.49** -.27* .39** -       
Metacognition 
(follow-up) 8 
.66** .64** -.33 -.56** -.33 .66* .4* -      
Positive symptoms 
(follow-up) 9 
-.32 -.36  -.39  .28 .17 -.31 -.29 -.59** -     
Negative symptoms 
(follow-up) 10 
-.54** -.46* .3 .51* .13 -.46* -.34 -.55** .71** -    
General 
psychopathology 
symptoms (follow-
up) 11 
-.28 -.44* .38 .23 .26 -.34 -.47* -.31  .75** .67** -   
UPSA (follow-up) 
12 
.71** .63** -.29 -.42* -.31 .74** .3 .49** -.29 -.48* -.24 -  
Time-use (follow-
up) 13 
.29 .82** .02 -.41* -.23 .54** .74** .42* -.37* -.46* .47** .5** - 
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Supplement B 
Figure 1: Bar chart for distribution of months between baseline and three years for full 
sample.  
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Supplement C 
Figure 2: Bar chart for distribution of baseline metacognitive ability for the follow-up 
sample.  
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11.3 Appendix C: Supplementary material for Chapter 5 
 
Supplement A 
Details of coding self-defining memory: The first self-defining memory was 
additionally coded using the variables below: 
• Age during event 
• Specificity: A binary variable coding non-specific (0) or specific (1) 
• Integration: A binary variable coding not integrated (0) or integrated (1)  
• Content type: We used the Manual for Coding Events in Self-Defining 
Memories95. This has been used in previous studies within schizophrenia research 
(Raffard et al., 2009) which scores the SDM into one of seven categories, but 
also including two additional categories: “hospitalization/stigmatization of 
illness” and “failure” relevant to people with psychosis. The categories included:  
o Recreation/Exploration (including spiritual moments);  
o Relationships (involving interpersonal investment, conflict or non-
conflict);  
o Achievement/mastery (effort towards goals or skills);  
o Guilt/Shame (over doing something wrong);  
o Drug, alcohol, and tobacco use (for recreation or self-harm);  
o Life-threatening/ death (perceived as such to self or others at the time of 
the event); 
o Hospitalization/Stigma (specifically mental health illness experience and 
stigma); 
o Failure (and negative self-perception including in a social construct); 
o Event unclassifiable (rare, not fitting any of the above categories) 
 
Content valence: A binary variable as negative (0) or positive (1)  
Content valence was added as a measure specifically to identify the impact of a positive 
or negative content on an individual’s real-world functioning. Positive or negative 
valence was decided using a similar decision making process as for content type within 
the Manual for Coding Events in Self-Defining Memories.
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Supplement B 
 
Figure 1: Clustered bar graph demonstrating percentage of type of events reported 
which are divided into positive or negative content of self-defining memories for First 
Episode Psychosis and healthy control sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	
308	
 
11.4 Appendix D: Supplementary material for Chapter 6  
 
Quality Assessment Tool for Observational Cohort and Cross-Sectional Studies table 
(U.S. Department of Health & Human Services. n.d.) 
 
 
 
 
Criteria Yes No Other 
(NA/NR/CD) 
Was the research question or objective in this paper 
clearly stated? 
   
Was the study population clearly specified and defined?    
Was the participation rate of eligible persons at least 
50%? 
   
Were all the subjects selected or recruited from the same 
or similar populations? Were inclusions and exclusion 
criteria for being in the study prespecified and applied 
uniformly to all participants? 
   
Was a sample size justification, power description, or 
variance and effect estimates provided? 
   
For the analyses in this paper, were the exposures of 
interest measured prior to the outcomes being 
measured?  
   
Was the time frame sufficient so that one could 
reasonably expect to see an association between 
exposure and outcome if it existed? 
   
For exposures that can vary in amount of level, did the 
study examine different levels of the exposure as related 
to the outcome? (e.g. categories of exposure, or 
exposure measured as continuous variable)? 
   
Were the exposure measures (independent variables) 
clearly defined, valid, reliable and implemented 
consistently across all study participants? 
   
Was the exposure assess more than once over time?    
Were the outcome measures (dependent variables) 
clearly defined, valid, reliable, and implemented 
consistently across all study participants? 
   
Were the outcome assessors blinded to the exposure 
status of participants? 
   
Was loss to follow-up after baseline 20% or less?    
Were key potential confounding variables measured and 
adjusted statistically for their impact on the relationship 
between exposure and outcome(s)?  
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11.5 Appendix E: Supplementary material for Chapter 8 
	
Twenty-four people (9 FEP and 15 controls) had a perfect score on absent trials, 
implying an infinite d’. Following current research (Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) we 
converted proportions of 0 and 1 to 1/(2N) and 1-1/(2/N), respectively, where N is the 
number of trials on which the proportion is based. This strategy was used to correct the 
infinity scores for further calculation. 
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11.6 Appendix F: NHS HRA Research Ethics Committee (REC) approval for 
Chapters 3, 4, 5 & 8 
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11.7 Appendix G: Sussex Partnership NHS Foundation Trust (SPFT) 
governance approval Chapters 3, 4, 5 & 8 
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11.8 Appendix H: Research Ethics Committee (REC) approval for Chapter 4 
(baseline) and Chapter 5 
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11.9 Appendix I: Sussex Ethics for Chapter 7 
 
 
